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Thesis abstract 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of hearing a voice in the 
absence of any speaker. Cognitive models of AVHs have suggested that they may 
occur when an internal mental event, such as inner speech, is misattributed to an 
external source. This has variously been explained by reference to biases in self-
monitoring, source monitoring, or reality discrimination processes. Evidence 
suggests that, mechanistically, this may be related to atypical functioning of a 
forward model system which usually predicts the outcome of self-generated actions, 
attenuating activity in sensory cortices to the resulting perceptual input. At a higher 
level, excessive vividness and low cognitive effort associated with internal mental 
events may be associated with external misattributions of inner speech. Chapter 1 
reviews inner speech models of AVH, as well as recent attempts to reduce the 
frequency of AVHs using neurostimulation. Chapter 2 then provides a 
methodological overview of techniques used in this thesis. 
The first two empirical studies presented in this thesis, in Chapters 3 and 4, explore 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying AVHs by investigating the associations 
between self-reported hallucination-proneness and phenomenology of inner speech, 
and performance on source monitoring and self-monitoring tasks, in a non-clinical, 
student sample. The results indicated that hallucination-prone participants were more 
likely to misattribute self-generated auditory verbal imagery, both when instructed to 
generate imagery and when they retrospectively reported using imagery. Regression 
analysis also indicated that a tendency to use dialogic inner speech, biased 
performance on reality discrimination and self-monitoring tasks, and a tendency to 
perceive meaning in jumbled speech independently predicted hallucination-
proneness.  
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The studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 investigated the neural basis of 
performance on auditory signal detection and source monitoring tasks using 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Results indicated that modulating 
activity in the superior temporal gyrus/temporoparietal junction (STG/TPJ) affected 
the number of false perceptions on the signal detection task. However, stimulation to 
the left STG or medial prefrontal cortex did not affect performance on a source 
monitoring task. These results indicate that different cortical regions may be 
involved in the two tasks, and hence that they may reflect different aspects of how 
self-generated actions are experienced as such. Together, the four experimental 
chapters 1) provide evidence for inner speech accounts of AVH, 2) indicate the need 
for a more complex account of self-monitoring and reality discrimination in which 
both are seen as independent predictors of AVHs, and 3) suggest that the left STG 
plays a key role in reality discrimination, but less so in source monitoring tasks (at 
least in the encoding stage). The thesis concludes with a general discussion of these 
issues, and recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Auditory verbal hallucinations as atypical inner speech monitoring, and the 
potential of neurostimulation as a treatment option 
Abstract 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of hearing voices in the 
absence of any speaker, often associated with a schizophrenia diagnosis. Prominent 
cognitive models of AVHs suggest they may be the result of inner speech being 
misattributed to an external or non-self source, due to atypical self- or reality 
monitoring. These arguments are supported by studies showing that people 
experiencing AVHs often show an externalising bias during monitoring tasks, and 
neuroimaging evidence which implicates superior temporal brain regions, both 
during AVHs and during tasks that measure verbal self-monitoring performance. 
Recently, efficacy of noninvasive neurostimulation techniques as a treatment option 
for AVHs has been tested. Meta-analyses show a moderate effect size in reduction of 
AVH frequency, but there has been little attempt to explain the therapeutic effect of 
neurostimulation in relation to existing cognitive models. This article reviews inner 
speech models of AVHs, and argues that a possible explanation for reduction in 
frequency following treatment may be modulation of activity in the brain regions 
involving the monitoring of inner speech.
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1. Introduction  
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the phenomenon of hearing voices in the 
absence of any speaker, and are experienced by around 60-80% of people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia (Sartorius et al., 1986). Some studies also report that they are 
experienced by between 1.5% and 3% of the general population (Tien, 1991), 
highlighting that the experience is not always pathological, though estimates greatly 
vary between sources on this matter (Beavan, Read, & Cartwright, 2011). Despite 
the prevalence of this experience, surprisingly little is known about the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms underlying AVHs, and they may be refractory to current 
treatment options in around 25% of cases (Shergill, Murray, & McGuire, 1998).  
A recent review by Sommer et al. (2012) suggested that antipsychotic medication 
such as olanzapine, amisulpride, ziprasidone or quetiapine may be the most 
efficacious treatment option for AVHs in schizophrenia, while clozapine should only 
be used in the event that these are unsuccessful. Anti-psychotic medication tends to 
block D2-receptors in the brain, leading to hypotheses emphasizing the importance of 
dopamine pathways in the creation of psychotic experiences (Carlsson, 1978; Farde, 
1997). However, it is well known that antipsychotic medication often causes 
undesirable side effects, such as weight gain and sedation (Buchanan et al., 2010). 
Therefore, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is often used, either as an adjunctive 
or as an alternative treatment. The aim of CBT is to change the appraisal of the 
hallucination, in a collaborative effort between the patient and therapist; the patient 
is encouraged to take an active part in the therapy, for example, by examining 
evidence for and against distressing beliefs, and testing explanations for unusual 
experiences in real world situations (Jones, Hacker, Cormac, Meaden, & Irvine, 
2012). One meta-analysis reported an effect size of 0.4 for a reduction in positive 
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symptoms of schizophrenia (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008), although this 
does not tell us specifically about CBT’s efficacy in treating AVHs. These studies 
are also confounded by whether the patients included were taking anti-psychotic 
medication at the time of therapy; it is difficult to know whether any effects were 
due to the use of CBT alone. 
The search for new treatment options for AVHs has led to the testing of the efficacy 
of noninvasive neurostimulation techniques in the treatment of AVHs. Although 
results have not been conclusive, repetitive pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(rTMS) was recently labelled as “potentially useful” in a summary of available 
treatment options (Sommer et al., 2012, p. 7), and recent research has used 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), with promising results (Brunelin et al., 
2012). Additionally, neurostimulation techniques, if indeed efficacious, have the 
potential to tell us much about the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
AVHs, by targeting specific brain regions thought to be involved in the experience 
(although it also affects brain regions other than those directly underneath the 
stimulating coil or electrode; e.g., Kindler et al., 2013). There has so far been little 
attempt to explain the therapeutic effects of neurostimulation (if not a placebo effect) 
in relation to pre-existing cognitive or neuroscientific models of AVHs. 
The most popular cognitive theory of AVHs is arguably that many are the result of 
internal cognitive events, such as inner speech, being misattributed to an external or 
alien source (Waters et al., 2012). Various models have suggested that this could be 
due to a specific deficit in the monitoring of one’s own actions, known as self-
monitoring (Frith, 1992), and/or due to a bias towards labelling internal mental 
events as externally produced under conditions of ambiguity, known as a bias in 
reality monitoring (Bentall & Slade, 1985). Evidence from neuroimaging suggests 
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that monitoring of one’s own speech, overt or covert, is related to activity in auditory 
cortical regions such as the lateral temporal lobe, including the superior temporal 
gyri (STG), a brain area that includes both primary and secondary auditory cortices 
(Allen et al., 2007; McGuire, Silbersweig, & Frith, 1996). This corresponds well to 
‘symptom-capture’ studies of AVHs, in which similar areas are often implicated 
(Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 2008). rTMS treatment is usually targeted at the 
left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), an area adjacent to, and with high levels of 
connectivity to, primary and secondary auditory cortex (Kindler et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is possible that neurostimulation treatment affects brain regions 
involved in verbal self- or reality monitoring.  
This review will discuss models that implicate atypical monitoring of inner speech, 
as well as the evidence surrounding the efficacy of neurostimulation as a treatment 
for AVHs, and the possible cognitive and neural mechanisms behind the therapeutic 
effect.  
 
2. Auditory verbal hallucinations as the result of misattributed inner speech 
Prominent models of AVHs have suggested that the experiences arise when an 
internal mental event is misattributed to an external or non-self source. For example, 
Frith (1992) suggests that, if inner speech is not recognized as self-initiated, it may 
be experienced as an AVH. Many models have assumed that the raw material of 
AVHs is a kind of inner speech (Bentall, 2003; Fernyhough, 2004), although 
definitions of inner speech have varied, from simply “thinking in words” (McGuire 
et al., 1995, p. 596) to “the overlapping region of thought and speech” (Jones & 
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Fernyhough, 2007a, p. 148), the latter of which highlights that not all thought 
processes necessarily take place as inner speech. 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the raw material of AVHs is 
misattributed inner speech comes from studies that have used electromyography 
(EMG) to show subvocalization (tiny movements of the vocal musculature which 
occur during inner speech; Gould, 1948; Inouye & Shimizu, 1970; McGuigan, 1966) 
whilst patients experience AVHs. In one case, the subvocalizations were amplified 
into intelligible speech which corresponded well to the contents of the AVH (Green 
& Preston, 1981), and some AVHs have been shown to be less frequent when 
patients explicitly vocalized competing utterances, for example humming (Green & 
Kinsbourne, 1990). Further evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests that 
similar cortical areas are active during inner speech as during AVHs. For example, 
during auditory verbal imagery, Shergill et al. (2001) found activation in the left 
superior temporal gyrus (including Wernicke’s area) and the left inferior frontal 
gyrus (Broca’s area), as well as in the supplementary motor area (SMA) and insula. 
These findings concord fairly well with other inner speech functional neuroimaging 
studies (Friedman et al., 1998; McGuire et al., 1996). Raij & Riekki (2012) showed 
that the main difference between neural activation during AVHs and during 
imagining speech was that AVHs showed less activation in the SMA, otherwise 
implying that similar areas were recruited for imagining speech and AVHs. The 
functional localisation of inner speech has also been studied using single pulse TMS: 
Aziz-Zadeh, Cattaneo, Rochat and Rizzolatti (2005) were able to induce ‘covert 
speech arrest’ by stimulating either motor or non-motor language areas in the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) in the left hemisphere, but not right hemispheric non-motor 
language areas.  
19 
 
In contrast, however, some have argued that left hemisphere language sites are not 
integral to the experience of AVHs. An fMRI study using a sample of 24 
hallucinating patients concluded that the right homologue of Broca’s area (IFG) and 
the right superior temporal gyrus, as well as the bilateral insula and anterior cingulate 
gyri, were most active during AVHs (Sommer et al., 2008). Vercammen, 
Knegtering, den Boer, Liemburg, & Aleman (2010) have also shown that functional 
connectivity of the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) with the right homologue of 
Broca’s area is reduced in patients who reported AVHs. These findings may be 
interpreted as discordant with the inner speech theory of AVHs, especially in light of 
Aziz-Zadeh et al.’s findings, which indicate that non-motor language areas in the 
right hemisphere are not causally involved in the production of inner speech. 
However, there are a number of possible explanations for right hemisphere 
involvement in AVHs. Vercammen et al. argue that inner speech generated by the 
right hemisphere may consist of short sentences, with negative or derogatory 
content, which seems to fit with phenomenological accounts of AVHs. It may simply 
be that the type of inner speech elicited by Aziz-Zadeh et al. did not recruit right 
hemisphere language areas. Alternatively, right-sided language areas could be 
involved in the contextualisation of AVHs (influencing emotional valence and 
attentional salience, for example). This suggestion would fit with findings that 
implicate right hemispheric activation in emotional prosody comprehension (Alba-
Ferrara, Ellison, & Mitchell, 2012; Alba-Ferrara, Fernyhough, Weis, Mitchell, & 
Hausmann, 2012). Superior temporal regions of the right hemisphere are also 
important in processing aspects of speech such as pitch (Lattner, Meyer, & 
Friederici, 2005).  
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Alternatively, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been implicated in theory 
of mind tasks (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; Young, 
Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010) and it has also been argued that the inferior parietal 
lobule (immediately adjacent to Wernicke’s area and its right homologue), 
particularly on the right side, is important for feelings of self-agency (Jardri et al., 
2007), leaving open the possibility that right-sided activation in AVHs is a result of 
the utilisation of some form of perspective taking mechanism (a possibility returned 
to later in this section). Inconsistent neuroimaging findings in relation to the 
lateralisation of AVHs may reflect the varying phenomenology of the experience, 
and it is likely that not all AVHs can be linked to inner speech (Jones, 2010). 
Hoffman, Fernandez, Pittman & Hampson (2011) have argued that a better model to 
explain AVHs involves the surfacing of ‘unbidden thoughts’ into consciousness, 
through a hyperconnected corticostriatal loop involving Wernicke’s area and its right 
homologue, the left inferior frontal gyrus, and the putamen bilaterally. This model 
also specifies that a possible reason for the experience of AVHs as another person’s 
voice is linked to the activation of right-sided temporal areas. Although different in 
its details, this model is not incompatible with the typical view of inner speech as the 
raw material of AVHs, additionally emphasizing the importance of subcortical 
structures such as the putamen in conscious experience. The putamen is crucial in the 
initiation of language representations (Price, 2010), and Hoffman et al. argue that 
hyperconnectivity of the putamen with temporal and frontal areas represents an 
overabundance of language representations reaching temporal cortices. It is not 
immediately clear, though, why these language representations might be experienced 
as hallucinatory and as external to the self. If anything, the differences between the 
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unbidden thoughts model and inner speech models emphasize the need for a better 
understanding of the phenomenology of what we are referring to as ‘inner speech’. 
It may be that the differential findings of inner speech and AVH neuroimaging 
studies are in fact due to the type of task used to elicit inner speech. For example, 
many of the aforementioned studies have simply asked participants to repeat cued 
sentences in their heads, whilst Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2005) inferred covert speech arrest 
by observing an increase in reaction time in a syllable counting task. Although these 
tasks undoubtedly elicit some form of inner speech, their validity in relation to the 
kinds of inner speech that we experience in real life, or that may be related to the 
experience of AVHs, may be tenuous. For example, these forms of elicited inner 
speech may lack spontaneity and the phenomenal experience of an inner dialogue 
(see below). Future inner speech neuroimaging studies would therefore do well to 
utilize tasks that may elicit more realistic inner speech, as discussed in Section 6.  
Inner speech theories of AVHs, though, have been criticized for not explaining the 
phenomenological aspects of AVHs. For example, AVHs are usually experienced as 
non-self generated and usually (but not always) located in external space. 
Furthermore, most hallucinations take the form of another person’s voice, often 
giving commands or commenting on actions of the person, and usually being 
experienced as ‘alien’ to the self (Nayani & David, 1996). This does not seem to 
correspond to what most would associate with ‘thinking in words’, and the negative 
and often derogatory content of AVHs would also seem to contrast with this idea. 
One study reported no phenomenological difference between the inner speech of 
hallucinating patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and a control group of 
participants who did not hear voices (Langdon, Jones, Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 
2009), whereas one might expect to find differences in, for example, the tendency to 
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represent others in inner speech (although, interestingly, the two questionnaire items 
which approached a significant effect were related to experiencing inner speech as a 
dialogic exchange). Also, an early neuroimaging study found no difference in brain 
activation between hallucinating patients and healthy controls during inner speech 
(McGuire, et al., 1995).  
Fernyhough (1996, 2004) has argued that inner speech is fundamentally dialogic in 
nature, or ‘shot through’ with other voices. This is a logical extension of Vygotsky’s 
(1934/1987) argument that inner speech is the result of the internalisation of external 
dialogues during psychological development. If true, it follows from Vygotsky’s 
ideas that typical inner speech may consist of a dialogue, often including voices 
other than the person’s own. One aspect of inner speech that has been shown to 
differ between hallucination-prone and non-hallucination prone healthy individuals 
is in fact self-reported propensity to use dialogic inner speech (McCarthy-Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2011), and the inner speech neuroimaging study by McGuire et al. did 
find differential activation between hallucinating patients and controls when 
participants were asked to imagine someone else’s voice. This would seem to 
explain why most AVHs are experienced as a voice other than the person’s own 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996): the atypical component of 
AVHs is not that they are experienced as someone else’s voice, but instead that they 
are experienced as alien and/or external to the self (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a). As 
already mentioned, the observation of right hemispheric activity during AVHs may 
in fact reflect engagement of a type of perspective-taking mechanism, which would 
be integral to the dialogicality of inner speech. This is backed up by the involvement 
of right temporal lobe involvement in theory of mind tasks (Young, Camprodon, 
Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010). 
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It therefore seems that the inner speech model is a good fit for at least some types of 
AVHs, although further research to elicit a better proxy for inner speech, and 
research that studies the neural correlates of different phenomenological types of 
AVHs (and inner speech), is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.  
 
3. Why do people who hear voices experience inner speech as alien? 
If AVHs are indeed the result of inner speech being misattributed to an external/non-
self source, it may follow that a mechanism that usually distinguishes between 
internally and externally produced stimuli is disrupted. This concept has variously 
been termed self-monitoring, source monitoring, or reality monitoring (Bentall, 
1990; Frith, 1992). These terms have often been used interchangeably in the 
literature, or simply grouped under the umbrella term ‘source monitoring’. In 
general, self-monitoring has tended to refer to the ability to monitor the planning and 
executing of actions (with inner speech being seen as a motor act), and has been 
associated with tasks requiring participants to monitor self-made actions or 
vocalisations (Frith, 1992). Meanwhile, source and reality monitoring have tended to 
be defined as the ability to distinguish between internal and external events, and have 
been associated with tasks requiring participants to recall whether a remembered 
item was produced by themselves or the experimenter (source memory) or signal 
detection tasks requiring participants to decide whether a voice is present in white 
noise or not (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Here, 
the terms will be used as described above, but the term ‘monitoring’ will also be 
used as an umbrella term to cover all of these concepts. (See Table 1.1 for a 
summary of cognitive tasks discussed in this review.) 
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Early self-monitoring studies measured schizophrenia patients’ ability to monitor 
their own actions by using a simple joystick task in which participants had to 
monitor errors without feedback (Frith & Done, 1989). It was shown that those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia were worse at this form of monitoring than healthy 
controls. Neuroimaging studies investigating self-monitoring of speech specifically 
implicated a network of brain areas, involving the lateral temporal cortex bilaterally 
(consistent with theories that implicate similar brain regions in monitoring both 
internally and externally produced speech), as well as left inferior frontal cortices 
and hippocampal formations (McGuire, Silbersweig, & Frith, 1996). Following from 
early self-monitoring studies, one prominent theory has suggested that an internal 
forward model is disrupted in those that experience AVHs. This theory explains the 
feeling of agency that accompanies motor actions by postulating a system that uses 
the predicted consequences of actions to label events as self- or other-generated. 
Importantly, this theory relies on inner speech being seen as a covert motor action 
(Jones & Fernyhough, 2007b), which is supported by the aforementioned 
subvocalization research. A forward model account of self-monitoring and AVHs 
argues that when a motor plan is first created, an ‘efference copy’ or ‘corollary 
discharge’ of the plan is sent to sensory areas to ‘warn’ them that the action is about 
to occur (Ford & Mathalon, 2005). If the planned action then occurs (and appropriate 
sensory information is received as reafference), the event is labelled as self-
generated (Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). 
Some models specify that the efference copy will dampen activity in the appropriate 
sensory area, to label the percept as self-generated (Ford & Mathalon, 2005; 
Whitford, Ford, Mathalon, Kubicki, & Shenton, 2010). Applied to AVHs, this would 
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mean that an efference copy of the inner speech motor act has not reached auditory 
cortical areas (i.e., Wernicke’s area, and the STG more generally). 
The forward model account of self-monitoring has received support from tasks that 
require participants to discriminate between distorted voices (lowered either 3 or 6 
semitones) that could be their own or someone else’s. Here, a voice is immediately 
fed back to them through headphones when participants speak, and they are required 
to respond whether they think the voice is their own or not (McGuire, Silbersweig, & 
Frith, 1996). Studies utilising this task have shown that patients with AVHs are 
worse at making the self/other judgement correctly (Johns et al., 2001). Evidence of 
a global self-monitoring deficit in schizophrenia also comes from studies which 
show that patients with AVHs do not show a difference between the tickle sensation 
evoked by others and by themselves, when both healthy controls and patients 
without AVHs do (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000). Interpreted 
in light of the forward model theory of AVHs, typical individuals may not be able to 
tickle themselves because the corresponding sensory cortical areas are dampened 
when the efference copy of the motor plan successfully reaches it, whereas this may 
not be the case in hallucinating patients. These findings can therefore be seen to 
support the idea of a disrupted forward model self-monitoring system in those 
experiencing AVHs.  
The neural instantiation of the efference copy has been postulated to be a dampened 
N1 event-related potential (ERP) during self-produced speech in comparison to 
other-produced speech in healthy controls, but not in patients with schizophrenia 
(Ford et al., 2001). Magnetoencephalography (MEG), the magnetic counterpart of 
EEG, indicates that the N1 ERP component originates in the STG (Krumbholz, 
Patterson, Seither-Preisler, Lammertmann, & Lütkenhöner, 2003). This finding 
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could reflect the failure of an efference copy to successfully dampen activity in 
sensory areas after self-produced speech, perhaps due to a delayed corollary 
discharge (Whitford, et al., 2010). This is supported by neuroimaging evidence 
suggesting that left superior temporal areas are more active during inner speech in 
those diagnosed with schizophrenia than healthy controls (Simons et al., 2010). 
Further EEG studies have shown that theta and gamma band coherence between 
frontal and temporal areas is impaired in patients with schizophrenia, implying that 
synchronous neural activity may be the neural substrate of the efference copy (Ford 
& Mathalon, 2005). Disrupted connectivity between frontal and temporal cortical 
areas has often been implicated in AVHs (Lawrie et al., 2002), and is possibly linked 
to structural alterations in white matter tracts such as the arcuate fasciculus (de 
Weijer et al., 2011). Self-monitoring studies have therefore provided evidence that 
hallucinating patients may experience inner speech as alien because of a failure of 
the efference copy system to dampen activity in auditory cortex and label it as self-
generated.  
It has, however, been argued that a deficit in self-monitoring as measured by some of 
the aforementioned tasks is not enough in itself to explain the misattribution to 
external sources that has been proposed to explain AVHs, and that there must be a 
specific bias towards labelling events as external (Allen et al., 2004). Therefore, 
tasks that attempt to measure participants’ bias towards locating events externally 
have been used with both hallucinating and non-hallucinating patients, as well as 
healthy controls. These reality monitoring tasks have been used to show a so-called 
‘externalising bias’. A response bias such as this would lead to a higher likelihood of 
stimuli of ambiguous source being attributed to an external source (Bentall, 1990). 
Early tasks utilized signal detection theory, in which hallucination-prone individuals, 
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hallucinating patients and healthy controls were asked to discriminate whether a 
voice was present in white noise, showed that the former two groups showed a 
response bias towards external misattributions (Bentall & Slade, 1985). More recent 
neuroimaging studies using auditory signal detection tasks have implicated, among 
other areas, the STG in the creation of false alarms (responding ‘yes’ when there is 
no voice present) (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, McKie, & Lewis, 2007), therefore 
showing overlapping regions of activation with neuroimaging studies of both inner 
speech and AVHs.  
A large body of research relating to reality monitoring has also accumulated looking 
at ‘source memory’ in people that experience AVHs. In these tasks, participants are 
generally required to distinguish between self-generated words, experimenter-
generated words, and words that have not appeared in the task before (see Waters, 
Woodward, Allen, Aleman & Sommer, 2012, for a recent review of self-recognition 
deficits). Findings typically indicate that hallucinating patients or hallucination-
prone participants are more likely to misattribute recalled items to the experimenter 
(Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991; Laroi, Van der Linden, & Marczewski, 2004), 
which has again been taken as evidence that AVHs are linked to an externalising 
bias. It has also been shown that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia who 
experience AVHs are more likely to recall an imagined word as spoken (Franck et 
al., 2000) or an imagined action as performed (Gawęda, Woodward, Moritz, & 
Kokoszka, 2013), compared to other patients and healthy controls. 
Distorted voice tasks have also been used to provide evidence for the existence of an 
externalising bias in those that experience AVHs. Allen et al. (2004) used a task in 
which, unlike the aforementioned verbal self-monitoring studies, the speech was pre-
recorded. The rationale underlying this alteration was that the task would no longer 
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measure immediate verbal self-monitoring ability, as participants were not 
generating the stimuli ‘online’. It was found that hallucinating patients were still 
more likely to make external misattributions. The authors argued that previous 
findings may not simply be due to a disrupted verbal self-monitoring system, but at 
least partly due to an externalising bias possibly due to disrupted top-down 
processing of auditory stimuli. A later neuroimaging study with the same paradigm 
showed that, in healthy controls and non-hallucinating patients with schizophrenia, 
the left superior temporal gyrus was generally active when other-produced speech 
was listened to whereas this was not the case when self-produced speech was 
listened to. These findings, however, did not apply to hallucinating patients, who did 
not show differential activity in this area between hearing their own or another’s 
voice (Allen et al., 2007). 
The tendency to make external misattributions may therefore be linked to additional, 
or alternative, mechanisms to the forward model system, because they were gained 
when participants were not engaged in any motor activity. Allen et al. (2007) suggest 
that this reflects conscious evaluation of the stimuli, perhaps involving the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), which has strong connectivity with the temporal cortex 
(Petrides & Pandya, 1988). Mechelli et al. (2007) have supported this hypothesis by 
demonstrating a lack of effective connectivity in patients with AVHs, between STG 
and ACC during other-produced speech. In addition, Vercammen, Knegtering, den 
Boer, Liemburg & Aleman (2010) have demonstrated atypical functional 
connectivity of the ACC with left TPJ in hallucinating patients, suggesting that this 
connectivity may be related to a ‘core control network’ which exhibits conscious 
control over experiences.
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Task Description Key findings Key references 
Error monitoring Participants are asked to monitor their own actions 
whilst moving a joystick. The proportion of errors 
corrected is the variable of interest, on the basis that 
an internal monitor is needed to correct errors made 
without feedback. 
Patients diagnosed with schizophrenia correct 
errors less often. (Not specific to AVHs.) 
Frith and Done (1989) 
Distorted voice Participants listen to recordings of their own voice, 
and another person’s voice. These recordings are 
sometimes distorted in pitch, and participants 
respond as to whether they think the voice belongs 
to them, or not. 
Patients with AVHs are more likely to 
incorrectly respond that a voice belongs to 
someone else. This finding holds whether the 
voice is instantly fed back whilst the 
participant talks, or if it is played back at a 
later point in time. 
Allen et al. (2004) 
Johns et al. (2001) 
McGuire, Silbersweig and Frith 
(1996) 
Self-experimenter word 
production (memory) 
Participants must recall whether a word was said by 
themselves or the experimenter. This task is 
‘offline’, in that it tests performance through 
memory of how an action was performed. 
Patients with AVHs are more likely to 
incorrectly attribute words as produced by the 
experimenter. 
Bentall, Baker and Havers (1991) 
Laroi, Van der Linden and 
Marczewski (2004) 
Say-imagine word 
production (memory) 
Participants must recall whether they said a word 
out loud, or imagined it. Alternatively, they may be 
asked to perform an action, or imagine performing 
it. This task is ‘offline’, in that it tests performance 
through memory of how an action was performed. 
Patients with AVHs are more likely to 
incorrectly recall saying a word out loud, or 
recall performing an action, as opposed to 
imagining it. 
Franck et al. (2000) 
Gawęda, Woodward, Moritz and 
Kokoszka (2013) 
White noise signal detection 
(SDT) 
Participants listen to bursts of white noise, and must 
respond, using a button press, whether they think a 
voice is present in the noise. 
Patients with AVHs, and hallucination-prone 
individuals, make more ‘false alarm’ responses 
(hearing voices in white noise that are not 
present). This seems to be due to a response 
bias, as opposed to a change in perceptual 
sensitivity. 
Barkus et al. (2007, 2011) 
Bentall and Slade (1985). 
Table 1.1: Summary of cognitive tasks associated with self-monitoring and reality monitoring, and their association to AVHs 
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Furthermore, the left planum temporale, an area within the left STG, has been shown 
to be involved specifically in the perception of externally located speech (Hunter et 
al., 2002), and posterior parts of the left STG are known to be involved in the spatial 
localisation of speech (Mathiak et al., 2007); this area has also recently been 
implicated in the experience of externally as opposed to internally experienced 
AVHs (Looijestijn et al., 2013). Interestingly, Mathalon, Sullivan, Lim and 
Pfefferbaum (2001) have shown that the STG diminishes in size over time in those 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, specifically related to positive symptoms in 
schizophrenia, although they do not report data relating to AVHs, and so it is not 
possible to tell whether this finding may be specific to AVHs. It has, however, been 
shown that over time AVHs are more likely to be experienced as internally located 
(Nayani & David, 1996), although evidence is so far lacking as to whether a 
correlation exists between this change in STG volume and the likelihood of 
experiencing AVHs as internal. This evidence, though, implicates left temporal 
language areas as important in labelling a percept as externally located, and it 
follows that over-activation of this area may therefore increase the likelihood that a 
percept will be incorrectly labelled as external. 
Temporal lobe regions, then, as well as being important in inner speech and often 
active during AVHs, have been implicated in both self-monitoring failures in tests of 
forward model theories and reality monitoring biases towards the external. This may 
imply that self-monitoring and reality monitoring tasks are to some extent measuring 
the same cognitive mechanism, although whether this is the ability to distinguish 
between the internal and external in space, or the ability to monitor self-generated 
actions and label them as self or non-self, is unknown, and is beyond the scope of 
this article. Returning to the discussion of neurostimulation as a treatment for AVHs: 
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neuroimaging findings relating to AVHs, inner speech, and self-/reality monitoring 
all point towards a key role for the left temporal lobe in the experience of AVHs 
(with differential findings regarding the right hemisphere). It is therefore possible 
that the success of the treatment may depend on its ability to modulate cortical areas 
involved in inner speech and self-/reality monitoring.  
 
4. Neurostimulation as a treatment for AVHs 
4.1.  Neurostimulation as a therapeutic technique 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a noninvasive brain stimulation 
technique in which a coil placed on the scalp uses a rapidly changing magnetic field 
to induce an electrical current in the cortex (Hallett, 2007; Walsh & Cowey, 2000). 
Pioneered by Barker, Freeston, Jalinous, Merton, and Morton (1985), TMS was at 
first used in single pulses, and can essentially introduce a focal area of neural noise 
in an area of cortex by activating neurons underlying the stimulating coil. Repetitive 
TMS (rTMS), in contrast, uses repeated pulses and can be applied in an event-related 
manner (to disrupt regions, synchronously with presented stimuli), to test whether a 
specific cortical area is necessary when completing a specific cognitive task (as, if 
the area is responding to the magnetic pulses, it cannot respond to the concurrent 
task demands). It is worth noting that secondary areas may also be affected by the 
introduction of neural noise due to connectivity, and that task effects may not be 
related to rTMS of the primary region but functionally connected, or indeed 
anatomically connected, regions (Komssi et al., 2002; Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 
2003). This factor is most prevalent when rTMS is utilized over longer time periods, 
in the absence of any task or stimuli, because it can have lasting after-effects of 
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excitation or inhibition of cortical areas both directly underneath the coil and trans-
synaptically (Hoffman & Cavus, 2002; Wassermann, Wedegaertner, Ziemann, 
George, & Chen, 1998). Results showing changes in excitation or inhibition in 
regions distal to the stimulating coil highlight that inferences regarding the role of 
specific brain areas in tasks need to be made cautiously, although this may be an 
advantage when attempting to modulate activity in widespread cortical networks 
(Pascual-Leone et al., 1998). 
Although TMS excites all neurons in the stimulated region with each pulse (both 
excitatory and inhibitory), it is important to distinguish between this and the 
excitation or inhibition of function that may follow. For example, low frequency (1 
Hz) rTMS can have lasting after-effects, which tends to cause a decrease in neuronal 
activity in the stimulated region, whereas higher frequencies (> 5 Hz) can cause 
lasting excitation (Maeda, Keenan, Tormos, Topka, & Pascual-Leone, 2000). The 
effects of TMS can also be modulated by underlying tissue type. For example, 
differences in anisotropy can affect the spatial distribution of the induced field, so 
although TMS is typically thought to largely affect grey matter, recent findings 
indicate that the morphology of underlying white matter tracts is also important (De 
Lucia, Parker, Embleton, Newton, & Walsh, 2007; Opitz et al., 2013). It has further 
been established that TMS can have state-dependent effects, and is thought to 
preferentially stimulate neurons that are less active (Silvanto, Muggleton, & Walsh, 
2008; Silvanto, Muggleton, Cowey, & Walsh, 2007) and can also have differential 
effects on cortical excitability depending on baseline levels. For example, Siebner et 
al. (2004) showed that if excitability was increased at baseline, then 1 Hz rTMS 
reduced excitability; however, if excitability was decreased at baseline, the same 
stimulation had the effect of increasing excitability. The mechanism through which 
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rTMS can produce lasting after-effects is still somewhat unclear, but may be due to 
long-term potentiation or long-term depression (LTP/LTD)-like effects, i.e., the 
observation that the strength of synapses between neurons can be altered if they 
repeatedly fire synchronously (Hoffman & Cavus, 2002). Since rTMS can have 
effects in regions distal to the stimulating coil, particularly when used to produce 
after-effects, it has the potential to affect neuronal networks thought to be involved 
in neurological and psychiatric conditions that may be a result of changes in 
connectivity between brain regions. 
Typically, studies applying rTMS to test its therapeutic potential stimulate for 
protracted periods of time (e.g., 15 minutes per day, for three weeks). The intensity 
of stimulation is determined for each participant separately, using the individual’s 
‘motor threshold’ (the intensity at which stimulation of motor cortex can elicit a 
hand movement); for example, treatment may be administered at 90% of each 
individual’s motor threshold. Perhaps most famously, the observation that under-
activation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex often coincides with clinical 
depression led to the use of high-frequency rTMS over this area, and there is 
evidence that it may be an effective treatment option (George et al., 2010; George et 
al., 1995). That said, some argue that the efficacy has often been exaggerated, and 
more studies may be needed to ensure that improvements are not simply a placebo 
effect (Miniussi et al., 2005; Ridding & Rothwell, 2007). The example of depression 
highlights difficulties in showing efficacy of rTMS as a valid treatment option, in 
that depression is a diverse diagnosis, and by definition is a subjective experience. 
This makes it hard to exclude placebo effects, especially since the control ‘sham’ 
condition usually used in rTMS studies has been criticized (Robertson, Théoret, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2003). These criticisms are equally valid when applied to using 
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rTMS to treat AVHs, and will be returned to below. Nevertheless, rTMS has now 
been approved for use in the treatment of depression by the Food and Drug 
Administration in the US (Connolly, Helmer, Cristancho, Cristancho, & O'Reardon, 
2012). 
An alternative neurostimulation technique is transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS). This can be used to selectively increase or decrease excitability of brain 
areas, as rTMS can. In tDCS, a weak electrical current is passed between two 
electrodes attached to the scalp. Current runs from an anodal electrode, under which 
the neurons’ membrane potentials are generally depolarized, to the cathodal 
electrode, under which they are generally hyperpolarized. This leads to increased 
neuronal excitability under the anode, and decreased excitability under the cathode 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, 2011). Importantly, effects of tDCS which outlast the 
stimulation period are often observed, probably due to longer term GABAergic and 
glutamatergic mechanisms (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), leading to studies into whether 
this technique could be used therapeutically for neurological and psychiatric 
disorders. One advantage of using tDCS over rTMS in an experimental setting is a 
more realistic sham condition. Active stimulation using tDCS leads to no more than 
a tingling or itching sensation underneath the electrodes, and participants tend to 
report that this sensation fades away after a short period of time. Therefore, sham 
tDCS attempts to mimic this by stimulating for only 30 seconds, and then gradually 
decreasing the stimulation intensity until the equipment is turned off. In this way, 
participants tend to be unaware that they are no longer receiving active stimulation 
(Gandiga, Hummel & Cohen, 2006; though see O’Connell et al., 2012). On top of 
this, tDCS is less expensive and easier to apply than rTMS, and can potentially be 
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used by patients at their own homes, with the clinician providing indirect support 
with a remote trigger (Brunoni et al., 2012).  
4.2. Can neurostimulation be used to treat AVHs? 
As discussed above, neuroimaging studies using positron emission tomography 
(PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown that AVHs 
are often accompanied by activation of the speech and language perception areas in 
the left hemisphere, in agreement with inner speech theories of AVHs (Allen et al., 
2012; Silbersweig et al., 1995), and research also suggests that patients with AVHs 
often show deficits in speech processing (Hoffman, Rapaport, Mazure, & Quinlan, 
1999). Therefore, initial studies tested the therapeutic effect of low-frequency (1 Hz) 
rTMS over left temporoparietal cortex (midway between the T3 and P3 electrodes 
using the EEG 10-20 system), at first tested on three patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (Hoffman et al., 1999), and later on a larger sample of 50 (Hoffman et 
al., 2005). Hallucinating patients received rTMS treatment for 9 consecutive days 
(excluding weekends). These initial studies indicated that rTMS may be effective as 
a treatment to reduce AVHs, as measured by the Auditory Hallucinations Rating 
Scale, a 7-item scale which assesses hallucination frequency, number of voices, 
volume, vividness, salience, length and distress caused. A large effect size of .94 was 
found in the 50 patient sample, reducing the frequency of AVHs. There was no 
improvement in other scores relating to positive or negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia, implying that the effects of stimulation are relatively specific to a 
reduction in AVHs. 
Recently, Hoffman et al. (2013) replicated their initial findings with a sample size of 
83, albeit it with reduced effect size of .65 for reduction in frequency of AVHs. This 
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effect size was increased to .74 when only patients with whom they could 
consistently detect a motor threshold were included. They also showed that 
stimulation of the right homologue of Wernicke’s area could lead to a reduction in 
frequency of AVHs, especially for those rated high in ‘attentional salience’ (“the 
degree to which hallucinations capture attention and alter ongoing thoughts and 
behaviour”, p. 2).  
Some studies, however, have failed to show the substantial improvement reported by 
Hoffman and colleagues. Notably, a relatively large randomized controlled trial (N = 
62) failed to find any significant advantage of active rTMS over sham stimulation, 
despite using fMRI and image-guided stereotaxy to localize the stimulation to the 
point of maximal activity during each patient’s AVHs (Slotema et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, meta-analyses with this finding taken into account still showed 
positive effects of rTMS with a moderate effect size of .38 (Slotema & Daskalakis, 
2012). 
Whether rTMS is effective at reducing frequency of hallucinations is confounded by 
the fact that most studies have used either medication- or therapy-resistant patients 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. It is difficult to speculate on whether rTMS would 
be more or less effective if tested on drug-naive individuals, or on patients without 
this diagnosis, but inter-individual variability in, for example, white matter volume, 
could change the distribution of current induced by stimulation, as previously 
mentioned. Many studies also do not report the specificity of the effects of 
neurostimulation – that is, whether there was a corresponding reduction in other 
positive symptoms. This information is crucial if conclusions are to be drawn 
relating to the underlying mechanisms of AVHs. Nevertheless, in Hoffman et al.’s 
(2005) study, it is reported that there was no significant change in the frequency of 
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other positive or negative symptoms, and so it seems likely that neurostimulation 
treatment operates solely on the symptom of AVHs.  
Additionally, it is possible that a publication bias has meant that negative findings 
with regard to efficacy are not publicly available; the effect sizes of published 
studies using rTMS to treat AVHs have tended to decrease with time, and so it is 
possible that some early negative findings were not published. Nevertheless, 
Slotema, Aleman, Daskalakis and Sommer (2012) conclude that there is little 
evidence of a publication bias, because there are examples in the literature of small, 
early studies with negative findings. Another major criticism, also made by Slotema 
et al., is that many studies have not achieved adequate statistical power: Hoffman et 
al.’s 50 patient sample, their recent 83 patient sample, and Slotema et al.’s recent 
negative finding being the exceptions. It is important that future studies aim to 
achieve higher statistical power to increase reliability. 
One possible reason for the variable findings of the therapeutic effects of rTMS on 
AVHs is the inadequacy of the sham condition in rTMS trials. Active rTMS trials 
elicit a loud clicking sound, with a characteristic tapping sensation on the scalp 
underneath the coil. This sensation is hard to mimic realistically – although sham 
coils do exist, they usually do not mimic anything more than the auditory aspect of 
receiving rTMS. Many studies, rather than utilising a sham coil, will tilt the active 
rTMS coil 45° or 90° from the scalp. In this way, both the sound and tactile 
sensation of rTMS are, to some extent, replicated. This method, though, leaves open 
questions about whether the stimulation may have some effect on underlying (or 
surrounding areas of) cortex. Indeed, Lisanby, Gutman, Luber, Schroeder, and 
Sackeim (2001) showed that, when the coil was tilted 45° from the scalp, the voltage 
induced in the cortex was approximately 33% of that induced in the ‘active TMS’ 
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condition. It is also unclear to what extent this technique is successful in blinding 
participants to the condition they are in: Hoffman et al. (2005), using this sham 
technique, reported that many patients correctly guessed which condition they had 
been in, but argued that in most cases their guess was actually based on curtailment 
of symptoms. Nevertheless, this is anecdotal, and the fact that many patients were 
able to tell which condition they were in may have affected the results. 
It has therefore been suggested that in experiments showing a positive effect, 
patients receiving rTMS treatment in fact showed a placebo effect to the treatment, 
with the observed difference between conditions being due to an inadequate sham 
condition (Slotema, et al., 2011). Further, the essentially subjective measures of 
severity of hallucinations arguably leave the studies even more susceptible to being 
confounded by the placebo effect. Some measures, however, are less subjective than 
others; Hoffman et al. (2013) asked participants to record frequency of AVHs with a 
mechanical counter, perhaps negating this criticism. In addition, most rTMS studies 
have recruited patients whose AVHs have been refractory to anti-psychotic drugs or 
other treatment options, leaving open the question of why the placebo effect would 
be evident after rTMS, but not other attempts to reduce AVHs. 
No studies to date have looked at the efficacy of rTMS in the treatment of different 
types of AVH, but there is a growing realisation that AVHs cannot be treated as one 
homogeneous group, and may in fact differ both phenomenologically and in their 
cognitive and neural substrates (Jones, 2010; Nayani & David, 1996). Recent 
studies, for example, have suggested a subtype of AVH known as ‘hypervigilance 
hallucinations’, characterised by their occurrence when attention is externally 
focused (Garwood, Dodgson, Bruce, & McCarthy-Jones, 2013). That 
phenomenologically different AVHs may have different neural substrates is 
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highlighted by Hoffman et al.’s most recent study (2013), showing that the 
effectiveness of rTMS to the right hemisphere is dependent on attentional salience of 
the AVHs. It is therefore possible that only some AVHs may be amenable to 
treatment using rTMS. If this were the case, the results may be skewed depending on 
the ‘types’ of AVHs that were studied. It will be argued in Section 4.3 that AVHs 
which may be best described as misattributed inner speech may be most amenable to 
neurostimulation treatment. 
At the time of writing, only one experimental study of the therapeutic effect of tDCS 
on AVHs has been reported. Brunelin et al. (2012) studied 30 hallucinating 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, placing the cathodal electrode over the left 
temporoparietal junction (midway between the T3-P3 electrodes as specified by the 
10-20 EEG system, similarly to rTMS studies), and the anodal electrode over left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; abnormal white matter volume of this area is often 
associated with negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Sanfilipo et al., 2000). The 
participants underwent stimulation twice a day, for 20 minutes, for 5 days. Half of 
the participants were assigned to the sham condition, while half were assigned to 
receive active stimulation. Results showed that those who received active cathodal 
stimulation over temporoparietal cortex experienced a 31% reduction in 
hallucination severity, as measured by the Auditory Hallucination Rating Scale 
(which takes into account variables such as hallucination frequency, loudness, and 
salience of the AVH), compared to an 8% reported reduction in the sham condition. 
This effect was still present 3 months later, with 6 of 15 participants in the 
experimental condition showing a reduction in hallucination frequency of more than 
50%. The most obvious criticism of this study is the relatively small sample size; it 
will be interesting to see whether future studies are able to replicate these results. As 
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already mentioned, the sham condition used in studies using tDCS is more effective, 
and therefore may be less susceptible to placebo effects. Issues such as portability 
and ease of use may also make it more realistic as a treatment option. 
To summarize, the evidence regarding efficacy of noninvasive brain stimulation 
techniques as a treatment for AVHs is still equivocal. What follows is an analysis of 
how treatment of AVHs with neurostimulation may affect the associated cognitive 
and neural mechanisms, interpreted within an inner speech monitoring framework. 
4.3. How might treatment with neurostimulation affect the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms associated with AVHs? 
Previous attempts to treat AVHs with noninvasive brain stimulation have not been 
carried out based on a clear prediction from our understanding of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying AVHs. Recent evidence, however, suggests that 
neurostimulation may be effective as a treatment option due to its effects on brain 
networks involved in the monitoring of inner speech. The following section aims to 
interpret the findings discussed in Section 4, based on inner speech models of AVHs, 
and discuss recent studies which have used neuroimaging to monitor the after-effects 
of neurostimulation in cortical regions known to be involved in AVHs. Table 1.2 
provides a summary of some key findings regarding the importance of different brain 
areas in AVHs and neurostimulation treatment. 
One of the few studies to look at the effects of left temporoparietal rTMS on reality 
monitoring performance in those that experience AVHs was conducted by Brunelin 
et al. (2006). This study used an rTMS protocol similar to those used in other studies 
of rTMS to treat AVHs, and was able to replicate the improvements in Auditory 
Hallucination Rating Scale score shown by others. The 24 patients also took part in a 
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source memory test in which they had to recall whether they had read an item 
silently to themselves, or said the word out loud (a ‘say/imagine’ paradigm). Patients 
that received active rTMS were less likely to misattribute an imagined word as one 
they had said after stimulation, whereas those that were allocated to the sham 
condition did not show this pattern. This can therefore be seen to support both the 
efficacy of rTMS as a treatment option for AVHs, and the link between AVHs and 
reality monitoring.  
The importance of the STG in responders to neurostimulation treatment has also 
been highlighted by a recent neuroimaging study showing higher left STG activation 
in a pre-TMS resting-state scan in those that were later classified as ‘responders’ to 
the TMS treatment paradigm (Homan, Kindler, Hauf, Hubl, & Dierks, 2012). These 
findings may be crucial, as they suggest that pre-existing levels of activity in the 
STG may be one biomarker for recognizing likely responders to neurostimulation 
treatment, and are also consistent with findings discussed in Section 4.1 showing that 
the after-effects of rTMS are dependent on baseline levels of excitability. In a 
separate study, measurement of cerebral blood flow post-TMS treatment, relative to 
pre-treatment, showed reductions in activation in primary auditory cortex (part of the 
STG), Broca’s area and the cingulate gyrus after 10 days of rTMS treatment (Kindler 
et al., 2013). This provides support for the claim that left temporoparietal cortex (the 
site of stimulation) is the most appropriate location to affect other temporal regions, 
as well as cingulate areas that may be related to conscious evaluation of stimuli. 
Kindler et al. suggest that a high level of activity in the STG makes it harder to 
differentiate between inner speech and externally perceived speech, concordant with 
self- or reality monitoring cognitive models of AVHs. This evidence is also 
consistent, to some extent, with some forward model theories of AVHs which argue 
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that a failure of the efference copy mechanism leads to an over-active auditory 
cortex, therefore leading to self-produced speech being labelled as ‘non-self’ 
(although it neither supports nor contradicts ideas surrounding the cause of over-
activity). Importantly, only reduced activation in the STG correlated with a reduction 
in AVHs, implying that effects in other areas may be not be causal to the 
improvement. The authors argue that the activation of Broca’s area typically seen 
during AVHs is due to the production of (subsequently misattributed) inner speech, 
although whether the observed reduction in activity post-TMS treatment corresponds 
to any change in the experience of inner speech (phenomenological or quantitative) 
is unknown. 
An excellent addition to these studies, in our opinion, would have been to investigate 
if any phenomenological differences in AVHs existed between the responders and 
non-responders to rTMS treatment. For example, it is possible that only AVHs that 
are best categorized as ‘misattributed inner speech’ may be amenable to this form of 
treatment. This hypothesis is consistent with imaging studies of self- and reality 
monitoring studies that show that activation of this area is related to task 
performance, as well as activation seen when participants are engaged in inner 
speech, as outlined in Sections 2 and 3. Hoffman et al.’s finding (2013) of efficacy of 
right-sided stimulation in more salient AVHs further implies that 
phenomenologically different AVHs may need to be accounted for by different 
cognitive-neuroscientific models. Alternatively, it is possible that a higher level of 
activation in right-sided temporal areas leads to a higher level of attentional salience 
because of other phenomenological variables, such as emotional valence. 
Results from rTMS treatment protocols, however, have also been used to argue that 
cortical areas involved in self-agency (as measured by self-monitoring and reality 
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monitoring tasks) can in fact be dissociated from those involved in AVHs. Jardri et 
al. (2009) showed that low-frequency stimulation of the right TPJ could improve 
performance on both types of task, but not decrease frequency of AVHs; meanwhile, 
left TPJ stimulation achieved both. The data, though, was gained from only a single 
participant (a child diagnosed with childhood-onset schizophrenia), and so further 
research is needed to support this finding. Despite this, the authors suggest that self-
agency may be linked to a network dissociable to that drawn upon during AVHs, 
implicating the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) rather than the TPJ/STG per se. 
Previous studies have suggested bilateral involvement of the IPL in feelings of 
agency, with a right sided dominance (Farrer et al., 2003; Jardri, et al., 2007). The 
IPL is immediately adjacent to the posterior STG (including the planum temporale 
and Wernicke’s area), and may be part of an alternative pathway that runs laterally to 
the arcuate fasciculus between Wernicke’s and Broca’s area (Catani, Jones, & 
ffytche, 2005; Frey, Campbell, Pike, & Petrides, 2008). It is possible that the IPL is 
part of a feed-forward mechanism between speech production areas and temporal 
areas (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009), which may explain evidence of its involvement 
in feelings of agency and monitoring tasks. It is therefore difficult to ascertain 
whether concurrent improvement in monitoring tasks and AVH frequency is due to 
the effect of stimulation on the targeted area (left TPJ) and its connections with other 
auditory cortical areas, or the immediately adjacent IPL, due to either the limitations 
of the spatial resolution of rTMS (approximately 1cm
3
,
 
dependent on coil size), or 
connectivity between the STG and the left IPL.  
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Brain region Role in AVHs Relevance to neurostimulation treatment Connectivity 
Superior temporal gyrus 
(STG) 
Includes PAC, Wernicke’s area, and planum 
temporale. Structural abnormalities and 
functional activity consistently implicated in 
AVHs, and during monitoring tasks. 
Posterior STG activity reduced after 
neurostimulation; this correlates with reduction 
in AVH severity. 
Strong connectivity with TPJ, and effective 
connectivity with ACC. Also connected to 
IFG through arcuate fasciculus white 
matter tract. 
Inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG, Broca’s area) 
Crucial for production of speech (including 
inner speech), particularly in the left 
hemisphere. Role of right IFG still relatively 
unexplored. 
rTMS of Broca’s area does not lead to a 
reduction in AVH frequency. Reduction in 
activity in IFG following stimulation of left 
TPJ, though not correlated with reduction in 
AVH frequency. 
Connected to STG through arcuate 
fasciculus white matter tract. Excessive 
functional connectivity with putamen in 
voice-hearers. 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) 
Activation seen during AVHs may reflect 
conscious evaluation of stimuli, and in 
combination with STG, may be involved in 
monitoring processes. 
Reduction in activity in ACC following 
stimulation of left TPJ, though not correlated 
with reduction in AVH frequency. 
Connectivity with STG & TPJ may reflect 
verbal monitoring processes – effective 
connectivity during monitoring task is 
reduced in voice-hearers. 
Inferior parietal lobe 
(IPL) 
Often activated in symptom-capture studies of 
AVHs, and commonly linked to feelings of 
self-agency. 
Data from neuroimaging has not implicated 
changes in activation post-neurostimulation; 
however, close proximity could mean activity 
is modulated by TPJ stimulation. 
May be part of an alternative pathway that 
runs laterally to the arcuate fasciculus, 
between IFG and STG. 
Putamen Hoffman’s corticostriatal loop model specifies 
that an overabundance of language 
representations initiated by the putamen may 
surface ‘unbidden thoughts’ as AVHs, due to 
hyperconnectivity with STG and IFG. 
If Hoffman’s model is supported, disruption of 
hyperconnectivity with this region may be 
related to the therapeutic effect of 
neurostimulation. 
Excessive functional connectivity with IFG 
and STG in voice-hearers. 
Table 1.2: Brain areas important in understanding the effects of neurostimulation on AVHs, and their connectivity with other regions. 
STG = superior temporal gyrus; PAC = primary auditory cortex; TPJ = temporoparietal junction; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobe. 
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This is difficult to reconcile with imaging studies of monitoring tasks and symptom-
capture studies of AVHs, in which superior temporal regions, particularly on the left, 
are often shown to be important. Although inferior parietal regions have been 
reported as involved in the occurrence of AVHs (Jardri, Pouchet, Pins, & Thomas, 
2011; Lennox, Park, Medley, Morris, & Jones, 2000), one might expect more 
reliable activation of this area in neuroimaging studies of AVHs if it were of such 
key importance. Speculations regarding the importance of the IPL in monitoring and 
AVHs therefore need to be empirically tested with larger sample sizes and a variety 
of neuroscientific and cognitive tests, before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
4.4. Neurostimulation and inner speech 
It is interesting that Hoffman et al. (2007) found no reduction in AVHs after 
stimulating Broca’s area, but did show that responders to the rTMS treatment tended 
to show reduced functional connectivity between left TPJ and the right homologue of 
Broca’s area, supporting Vercammen et al. (2010), who found reduced connectivity 
between these areas in patients with AVHs. In combination with Aziz-Zadeh et al.’s 
(2005) results showing induction of covert speech arrest during Broca’s area 
stimulation, the lack of improvement shown after treatment through Broca’s area 
stimulation may support arguments that there is no difference, at a neural level, in 
the production of inner speech in those that experience AVHs. Instead, it is the 
subsequent perception (by temporal regions) or evaluation (by ACC) that leads to a 
misattribution. In combination with the aforementioned study by Homan et al. 
(2012), these results indicate that reduction of activity in superior temporal regions is 
crucial to the therapeutic effect of rTMS on AVHs. More detailed studies are 
required to distinguish whether reduction in activity in specific areas of the STG, 
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such as the planum temporale, are responsible for the improvement in AVH 
frequency. 
The role of right hemispheric language areas in inner speech and AVHs is still a 
relatively unexplored area: current inner speech theories might predict that they are 
not integral to the creation of AVHs, but are instead important in their 
contextualisation (experiencing AVHs as another person’s voice and/or perspective, 
emotional content of AVHs). Nevertheless, neurostimulation treatment protocols 
reviewed above suggest that in some cases stimulation of the right TPJ may be 
successful in reduction of AVH frequency, which may imply a causal role for right 
temporal regions in the experience of AVHs, rather than simply contextualisation. 
Further research into the neural basis of different forms of inner speech (e.g., 
dialogic, emotional) could help to clarify what role the right homologue of Broca’s 
area and right superior temporal regions play in the generation of inner speech, self-
/source monitoring, and therefore AVHs. 
 
5. Future directions 
The evidence so far reviewed suggests that the efficacy of neurostimulation as a 
treatment option may depend on its ability to modulate activity in superior temporal 
cortical regions, as well as inferior frontal and anterior cingulate regions. We have 
argued that this is consistent with inner speech theories of AVHs, which postulate 
that atypical monitoring processes lead to its misattribution to an external or non-self 
source. This is supported by findings implicating similar regions in the monitoring of 
speech as those affected by neurostimulation of TPJ. There are, however, a number 
of key avenues of research which remain to be explored. 
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While it seems likely that, at a cognitive level, the effect of treatment may be due to 
an improvement in self- and/or reality monitoring, it is hard to discount the 
possibility that a decrease in AVH frequency may lead to improvements in 
monitoring capability, perhaps due to the distracting effects of AVHs. Future studies 
should aim to test this more directly. Such studies could use low frequency rTMS, or 
tDCS, in conjunction with previously used monitoring tasks in both clinical and non-
clinical populations, to study the effects of reduction of STG activity on the ability to 
distinguish between internal and external events. Such studies would not only be 
able to test the importance of superior temporal regions in monitoring tasks, but 
would also be able to inform us of the causality of observed improvements. They 
would also potentially provide evidence both for cognitive models that specify 
monitoring deficits or biases as a cause of AVHs, and clinical studies of the efficacy 
of brain stimulation techniques that claim to be able to reduce AVH frequency. 
As already noted, it is likely that AVHs are not a homogeneous phenomenon (Jones, 
2010). The experience may differ, for example, in terms of level of externality (the 
extent to which the voice is experienced as coming from the external environment), 
the number of voices heard, the volume of the voice, and attentional salience (the 
extent to which the voice captures the attention of the person, and is thus effective in 
altering behavior). As yet, only a small number of studies have investigated 
differences in neural activity between phenomenologically different AVHs using 
fMRI (Looijestijn et al., 2013; Vercammen, Knegtering, Bruggeman, & Aleman, 
2010). Hoffman et al. (2013) has noted that attentional salience appears to be one 
marker for likely response to neurostimulation treatment to the right TPJ (as opposed 
to the left TPJ).  
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On a broader level, it is possible that some AVHs can best be described as 
misattributed inner speech, whereas others might best be described as intrusive 
memories (Waters, Badcock, Michie, & Maybery, 2006), and others still as 
‘hypervigilance’ towards detecting stimuli in the environment (Dodgson & Gordon, 
2009; Garwood, Dodgson, Bruce, & McCarthy-Jones, 2013). This review has 
focused on the former; that is, AVHs which seem to be explicable within an inner 
speech framework. As outlined, it may be that neurostimulation of the TPJ affects 
mechanisms that are involved with the monitoring of inner speech. An important 
area for future research would therefore be to investigate whether these subtypes of 
hallucinations are distinguishable by neural activation, and whether some types of 
AVHs are more amenable to treatment with neurostimulation. 
Thirdly, there is a need to develop more valid inner speech paradigms if we are to 
understand its relation to AVHs. For example, ideas surrounding the dialogic nature 
of inner speech are yet to be tested within a cognitive-neuroscientific framework – 
important questions to address would be related to differences in activation between 
monologic inner speech (inner speech that does not involve the back-and-forth of a 
conversation) and dialogic inner speech. Moreover, it is important that more realistic 
forms of inner speech are studied. Currently, most studies rely on asking participants 
to repeat sentences to themselves (e.g., McGuire et al., 1995) or requiring 
participants to count syllables (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2005). More valid forms of 
inner speech could be evoked by, for example, asking participants to imagine a 
conversation, evaluate behaviour, or plan a speech for a future event – these have all 
been suggested as important functions of inner speech (McCarthy-Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2011), and so should be more accurate approximations. A further 
possibility would be to use experience sampling techniques such as Descriptive 
49 
 
Experience Sampling, which involves fitting participants with a ‘beeper’ which 
randomly cues the participant to report their current inner experience (Hurlburt & 
Heavey, 2001). Coupled with neuroimaging techniques, this could become a 
powerful method by which to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying inner 
speech and AVHs. 
Importantly, there is a need for larger scale tests of treating AVHs with 
neurostimulation. Of the three studies discussed here that have achieved adequate 
power, one finds no effect of neurostimulation (Slotema et al., 2011), and the other 
two originate from the same institution (Hoffman et al., 2005; 2013). Further 
replication studies by independent teams are needed, and tests should be consistent 
with the methods used to target the stimulation (e.g., consistently using structural or 
functional MRI scans to locate TPJ, or following the EEG 10-20 system). It is 
important that studies attempt to monitor possible effects of neurostimulation of left 
TPJ on a wide variety of variables. Currently, evidence suggests that there are no 
negative effects on neuropsychological measures such a short-term verbal memory 
(Hoffman et al., 2005) or measures of hearing function such as pure-tone audiometry 
(Schonfeldt-Lecuona et al., 2012), but it would also be interesting to study potential 
changes in phenomenal characteristics of inner speech following reduction in activity 
in either left or right superior temporal regions. Finally, as outlined, testing the 
efficacy of tDCS to treat AVHs is a promising area of research and studies with 
larger samples are needed to examine whether this technique could be a useful 
addition to currently available treatment options for those who seek help in relieving 
the distress of AVHs. 
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6. Conclusions 
Using neurostimulation as a treatment option for AVHs seems promising. Existing 
findings indicate that over-activation of the STG in the resting state is one marker for 
a response to the treatment. If it is possible, finding phenomenological markers of 
likely responders would not only mean that treatment could be targeted quickly and 
easily to those who might benefit most, but would also tell us much about the 
underlying cognitive neuroscience of AVHs. Although controversy still exists as to 
whether the putative therapeutic effects of rTMS can simply be attributed to an 
ineffective sham condition, future studies, especially those using tDCS, could settle 
this debate. Indeed, if noninvasive brain stimulation techniques are to be taken 
seriously as a viable treatment option, tDCS is a much more realistic alternative, due 
to the portability, ease and comfort of use, and cost. Further study is also needed into 
the long-term effects on AVHs of this treatment – currently, minimal evidence exists 
into the effects past one month. 
Models of AVHs that suggest self-monitoring deficits or reality monitoring biases, 
leading to the misattribution of inner speech to an external or non-self source, do 
seem to be supported by studies using brain stimulation techniques. Although it is 
important not to overstate the power of neurostimulation as an experimental 
technique, neuroimaging studies of both hallucinating individuals and of individuals 
performing monitoring tasks point to the importance of left superior temporal 
regions and areas connected functionally and anatomically to it, in these processes. 
Typical neurostimulation protocols, meanwhile, direct the stimulation to affect these 
areas. There is tentative evidence that improvement in AVH frequency following 
rTMS coincides with improvement on monitoring tasks, although much more work 
needs to be carried out in this area to establish a causal link between the two.
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Chapter 2 
Methodological review and experimental aims of this thesis 
Chapter 1 provided a review of contemporary cognitive neuroscientific theories of 
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), with a particular focus on attempts to treat 
AVHs with neurostimulation techniques. The following chapter will give an 
overview of the theoretical and technical methodology used as part of this thesis, and 
summarise the four experimental chapters that follow. Firstly, a brief overview of 
signal detection theory and its applicability to the study of hallucinations will be 
given. Much of the information in Section 1.1 is from Stanislaw and Todorov 
(1999), although the examples of signal detection theory usage for task performance 
analysis are based on tasks more relevant to the study of hallucinations. This is 
followed by a summary of the relative advantages and disadvantages of noninvasive 
neurostimulation techniques which are used in two of the experimental chapters, 
with a justification for usage of the technique in this thesis. 
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1. Signal detection theory 
1.1. Overview 
Signal detection theory (SDT) can be used whenever a task requires participants to 
distinguish between two types of stimulus – for example, whether they believe a 
stimulus to be present or absent, or whether they believe a perception was self-
generated or non-self-generated. For instance, if an individual must decide whether 
they perceived a voice stimulus in random noise, there are four possible outcomes, 
depending on the presence or absence of a stimulus, and their subsequent response. 
In the presence of the stimulus, the individual may 1) correctly respond that they 
believe a voice to be present (a ‘hit’, or a true positive), or 2) incorrectly respond that 
they do not believe a voice is present (a ‘miss’, or a false negative). Alternatively, in 
the absence of a voice, the individual may 3) correctly respond that a voice is not 
present (a ‘correct rejection’, or a true negative), or 4) incorrectly respond that they 
believe a voice to be present (a ‘false alarm’, or a false positive). The key dependent 
variables in a signal detection task are therefore the ‘hit rate’ (the number of hits, 
divided by the total number of ‘stimulus present’ trials), and the ‘false alarm rate’ 
(the number of false alarms, divided by the number of ‘stimulus absent’ trials). 
These can also be expressed as a percentage, if multiplied by 100. (The ‘miss rate’ 
and ‘correct rejection rate’ are generally not discussed, since they would be directly 
proportional to the hit rate and false alarm rate, respectively). Furthermore, hit rates 
and false alarm rates can be used to quantify the capability to distinguish between 
signal and noise (sensitivity), and the criterion which individuals use to accept the 
presence of a signal (response bias). 
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Sensitivity, denoted by d', is defined as the difference between the standardised hit 
rate and the standardised false alarm rate
1
. Thus, if a participant correctly detected 
the signal on the majority of signal-present trials (a high hit rate), and rarely made 
false alarm responses (a low false alarm rate), there would be a large difference 
between the hit and false alarm rate, and therefore the participant would have a 
relatively high d' value (that is, they have high task sensitivity). Conversely, if the 
participant struggled to detect the signal when it was present, and also frequently 
incorrectly detected the signal (therefore having a high false alarm rate), they would 
have a relatively low d' value, because there would be little difference between the 
hit and false alarm rate. d' is therefore a useful measure of ability to distinguish 
signal from noise. 
Response bias (denoted by β, sometimes also referred to as ‘response criterion’) 
refers to the tendency of the participant to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the task. For 
example, a participant with a low response bias would be more willing to respond 
‘yes’ on a signal detection task, regardless of the presence or absence of a signal, and 
would therefore be likely to have a high hit rate, and a high false alarm rate. 
Conversely, an individual with a high response bias would be less willing to respond 
‘yes’, and would therefore have a low hit rate, and a low false alarm rate. 
Throughout this thesis, response bias will be calculated as outlined in Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999), as follows:     
             
 
 , where FA represents false alarm 
rate, H represents hit rate, z represents standardised scores (i.e., z-scores), and e 
represents exponentiation. 
                                                 
1
 Nonparametric measures of sensitivity such as A’ also exist, although are not used in this thesis, and 
so are not discussed any further. Likewise, nonparametric versions of response bias also exist, but will 
not be discussed any further. 
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1.2. Signal detection theory and hallucinations 
Clearly, of interest in the study of hallucinations is the propensity to make false 
alarm responses, i.e., to report that a signal is present, when one is not. A question of 
interest is therefore whether hallucinations (conceptualised as false alarms) are due 
to low perceptual sensitivity, or a low response bias. Interestingly, these two 
possibilities would make opposite predictions about performance in the presence of a 
signal: that is, if hallucinations were due to low perceptual sensitivity, they would 
likely be accompanied by deficits in detection of presented perceptual stimuli; 
however, if hallucinations were due to a low response bias, they would be 
accompanied by a higher detection of presented perceptual stimuli. 
Previously, this issue has been investigated in samples with diagnoses of 
schizophrenia, comparing those that hallucinate and those that do not (Brookwell, 
Bentall, & Varese, 2013). In a typical auditory signal detection task, participants are 
asked to listen to bursts of noise through headphones, and, for each burst, asked to 
respond whether they believed a voice was present. Importantly, on some trials a 
voice is presented, usually at a pre-determined level likely to be close to the 
participant’s auditory threshold, and on other trials, no voice is presented. (The 
volume and signal-to-noise ratio of the stimuli must be kept constant across all 
participants, however, for signal detection parameters to be comparable across the 
sample.) In clinical samples, individuals who hallucinate tend to have a reduced 
response bias (β), but similar levels of sensitivity (d'), compared to individuals who 
do not hallucinate, or healthy controls (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Varese, Barkus, & 
Bentall, 2012;  though see Vercammen, de Haan, & Aleman, 2008, for an 
exception). This finding has also been extended to non-clinical samples, showing 
that individuals who report higher levels of hallucination-proneness showed a 
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reduced response bias, but no change in sensitivity (Barkus et al., 2011; Varese, 
Barkus, & Bentall, 2011; see Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013, for a meta-
analysis). Thus, individuals who hallucinate, or who seem to be more prone to such 
experiences, show a style of responding in which they are more willing to label an 
ambiguous percept as ‘signal present’. An alternative interpretation of these findings 
would be that highly hallucination-prone individuals are more willing to accept that 
an internally generated percept is external (i.e., has appeared in the noise). 
This alternative interpretation is supported by a parallel stream of research which has 
investigated memory for the source of information. A common paradigm, based on 
the source monitoring framework, presents participants with a series of words, half 
of which they are required to read aloud themselves, and half of which the 
experimenter reads aloud. At a later point, the participant is then required to recall 
which words were self-generated, and which were non-self-generated (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Here, signal detection theory is again useful in the 
data analysis; instances in which the participant correctly recalls a word as read 
aloud by the experimenter can be conceptualised as a ‘hit’ (because they have 
correctly identified an ‘external’ signal as present), and instances in which the 
participant incorrectly recalls a word as read aloud by the experimenter can be 
conceptualised as a ‘false alarm’ (because they have incorrectly labelled an item that 
was self-generated as externally generated). Similarly to the auditory paradigm 
discussed above, a common finding in both clinical and non-clinical samples is that 
individuals who are more prone to hallucinations show a lower response bias (they 
are more willing to respond that a word was non-self-generated, regardless of its 
source), but comparable levels of sensitivity (that is, they do not seem to show a 
general deficit in source memory performance) (Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991; 
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Brookwell, et al., 2013; Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Woodward, Menon, & 
Whitman, 2007). This evidence therefore suggests that the lowered response bias 
seen in individuals prone to hallucinations may be linked to a propensity to label 
perceptions as external/non-self-generated, both in the auditory signal detection 
paradigm and the source memory paradigm.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the most prominent cognitive neuroscientific model of 
self-monitoring suggests that a forward model is used to predict the sensory 
consequences of self-produced action, attenuating activity in sensory cortices in 
response to the resulting incoming perceptual information. According to this model, 
when a motor command is sent, an efference copy of the command is sent to sensory 
cortices, which is compared with incoming sensory information; if there is a 
mismatch, the sensory information may be experienced as non-self-generated 
(Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). Therefore, it has been suggested that a 
disrupted or delayed efference copy of a speech motor command could lead to inner 
speech being misattributed to an external source (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 
2000; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). A disrupted 
efference copy signal would increase the likelihood that self-generated actions would 
erroneously be experienced as non-self-generated (but would not cause non-self-
generated actions to be experienced as self-generated, since perception of non-self-
produced actions should not be affected by a disrupted efference copy mechanism). 
Therefore, in signal detection terminology, a disrupted efference copy might lead to 
a reduced response bias in decisions regarding whether a perception was self-
generated or not.  
A separate, though related, strand of research has attempted to explain how internal 
mental events may be experienced as external, through the source monitoring 
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framework (SMF). Described in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, the SMF would 
also make predictions regarding signal detection response biases in tasks that require 
participants to monitor their own actions. The SMF specifies that self- or non-self-
generated events are experienced as such by reference to subjective qualities such as 
recalled vividness, cognitive effort associated with the recollection, and affective or 
semantic content (Johnson et al., 1993). As such, aspects of inner experience such as 
heightened perceptual content/vividness, or low cognitive effort, may lead to a 
higher likelihood of external misattributions (but are unlikely to lead to incorrectly 
misattributing an external event as internal). The SMF would therefore also predict 
that hallucinations may be associated with a response bias towards responding that 
events took place externally, rather than a change in task sensitivity. 
It should be noted that efference copy and SMF theories are not mutually exclusive; 
for example, it is possible that atypical efference copy mechanisms may be linked to 
the cognitive effort or vividness of mental imagery, although this possibility has not 
yet been empirically tested. The issue of the overlap between different cognitive 
explanations of self-/source-monitoring is addressed in Chapter 4. 
 
2. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis investigate the role of specific cortical regions in 
some of the tasks discussed throughout Chapters 1 and 2. The technique employed to 
investigate this, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), is a neurostimulation 
method which can transiently increase or decrease the level of cortical excitability in 
neurons underneath electrodes placed on the scalp. As such, it is an ideal technique 
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to investigate the effects of attenuating or increasing cortical activity on signal 
detection biases, as described above. 
Using tDCS involves running a weak electrical current (usually < 2.0mA, with a 
current density of < 0.06 mA/cm
2
) between two electrodes which are placed on the 
participant’s scalp. Typically, stimulation increases excitability underneath the 
anodal electrode, and decreases excitability underneath the cathodal electrode; for 
example, anodal stimulation of motor cortex reduces the motor threshold (i.e., 
reduces the strength of cortical stimulation required to evoke a hand movement), 
whilst cathodal stimulation has the opposite effect (Nitsche et al., 2008; Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2000; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011). During stimulation, cortical effects seem to 
be due to hyperpolarisation (cathodal) or depolarisation (anodal) of neurons 
underlying the electrode (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). After-effects of stimulation have 
also been shown, both at a neural (Ardolino, Bossi, Barbieri, & Priori, 2005) and 
behavioural level (Hummel & Cohen, 2006). This appears to be due to a reduction in 
GABA concentration underneath the anodal electrode and a reduction in glutamate 
concentration underneath the cathodal electrode (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011). 
The main advantage of using tDCS is that it allows causal inferences regarding the 
role of specific brain areas in cognition. Using tDCS, it is possible to modulate 
activity in cortical regions and then observe the resultant changes in task 
performance, which in turn is evidence that activity in that brain area plays a causal 
role in performing the task. This is in contrast to techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which can show correlations between levels of 
activity in certain brain areas and performance on specific tasks, but only allows a 
limited level of insight into the direction of causation (observed activity in a certain 
brain area could, for example, be epiphenomenal to the task being performed). As 
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such, a common research trajectory is to use neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI 
to investigate BOLD activations during task performance (which may implicate 
multiple brain areas), and then to test the causal role of these areas using 
neurostimulation techniques. For example, neuroimaging evidence suggested that 
posterior parietal cortex plays an important role in visual search tasks for conjunction 
items (Shafritz, Gore, & Marois, 2002). This was then confirmed using TMS to 
interrupt functioning in the right posterior parietal cortex, and observing an increase 
in reaction time for a conjunction visual search task (Ellison, Lane, & Schenk, 2007). 
Indeed, a similar approach has been taken in this thesis, in that neuroimaging 
evidence suggests that superior temporal cortical regions (among a number of other 
regions) may be important in biases in auditory signal detection and source memory 
(Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, McKie, & Lewis, 2007; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; 
Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson, 2014). The studies reported here 
apply tDCS to superior temporal regions on the basis of previous findings suggesting 
that high levels of activation in these regions may cause misattribution of self-
generated perceptions to a non-self source. 
Logistically, tDCS is also an ideal technique to apply during tasks which require 
participants to attend to auditory stimuli, because it does not cause any noise itself 
(as opposed to other neurostimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), which emit loud clicking noises). Furthermore, with tDCS, 
‘sham’ stimulation is an effective and simple control condition against which to 
compare any effects of stimulation (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006). Typically, 
sham stimulation involves stimulating for a much shorter time period (usually ~30 
secs), without telling the participant that the stimulation will stop earlier than they 
were originally informed. This length of stimulation is not sufficient to cause 
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significant neuronal modulation, but does elicit the tingling sensation characteristic 
of tDCS underneath the electrodes. Sham tDCS is therefore thought to be an 
effective method of blinding participants to the experimental condition (Gandiga, et 
al., 2006) (see Chapter 1, Section 4.1 for a discussion of this issue). 
One drawback to using tDCS, however, is its relative lack of spatial resolution: the 
sizes of the stimulating electrodes vary between studies, but are typically between 
25–35cm2. Coupled with the possibility of spread of activation between brain 
regions following neurostimulation (Pascual-Leone, Tormos, Keenan, Tarazona, 
Canete, & Catala, 1998), this means that firm conclusions about the precise areas 
being stimulated are hard to draw without concurrent neuroimaging techniques (see 
Ellison et al., 2014, for an example). Nevertheless, given that neurostimulation 
research typically draws on neuroimaging studies that have identified activity in 
relatively precise cortical regions, it is often parsimonious to conclude that any 
behavioural effects are due to stimulating the previously identified cortical regions. 
 
3. Experimental aims, and outline of empirical studies in this thesis 
Broadly, the studies reported in this thesis aim to explore the cognitive and neural 
substrates of hallucinatory experiences in a non-clinical sample. As outlined above, 
the key techniques used to accomplish this are tasks amenable to analysis using 
signal detection theory, and noninvasive brain stimulation techniques such as tDCS, 
used to investigate the role of superior temporal regions in these tasks.  
Chapter 3 aims to explore the role that auditory verbal mental imagery plays in 
signal detection, testing the prediction that engaging participants in mental imagery 
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will result in a lower response bias, particularly in participants prone to hallucinatory 
experiences. Chapter 4 extends the findings from that study, using hierarchical 
regression analyses to investigate whether a variety of different tasks which 
putatively require the participants to monitor their own actions predict self-reported 
hallucination-proneness. Reported phenomenological differences in the use of inner 
speech are also studied in relation to hallucination-proneness. Drawing on the 
research discussed and the conclusions drawn in Chapter 1, Chapter 5 then uses 
tDCS to test the role of the superior temporal lobe in auditory signal detection, whilst 
Chapter 6 uses a similar methodology to test the role of superior temporal and 
prefrontal cortices in source memory. 
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Chapter 3 
Biased monitoring of inner speech in hallucination-prone individuals: the effect 
of auditory verbal imagery on signal detection 
Abstract 
Cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations have suggested that they may 
result when internal mental events, such as inner speech or auditory verbal imagery 
(AVI), are misattributed to an external source. This has been supported by numerous 
studies indicating that individuals who experience hallucinations tend to perform in a 
biased manner on tasks that require them to distinguish self-generated from non-self-
generated perceptions. However, these tasks have typically been of limited relevance 
to inner speech or hallucinations. Here, a paradigm is used in which participants 
were instructed to use AVI whilst completing an auditory signal detection task. It 
was hypothesized that AVI-usage would cause participants to perform in a biased 
manner, therefore falsely detecting more voices in bursts of noise. In a first 
experiment, when cued to generate AVI, highly hallucination-prone participants 
showed a lower response bias than when performing a standard signal detection task, 
whereas participants not prone to hallucinations performed no differently between 
the two conditions. In a second experiment, participants were not specifically 
instructed to use AVI, but highly hallucination-prone participants who 
retrospectively reported using AVI showed the same lowered response bias. Results 
are discussed in relation to prominent inner speech models of hallucinations. 
  
74 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Auditory verbal hallucinations and inner speech 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of hearing a voice in the 
absence of any speaker. Although commonly associated with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, AVHs also occur in around 1.5–3% of the healthy, nonclinical 
population (Tien, 1991). There is emerging evidence that the predisposition to AVHs 
may lie on a continuum, ranging from individuals who frequently experience, to 
individuals who rarely or never report, hallucinations (Johns et al., 2014; Johns & 
van Os, 2001). A fruitful area of investigation is therefore to investigate whether 
cognitive traits and biases associated with hallucinations in clinical populations are 
shared by individuals in the general population who report frequent hallucinatory 
experiences.  
The most prominent cognitive model of AVHs suggests that they occur when an 
internal mental event (such as inner speech or auditory verbal imagery – AVI) is 
misattributed to an external source (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 1992; Jones 
& Fernyhough, 2007b). This strand of research has therefore been embedded in the 
source monitoring framework, which attempts to explain how we make judgements 
regarding the origin of information (i.e., its source) (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Specifically, a bias in ‘reality monitoring’, which refers to the ability 
to distinguish between internally generated and externally generated perceptions, has 
been linked to AVHs (Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991). Externalising biases have 
variously been linked to excessively vivid mental imagery (Aleman, Böcker, 
Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 2003), and low cognitive effort/intrusiveness associated 
with mental imagery (Jones & Fernyhough, 2009; Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 
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1995). On a mechanistic level, forward models may be involved in predicting the 
sensory consequences of motor processes, and successful prediction via an efference 
copy may be one way in which self-generated actions are experienced as such (Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Aberrant efference copy mechanisms could therefore 
underlie the external misattribution of internal mental events (Ford & Mathalon, 
2005). 
Reality monitoring for verbal stimuli has typically been assessed using source 
memory paradigms, which require participants to recall whether words were spoken 
by the experimenter or by themselves. A common finding is that patients with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia who hallucinate, compared to those who do not 
hallucinate or healthy control participants, are more likely to misremember words as 
having been spoken by the experimenter (Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007), 
therefore showing an ‘externalising bias’ on reality monitoring tasks. Providing 
support for continuum models of AVHs, non-clinical samples who report higher 
levels of hallucination-proneness also show a similar pattern of responding on reality 
monitoring tasks (Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013; Larøi, van der Linden, & 
Marczewski, 2004). 
A similar line of research has attempted to engage the participant in an ‘online’ 
decision making process, referred to as ‘reality discrimination’, requiring 
participants to immediately respond as to whether a perception was internal or 
external (in contrast to the ‘offline’ decisions required in a source memory task, 
which typically require a decision to be made at a later time point, e.g., Woodward, 
et al., 2007). Reality discrimination tasks typically take the form of signal detection 
tasks, in which the participant must decide whether a voice was present in a burst of 
noise. In these tasks, hallucinating patients tend to show a bias towards responding 
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that a voice is present in the noise (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012). In a non-
clinical sample, participants who reported more hallucinatory experiences also 
showed the same bias in responding (Barkus et al., 2011) (see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of signal detection methodology). These findings have been linked 
theoretically to the reality monitoring tasks described above, as providing evidence 
linking AVHs to an externalising bias (Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013). 
However, these tasks are not ideally positioned to test models of AVHs that specify 
the misattribution of internal mental events such as inner speech, for two main 
reasons: 1) they are not ‘online’ measures (source memory tasks, for example, are 
‘offline’ in that they require participants to decide who generated words earlier in the 
testing session); 2) they are either not specific to monitoring of speech or, if they are, 
are likely to use ‘overt’ (out loud) speech, as opposed to engaging the participant in 
auditory verbal imagery or inner speech. This limits the applicability of the results to 
inner speech models of AVHs, because it assumes that overt vocalisation in an 
experimental situation utilises the same mechanisms as covert or inner speech. 
Although there is evidence that overt and covert speech share cognitive and neural 
mechanisms, particularly in relation to the motor system (Perrone-Bertolotti, Rapin, 
Lachaux, Baciu, & Lœvenbruck, 2014), applicability of findings from studies 
requiring participants to use overt speech is limited. 
A more valid paradigm would require participants to engage in covert auditory 
verbal mental imagery, whilst simultaneously detecting the presence or absence of a 
similar auditory verbal stimulus, thus sidestepping both of the above problems. This 
would engage participants in covert auditory imagery, giving them the opportunity to 
misattribute internally generated imagery to an external source (i.e., falsely respond 
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that they believed a stimulus was presented), without including a time interval 
between stimulus presentation and participant response. 
1.2. Mental imagery and perception 
One task-based measure that meets the criteria outlined above (requiring an ‘online’ 
response from the participant, and using auditory imagery) has been used to study 
the interaction between mental imagery and perception. Perky (1910), a student in 
Edward Titchener’s laboratory which mainly used methods involving introspection 
by the participant, was the first to systematically study the effect of mental imagery 
on perception. Perky carried out a series of experiments that suggested that visual 
imagery interfered with the simultaneous perception of a visually presented stimulus 
(subsequently referred to as the Perky Effect). This was taken to indicate that, since 
mental imagery and perception could be confused, they must rely on similar 
mechanisms. However, others have found that mental imagery actually facilitates 
perceptions in the visual modality (Peterson & Graham, 1974). This finding has also 
been replicated in the auditory modality; for example, Farah and Smith (1983) 
engaged participants in auditory imagery of a pure tone, whilst simultaneously 
requiring them to detect a similar tone in noise. Participants were therefore required 
to distinguish between self-generated, internal mental imagery and an external 
stimulus. The results showed that using auditory imagery facilitated perception of the 
tone, although the task used did not include trials with no signal present, and so 
signal detection analysis was not reported. Findings on the interaction between 
imagery and perception have, therefore, been equivocal. 
More recently, Aleman et al. (2003) used a similar paradigm with a sample of 
patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, showing that the ‘gain’ on perception of a 
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pure tone due to auditory imagery was strongly correlated with hallucination 
severity. This finding was interpreted as reflecting an over-reliance on top-down 
processes in hallucinating patients (which could also be related to a bias towards 
labelling internal imagery as external). It should be noted that there was not a 
significant difference in performance on this task between non-hallucinating and 
hallucinating patients. This may have been due to the criterion used to separate 
hallucinating from non-hallucinating patients in the analysis, which meant that some 
patients in the non-hallucinating group may have hallucinated as recently as three 
months before participating. 
One problem with these studies is that they do not measure the effect of imagery on 
the tendency to falsely detect a signal in noise
2
, because there is always a signal 
present. This is a key variable when linking performance to the tendency to 
hallucinate, and also when performing signal detection analysis. From the data 
presented by Aleman et al. (2003), for example, it is not possible to tell whether the 
‘gain’ on perception was due to a change in sensitivity (an increased ability to 
distinguish signal from noise), or a change in response bias (i.e., participants being 
more willing to respond that a tone was present when using imagery). The 
previously discussed literature relating to biases in reality monitoring/discrimination 
would imply that it may be the latter. Imagery-perception interaction tasks, though, 
have the advantage of directly engaging participants in internal mental imagery (as 
opposed to speaking aloud), and requiring them to distinguish whether any 
subsequent perception was internally generated or not, hence meeting the criteria 
                                                 
2
 Farah & Smith (1983), however, note that many participants, when using auditory imagery of a pure 
tone, reported hearing the tone at times discordant with when the tone was actually presented, 
implying that imagery may have cause false detections. These false alarm responses were not 
quantified, however. 
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outlined above. As well as being informative on the nature of mental imagery, this 
makes the tasks ideal for testing inner speech models of AVHs.  
A further question stemming from inner speech models of AVHs relates to what may 
cause one instance of inner speech to become misattributed, but not another instance. 
As discussed, source monitoring theories may appeal to vividness of mental imagery 
and the effort associated with cognitions, but theories of AVHs have also suggested 
that unpleasant, ego-dystonic cognitions are more likely to become misattributed 
(Morrison, et al., 1995). This is consistent with reports that AVHs are more likely to 
occur in conditions of negative affect or stress (Nayani & David, 1996). However, 
the findings of studies that have investigated whether negatively valenced cognitions 
are more likely to become externally misattributed than neutral or positively-
valenced cognitions have been inconsistent (Bendall, Jackson, & Hulbert, 2011; 
Morrison, et al., 1995).  
In a recent meta-analysis of these studies (Brookwell et al., 2013), slightly larger 
externalizing biases were observed in studies that employed positive (Hedges g = 
0.75), than negative (Hedges g = 0.62), or than neutral stimuli (Hedges g = 0.50). 
However, because of the designs of the synthesized studies, it was not possible to 
examine whether these effect sizes differed from one another, which makes drawing 
any conclusions difficult (especially when only a small number of studies (five) were 
included in the meta-analysis). Recent work investigating how emotion can modulate 
intentional binding (a low-level measure of sensorimotor agency) showed that 
intentional binding was reduced (i.e., participants’ sense of agency over their actions 
was reduced) when participants’ actions were paired with a negative emotional 
outcome in comparison to when actions were paired with a neutral or positive 
outcome (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Thus, there are reasons to believe that 
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negatively-valenced cognitions may be more likely to become misattributed to an 
external source than are neutral or positively-valenced cognitions, although previous 
research has been equivocal.  
The present study therefore set out to test whether performance on an auditory signal 
detection task was affected by the generation of auditory verbal mental imagery, and 
whether this was linked to the emotional valence of the stimuli, and/or self-reported 
hallucination-proneness, in a non-clinical sample. However, two key changes were 
made to previous paradigms investigating AVI and signal detection. Firstly, trials in 
which no signal was present were included, to allow the generation of ‘false alarm’ 
responses and the calculation of relevant signal detection measures. Secondly, the 
signal detected was a voice (as opposed to a pure tone), in order to maximise the 
relevance of the task to inner speech models of AVHs.  
We conducted two experiments which manipulated or measured the extent to which 
participants generated AVI. In the first experiment, participants completed two 
blocks of auditory signal detection: one in which they were cued with a short 
sentence and required to generate AVI of that sentence whilst performing the task, 
and one in which there was no cued sentence or instruction to use AVI. In the second 
experiment, participants completed the same two blocks, but with no instruction to 
use AVI; instead, participants were invited retrospectively to report on the extent to 
which they felt they had used AVI whilst attempting to detect the auditory stimulus. 
We predicted that use of auditory verbal imagery would lower participants’ response 
bias, because it would lead to a higher likelihood of external misattributions (i.e., 
participants would have more opportunity to misattribute a self-generated event to an 
external source). Such a bias would lead participants to correctly detect more voices 
in the noise, but also incorrectly detect more voices in the noise (i.e., report hearing a 
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voice when none was present). Furthermore, drawing on the previous literature 
linking imagery-perception interactions and AVHs, we predicted that participants 
who scored highly on self-report measures of proneness to hallucinations may be 
particularly vulnerable to this effect. Finally, consistent with the findings of Yoshie 
and Haggard (2013) but in contrast to the findings of Brookwell et al. (2013), we 
predicted that participants’ response biases would be lower when they generated 
negative AVI than when they generated positive AVI. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, participants performed an auditory signal detection task 
under two conditions: 1) with a visually presented verbal cue using AVI and 2) with 
no cue, and no instruction to use AVI. We predicted that using imagery would lower 
participants’ response bias (making them more likely to report hearing a voice in the 
noise), but have no effect on sensitivity (the ability to distinguish between the voice 
and the noise). 
 
2.1. Materials and Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 125 participants from the undergraduate and staff 
population of Durham University, UK. Five participants were excluded from the 
final sample, due to technical malfunctions during the testing session (n = 3), or 
because their task sensitivity (d' – see below) was classified as an outlier (> 4.5 
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standard deviations above the mean) (n = 2). The final sample size was therefore 120 
(number of females = 91; mean age = 20.7, SD = 2.5, range = 18–30). 
2.1.2. Signal detection task 
The task required participants to listen to bursts of noise, and to respond whether 
they believed that a voice stimulus was present in the noise. All participants 
completed two conditions: one block in which they were asked to use auditory verbal 
imagery whilst detecting the stimuli (the ‘AVI’ condition) and one block in which 
they were not (the ‘non-AVI’ condition) 
Each block of the signal detection task (SDT) consisted of 80 trials, each lasting 5s 
(plus response time). Fig. 3.1 shows an illustration of a single trial of the task. In the 
AVI condition, participants were first presented with a 3–4 syllable sentence, in the 
centre of the screen, for 1.5s. In the non-AVI condition, participants were simply 
presented with a blank screen for 1.5s. This was followed by an on-screen 
countdown, which consisted of a shrinking circle, to mimic a ‘3, 2, 1...’ countdown. 
(It was not appropriate to use a verbal on-screen countdown, as this may have 
interfered with processing of the presented sentence.) Pink noise (which consists of 
equal energy per octave; generated using Audacity 2.0.2) began playing through the 
provided headphones, simultaneously with the countdown. The countdown was 
followed by a fixation cross, which was present on the screen for 2s. The participants 
were informed that, if there was a voice present in the noise, it would only appear 
when the fixation cross was present. Participants were then prompted to respond, 
with a button press, as to whether they believed a voice was present in the noise. 
The sentence presented to the participant always took the form of the words ‘I am’, 
followed by an adjective (i.e., the participant was required to repeat a sentence about 
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themselves). Half of the trials presented a positively valenced sentence (e.g. ‘I am 
happy’), whereas the other half presented negatively valenced sentences (e.g. ‘I am 
sad’). These sentences were rated for valence on a Likert scale (1 = very negative; 7 
= very positive), by a separate subset of participants (N = 13), none of whom 
participated in the main experiments. The ratings of the words used for positive 
sentences (M = 6.04, SD = 0.42) were significantly higher than the words used for 
negative sentences (M = 2.13, SD = 0.66), (t(65.9) = 31.53, p < .001, equal variances 
not assumed). (Additionally, none of the mean ratings for any individual positive 
words were rated lower than any of the negative words.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of a single trial in the AVI condition of the 
signal detection task. A sentence is presented to the participant (Screen 1), followed 
by a 1500ms countdown (Screens 2-4), followed by a fixation cross, which, on 
voice-present trials, was accompanied by a voice stimulus (Screen 5). Participants 
were instructed to ‘imagine saying’ the presented sentence when they saw the 
fixation cross, and then provide a response as to whether they believed a voice was 
present during Screen 6. The proportion of the trial during which pink noise played 
is indicated by the dashed line. 
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In 44/80 trials, a male voice stimulus was embedded in the noise as the fixation cross 
appeared on the screen, lasting for 1.5 seconds (‘voice-present trials’). The voice 
stimuli always spoke the words previously presented to the participant on-screen on 
that trial (that is, participants could specifically detect the words they had been 
presented with). Within the task, the signal-to-noise ratio (voice stimulus-to-noise 
volume ratio) varied between four different levels, based around the auditory 
threshold of pilot participants, none of whom participated in the main experiments. 
This was designed to maximise the ambiguity of the presented stimuli. In the 
remaining 36/80 trials, no voice was embedded in the noise (‘voice-absent trials’). 
The 44:36 ratio of present:absent trials was roughly based on previous auditory 
signal detection studies (e.g., Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, McKie, & Lewis, 2007), 
who included more voice-present than voice-absent trials, presumably to elicit a 
larger bias towards responding ‘present’ in all participants. Signal-to-noise ratio and 
the presence/absence of a voice stimulus were balanced across valence of the 
presented sentence. 
2.1.3. Measure of hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage 
The Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) (9 items) was used to 
assess hallucination-proneness. This measure was adapted by McCarthy-Jones and 
Fernyhough (2011), from the longer Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale used by 
Morrison, Wells, and Nothard (2000), and has previously shown high internal 
reliability. The scale assesses proneness to hallucinatory experiences in both the 
auditory and visual modality. 
Participants were also asked to estimate the extent to which they had generated AVI 
at the correct time point, giving a number between 0–100. 
85 
 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Participants wore over-the-ear headphones (Logik LHHIFI10) to complete the task. 
They were informed that they would be listening to bursts of noise, and listening out 
for a voice in the noise, responding present/absent with a button press. All 
participants were told that some voices would be easier to hear, whereas others 
would be quieter and harder to detect, although they were not informed how often a 
voice was likely to be present. For the AVI condition, participants were instructed to 
“imagine saying the sentence to yourself silently”, at the same time as the fixation 
cross appeared on the screen. They were also informed that, if there was a voice 
present in the noise, it would be presented at the same time as the fixation cross. 
During the practice phase of the AVI condition, participants were asked to speak the 
sentence out loud at the required time point for the first four trials, to ensure that they 
understood the instructions. If the participant did not vocalise the sentence at the 
appropriate time point, the practice trials were repeated until they were able to 
perform the task as requested. After the practice trials, participants were asked 
whether they understood the instructions relating to using AVI, and offered the 
chance to repeat the practice if unsure. In the non-AVI condition, participants were 
simply asked to detect a voice in the noise, but not given any instructions about 
imagining a voice.  
All participants completed both conditions of the SDT. The order in which they 
completed the tasks was counterbalanced across participants. Between the two 
blocks of trials, participants completed the self-report items (see Section 2.1.2), and 
completed a variety of other task-based measures (the results of which are reported 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
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2.1.5. Data analysis 
Performance on the SDT was analysed using signal detection theory. For each trial 
response, there were therefore four possible outcomes: hit (voice-present, ‘present’ 
response), miss (voice-present, ‘absent’ response), correct rejection (voice-absent, 
‘absent’ response) and false alarm (voice-absent, ‘present’ response). From these, 
signal detection parameters relating to response bias (β) and sensitivity (d') were 
calculated. Following Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), β was calculated as follows: 
    
             
 
 . d' is defined as the difference between the standardised hit rate 
and false alarm rate. 
There were two within group variables: task condition and sentence valence. A 
median split was also performed on the data according to score on the LSHS-R, 
grouping the participants into high (scoring ≥ 15 on the LSHS-R, N = 61) and low 
(scoring < 15, N = 59) hallucination-proneness; hence there was one between group 
variable: hallucination-proneness group (high/low). We therefore performed a 2 × 2 
× 2 mixed model ANOVA, with response bias (β) as the dependent variable, and 
task condition (AVI/non-AVI), sentence valence (positive/negative) and 
hallucination-proneness group (high/low) as independent variables. This analysis 
was also repeated with sensitivity (d') as the dependent variable, to test whether the 
manipulation affected participants’ ability to distinguish the voice from the noise. 
Where data was non-normally distributed, Mann-Whitney U tests were used during 
further analysis. 
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2.2. Results 
Participants generally reported being able to complete the task as instructed without 
difficulty, and reported using AVI with the fixation cross a relatively high amount 
(M = 91.7, SD = 9.0). There was no difference in the amount of AVI-usage reported 
between participants in the high (M = 90.58, SD = 9.2) and low (M = 92.88, SD = 
8.6) hallucination-proneness groups: t(117) = 1.40, p = .16. Descriptive statistics for 
response bias (β) and sensitivity (d') to the auditory SDT under the two conditions 
(AVI/non-AVI), for positively and negatively valenced sentences, and for high and 
low hallucination-prone participants, are shown in Table 3.1.  
2.2.1. Response bias (β) 
For descriptive statistics, see Table 3.1. For β (response bias), a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed 
model ANOVA showed a main effect of task condition (AVI/non-AVI): F(1, 118) = 
5.99, p = .016, showing that participants performed with a lower response bias in the 
AVI condition (M = 2.41, SD = 2.7) compared to when not using AVI (M = 2.97, SD 
= 3.01). There was no main effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1, 118) = 0.43, p = 
.51). There was a task condition × hallucination-proneness interaction: F(1, 118) = 
4.47, p = .037) (see Fig. 3.2a). Further analysis using Mann-Whitney U tests showed 
that the effect of AVI appeared to be specific to highly hallucination-prone 
participants, who had a significantly lower response bias in the AVI condition (Mdn 
= 1.12) than in the non-AVI condition (Mdn = 1.79): z = 3.51, p < .001, r = .45. In 
the low hallucination-prone participants, there was not a significant difference in β 
between the AVI condition (Mdn = 1.50) and the non-AVI condition (Mdn = 1.47): Z 
= 0.11, p = .91, r = .01. There was no effect of sentence valence on β: F(1, 118) = 1.18, 
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p = .28, nor any interactions between sentence valence and any other variables (all ps 
> .13).  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1, showing performance on the 
auditory signal detection task in the AVI and non-AVI task conditions, for high 
and low hallucination-prone participants, for positively and negatively valenced 
stimuli. (M, SD). AVI = auditory verbal imagery condition. Non-AVI = non-
auditory verbal imagery condition. + = positively valenced statements. - = negatively 
valenced statements. β = response criterion. d' = task sensitivity. 
 
2.2.2. Sensitivity (d') 
For descriptive statistics, see Table 3.1. For d' (sensitivity), there was no effect of 
task condition: F(1, 118) = .148, p = .701, nor any interaction between task condition 
and hallucination-proneness: F(1, 118) = 2.39, p = .125. There was no effect of valence 
on d': F(1, 118) = .316, p = .575, nor any interactions between valence and any other 
variables (all ps > .23). 
2.3. Discussion 
The first key finding from Experiment 1 was that when participants were instructed 
to use AVI during a signal detection task, there was a significant drop in response 
Hallucination-
proneness 
Valence 
AVI Non-AVI 
β d' β d' 
High 
+ 1.74 (1.5) 1.12 (0.6) 2.55 (1.8) 0.98 (0.6) 
- 1.83 (1.6) 1.10 (0.7) 2.47 (1.8) 1.03 (0.5) 
Low 
+ 2.37 (1.9) 0.92 (0.6) 2.36 (1.9) 0.93 (0.6) 
- 2.15 (1.6) 0.90 (0.5) 2.17 (1.6) 1.00 (0.6) 
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bias. That is, participants were more likely to respond that a voice was presented in 
the noise when they used imagery of the same verbal stimulus, regardless of whether 
it was actually presented. However, using AVI did not affect participants’ sensitivity 
(ability to distinguish between the speech and the noise). Importantly, the effect of 
AVI on response bias was specific to participants who scored highly on self-reported 
hallucination-proneness, whilst there was no difference between the imagery 
conditions in participants who reported few hallucinatory experiences. This supports 
previous findings suggesting that a bias in reality monitoring or reality 
discrimination may lead to auditory verbal imagery (such as inner speech) becoming 
misattributed to an external source. Equally, it is possible that use of AVI caused 
participants to exhibit a lower response bias. In this light, previous findings of lower 
response bias in signal detection tasks in hallucination-prone participants could be 
due to a higher rate of spontaneous AVI usage. This interpretation, though, is not 
supported by the present data, which indicated that there was no difference in AVI-
usage between individuals scoring high and low in hallucination-proneness. 
However, since all participants were instructed to use AVI, this may have masked 
potential differences in spontaneous AVI usage (a possibility that is explored further 
in Experiment 2, below). 
Contrary to our prediction, there was no effect of the emotional valence of the 
imagined sentence on performance, nor any interaction between valence and any 
other variables. This is consistent with previous research showing that, on a source 
memory task, the emotional valence of the stimuli did not affect performance or 
interact with hallucination-proneness (Bendall, et al., 2011). 
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3. Experiment 2 
The first experiment reported here showed that using AVI during auditory signal 
detection led to a reduction in response bias, especially in highly hallucination-prone 
individuals. However, one concern is that simply cuing participants with a sentence 
to imagine could have altered task performance, and that the observed effect could 
be due to priming of the sentence, rather than the use of AVI specifically (although 
the observed interaction with hallucination-proneness would still be of interest). The 
data from Experiment 1 is not capable of addressing this concern. Because almost all 
participants reported a high level of AVI use, it was not possible to determine 
whether the effect was specific to participants who engaged in high levels of AVI. 
To investigate this, we therefore conducted a second experiment, using identical 
stimuli, in which participants were not instructed to use AVI, but were still cued with 
a sentence before each signal detection trial. After task completion, participants were 
asked to introspectively report the extent to which they felt they had used AVI whilst 
performing the task. The rationale for this design was that it made it possible to 
investigate whether signal detection performance was associated with AVI use, even 
when participants were not explicitly instructed to use it. This design also enabled 
investigation of whether hallucination-prone participants reporting using more AVI 
during the task (and hence had a lower response bias), or whether the amount of AVI 
usage was similar between groups (and any lowered response bias was solely due to 
an interaction between AVI usage and hallucination-proneness, as suggested in 
Experiment 1).  
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Therefore, for Experiment 2, we predicted that there would only be a difference 
between the two task conditions in hallucination-prone individuals who reported 
using high levels of AVI whilst performing the SDT.  
3.1. Materials and Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 60 participants from the undergraduate and staff population 
of Durham University, UK, none of whom had taken part in Experiment 1 (number 
of females = 48; mean age = 19.73, SD = 2.5, range = 18–30). 
3.1.2. Procedure 
Using identical stimuli and equipment as in Experiment 1, participants completed 
two blocks of the SDT. Participants were given the same instructions for how to 
complete the task, with the only difference being that they were given no instructions 
relating to AVI. Therefore, they completed two conditions: a ‘non-cued’ condition 
(identical to the non-AVI condition in Experiment 1) and a ‘cued’ condition (in 
which the same sentences as in Experiment 1 were presented before each burst of 
noise, but there were no AVI instructions). Participants were informed that, in the 
cued condition, the sentence they were presented on-screen would be the same as the 
voice they were instructed to detect, although they were not required to be able to 
comprehend the sentence in the noise to respond ‘yes’. 
As in the first experiment, participants completed the 9 item LSHS-R as a measure 
of hallucination-proneness (see Section 2.1.2) between the two blocks of the SDT. 
After completion of the tasks, participants were asked to what extent they felt they 
had used AVI during the cued condition, whilst listening for a voice, providing an 
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answer for the question ‘This question relates to the task in which you were 
presented with a sentence before listening to the noise. When the fixation cross 
appeared on the screen, did you find yourself using ‘inner speech’ to say the 
previously presented sentence? If yes, what percentage of the time do you think you 
did this? (0–100)’. 
3.1.3. Data analysis 
As in Experiment 1, we performed a median split on the data according to LSHS-R 
score (high: ≥  15, N = 32; low: < 15, N = 28). We also performed a median split on 
the data according to the amount of AVI reported by the participants (high: ≥ 75, N = 
32; low: < 75, N = 28) and conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA, with task 
condition (cued/non-cued) as a within-subject variable, and hallucination-proneness 
(high/low) and AVI use (high/low) as between-subject variables. Due to the lack of 
effect of valence in Experiment 1, we did not include valence as a within-subject 
variable in this experiment. The dependent variable was response bias (β) on the 
SDT. The analysis was also repeated using sensitivity (d') as the dependent variable. 
3.2. Results 
Participants reported using AVI (‘inner speech’) a relatively high amount, 
considering that no instructions were given (M = 66.83, SD = 29.1), although 
estimates ranged from the bottom to the top of the scale (range = 0–100). A Mann-
Whitney U test indicated that there was no difference between the high (Mdn = 
77.50) and low (Mdn = 75.00) hallucination-proneness groups in the amount of AVI 
retrospectively reported (U = 436, p = .86, r = .02).  
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3.2.1. Response bias (β) 
For descriptive statistics, see Table 3.2. The 2 × 2 × 2 (task condition × AVI-usage × 
hallucination-proneness) mixed model ANOVA with β as the dependent variable 
indicated that there was no effect of task condition (F(1, 56) = .097, p = .76) on β. That 
is, the presentation of the to-be-detected sentence did not alter participants’ response 
biases. There was no interaction between condition and hallucination-proneness (F(1, 
56) = 2.17, p = .146). There was also no interaction between task condition and inner 
speech usage (F(1, 56) = .01, p = .91). The three-way interaction between task 
condition, hallucination-proneness and inner speech usage was not significant (F(1, 56) 
= 3.16, p = .08). However, since the interaction was close to significance, we 
explored the result further by conducting two 2 × 2 [AVI-usage × hallucination-
proneness] ANOVAs, for the cued and non-cued conditions separately.  
For the non-cued condition, there was no effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1, 56) = 
1.91, p = .17), no effect of AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 2.36, p = .13) and no interaction 
between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = .44, p = .51). This seems 
unsurprising, since the measure of AVI-usage specifically asked participants to 
estimate their usage of AVI only during the cued condition. For the cued condition, 
there was no main effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1, 56) = .07, p = .80), and there 
was a trend towards an effect of AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 3.75, p = .058), with 
participants who reported high levels of AVI (M = 1.99, SD = 2.59) showing a lower 
response bias than those who reported low levels of AVI (M = 3.56, SD = 3.41).  
Importantly, in the cued condition, there was a significant interaction between 
hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 9.12, p = .004). This interaction 
effect was explored by conducting two Mann-Whitney U tests for the cued 
94 
 
condition, comparing β between the high/low AVI-usage groups for both the high 
and low hallucination-proneness groups. This showed that, for the low hallucination-
proneness group, there was no significant difference in β between the high (Mdn = 
1.60) and low (Mdn = 1.80) AVI-usage groups (U = 93.0, p = .84, r = .04). However, 
for the high hallucination-proneness group, there was a significant difference in β 
between participants who reported high levels (Mdn = 1.01) of AVI-usage and those 
who reported low-levels (Mdn = 2.53) of AVI-usage (U = 66.0, p = .02, r = .41). 
 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2, showing performance on the 
auditory signal detection task, for high and low hallucination-prone 
participants, who reported high and low levels of AVI (M, SD). AVI = auditory 
verbal imagery; β = response bias; d' = sensitivity. 
Hallucination-
proneness 
AVI-usage 
Cued Non-cued 
β d' β d' 
High 
High 1.04 (0.4) 0.87 (0.6) 1.38 (0.7) 0.86 (0.6) 
Low 4.68 (4.2) 1.40 (0.5) 3.25 (3.6) 1.14 (0.6) 
Low 
High 3.07 (3.5) 1.23 (0.6) 3.12 (3.7) 1.03 (0.5) 
Low 2.27 (1.6) 1.04 (0.7) 3.87 (4.4) 1.11 (0.7) 
 
(a) Experiment 1 
* 
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Figure 3.2: Response bias (β) in Experiment 1 & 2 auditory signal detection 
task. (a) Performance on the AVI and non-AVI condition, in high and low 
hallucination-prone participants. AVI = auditory verbal imagery; Non-AVI = non-
auditory verbal imagery. (b) Performance on the cued condition of the SDT, split by 
reported level of AVI-usage, and high and low hallucination-proneness. High AVI = 
participants who reported levels of AVI above the median; Low AVI = participants 
who reported levels of AVI below the median. Error bars = 1 SEM. * p < .01. 
 
3.2.2. Sensitivity (d') 
For descriptive statistics, see Table 3.2. A 2 × 2 × 2 (task condition × AVI-usage × 
hallucination-proneness) mixed model ANOVA with d' as the dependent variable 
showed no significant effect of task condition (F(1, 56) = 1.98, p = .165). As in 
Experiment 1, there was no interaction between task condition and hallucination-
proneness (F(1, 56) = .254, p = .62). There was also no interaction between task 
condition and AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = .02, p = .90). However, as with response bias (β), 
there was an interaction, at the trend level, between task condition, hallucination-
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proneness and AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 3.74, p = .058). As with β, two 2 × 2 
[hallucination-proneness × AVI-usage] ANOVAs were conducted to explore this 
further. For the non-cued condition, there was no effect of hallucination-proneness 
(F(1, 56) = .18, p = .68), no effect of AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 1.35, p = .25), nor any 
interaction between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = .36, p = .55). 
For the cued condition, there was no effect of hallucination-proneness (F(1, 56) < .01, 
p = .99), nor an effect of AVI-usage (F(1, 56) = 1.11, p = .30). However, for the cued 
condition, there was an interaction between hallucination-proneness and AVI-usage 
(F(1, 56) = 5.23, p = .03). Mann-Whitney U tests showed that, for participants in the 
low hallucination-proneness group, there was no difference in d' between the high 
(Mdn = 1.23) and low (Mdn = 0.99) AVI-usage group (U = 78, p = .37, r = .17). For 
participants in the high hallucination-proneness group, those who were in the high 
AVI-usage (Mdn = 0.85) group had a significantly lower d' score than those in the 
low AVI-usage group (Mdn = 1.37) (U = 57, p = .008, r = 0.47). 
3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 used identical auditory and visual stimuli as Experiment 1; only the 
task instructions differed, in that participants were not told that they should use AVI. 
After completing the task, participants estimated the extent to which they had 
spontaneously engaged in AVI after being cued with a sentence. The results showed 
that both response bias and sensitivity were affected by the presence of a sentence 
cue only in participants who reported high levels of hallucination-proneness and 
reported using high levels of AVI whilst detecting a voice stimulus (although it 
should be noted that the three-way interactions only reached trend levels of 
significance). Nevertheless, results seemed to indicate that if the sentence cue did not 
97 
 
cause participants to use high levels of AVI, it did not have an effect on task 
performance; however, if participants used high levels of AVI, only the participants 
who scored highly on self-reported hallucination-proneness showed a lowered 
response bias, and reduced sensitivity, when cued with a sentence. 
These results are partially consistent with the results from Experiment 1: they 
indicate that highly hallucination-prone individuals show a lower response bias when 
using AVI. However, unlike Experiment 1, the results from Experiment 2 indicated 
that use of AVI also affected sensitivity to the task in highly hallucination-prone 
individuals. This was an unexpected finding, which may be explained by a greater 
increase in the number of ‘false alarm’ responses relative to the increase in ‘hit’ 
responses. That is, if the participant mistook internally-generated AVI for an 
externally located perception, it may have had a relatively smaller effect on the hit 
rate, especially if presentation of a stimulus at a low signal-to-noise ratio affected 
performance. For example, the presentation of voice stimuli (even below a 
participant’s auditory threshold) may have interfered with the likelihood that 
internally generated AVI was mistaken as external. 
It should be noted that the statistical power for the three-way interaction in 
Experiment 2 is low (observed β = .42). Given that exploration of the interaction was 
based on a finding that was above the traditional level of statistical significance, this 
finding should be replicated with a larger sample size. 
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4. General Discussion 
To summarise, the two experiments reported in this paper examined the effect of the 
generation of auditory verbal imagery (AVI) on auditory signal detection, in 
participants who reported high or low levels of hallucination-proneness. Experiment 
1 showed that, when instructed to use AVI, participants showed a lower response 
bias, being more willing to respond that a voice was present in noise, compared to 
performance on a standard auditory signal detection task. Further analysis showed 
that this effect was specific to participants who score highly on self-reported 
hallucination-proneness. Emotional valence of the material being imagined did not 
affect performance. Experiment 2 compared performance on a standard auditory 
signal detection task, and a variant of the task in which participants were cued with a 
sentence to detect, but not given any instructions to use AVI. The results suggested 
that hallucination-prone participants only showed a lower response bias when they 
retrospectively reported using AVI, despite not being instructed to do so (a finding 
only at trend levels of significance). In Experiment 2, counter to expectations, task 
sensitivity was also affected by usage of AVI. 
These findings provide support for models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) 
which suggest that they may result from an external misattribution of an internal 
mental event, such as inner speech (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 1992; Jones 
& Fernyhough, 2007b). The present studies partially support previous findings 
which have shown lower response biases in auditory signal detection, in both clinical 
and non-clinical samples that report frequent hallucinatory experiences (Brookwell 
et al., 2013), and extend the findings by showing that hallucination-prone individuals 
only showed a lower response bias when using AVI. As far as we are aware, 
99 
 
previous studies that have linked performance on signal detection tasks to 
hallucinations have not incorporated variation in AVI/inner speech usage into their 
study design.  
Given that there was no association between level of reported AVI and level of 
reported hallucination-proneness, the results cannot be explained in terms of 
increased AVI usage in hallucination-prone individuals. Instead, the results suggest 
that when hallucination-prone individuals do use AVI, it is more liable to become 
externally misattributed. This is consistent with the previously outlined inner speech 
models of AVHs. The present study does not, however, provide evidence to 
distinguish between precise mechanisms at play in reality discrimination or reality 
monitoring biases. It is possible that hallucination-prone participants misattributed 
AVI due to high levels of vividness of the imagery, making it harder to distinguish 
from a ‘real’ perception. High levels of vividness of mental imagery may be a trait 
shared by hallucination-prone individuals, which could lead to a higher likelihood of 
external misattributions. Alternatively, low levels of cognitive effort associated with 
AVI generation may have led to a similar effect in this group. Neuroscientific 
findings describing activations in inner speech and those occurring during AVHs 
have implicated speech production areas, as well as primary and secondary auditory 
cortical regions, in the generation of AVHs (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 
2008), as well as showing higher levels of activity in auditory cortical (including 
speech perception) regions when patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia use inner 
speech (Simons et al., 2010). Ford et al. (2001) previously showed that inner speech 
usage in hallucinating individuals was not associated with the same cortical 
attenuation in response to an external stimulus as in non-hallucinating individuals. In 
combination with the present results, this may imply that hallucination-prone 
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individuals’ inner speech may be associated with higher levels of vividness, reflected 
in higher levels of activity in speech perception regions. This is supported by 
neuroimaging findings showing that auditory mental imagery (in a non-clinical 
sample) rated as higher in vividness is associated with higher levels of activity in 
speech perception regions (Zvyagintsev, Clemens, Chechko, Mathiak, Sack, & 
Mathiak, 2013). This is also consistent with the conclusions of Aleman et al. (2003), 
who interpreted the effects of auditory imagery on task performance as evidence of 
higher perceptual detail in the AVI of hallucinators, and may suggest that earlier 
findings relating to the interaction between imagery and perception (Farah & Smith, 
1983) are linked to reality discrimination biases through the perceptual detail 
involved in auditory imagery. 
Unexpectedly, hallucination-prone participants did not show a lower response bias 
on signal detection overall: the effect was only observed when using AVI. In this 
respect, the results are inconsistent with previous findings (e.g., Barkus et al., 2007; 
Rankin & O'Carroll, 1995; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011) which have suggested 
that hallucination-proneness is associated with a lower response bias in typical 
auditory signal detection. It is possible that task differences (for example, cueing the 
participants with a fixation cross at the point of the voice stimulus presentation, even 
in non-AVI versions of the task) could have affected performance in our study, and 
may make our results in non-AVI conditions non-comparable with previously 
conducted research. It is possible, for example, that presentation of the cross to cue 
voice presentation may have focused attention on voice detection, and therefore 
reduced the rate of spontaneous AVI, which may have masked the association with 
hallucination-proneness. In future experiments, it would be informative to include a 
condition in which no voice presentation cue is included, to test this hypothesis. 
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One possible objection to the interpretation of this data as relating directly to the 
external misattribution of internal mental imagery relates to the role of working 
memory, and the cognitive load associated with generating AVI during the task. 
Research has previously shown that increasing working memory load can lead to a 
reduction in the sense of agency over self-generated actions (Hon, Poh, & Soon, 
2013). From our data, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the increased 
working memory load (by presenting a sentence to be detected) may have interacted 
with hallucination-proneness, which could underlie the observed effect; however, 
this explanation seems unlikely, given the relatively light cognitive load involved in 
our task. Hon, Poh, and Soon, for example, did not find an effect of working 
memory on the sense of agency using a lower working memory load (two presented 
items), but did with a higher load (six presented items). This therefore seems like an 
unlikely explanation for our results. 
It is also not possible to rule out that attentional processes may underlie the observed 
effect; for example, heightened attention to the to-be-detected stimuli in the AVI 
condition may have increased the participants’ willingness to respond that a voice 
was present (although the reverse could also be the case, in that heightened attention 
could plausibly decrease willingness to respond a voice was present).Contemporary 
cognitive theories have suggested that biased attentional processes may underlie 
some AVHs (Hugdahl et al., 2008), and it is likely that reality discrimination biases 
and attentional biases are not wholly independent constructs. Future research, 
though, should investigate the relation between working memory, attentional biases 
and auditory signal detection in relation to hallucinations. 
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A key area of research will be to understand what causes some instances of 
AVI/inner speech to become misattributed, but not others. The present study found 
no evidence that negatively valenced words were more likely to become 
misattributed, which does not provide evidence for the hypothesis that negative, ego-
dystonic thoughts may be externalised and experienced as a hallucination (Morrison, 
et al., 1995). This supports previous research using source memory tasks, which 
found that words associated with traumatic events were not more likely to be 
externally misattributed (Bendall, et al., 2011). Previous research has, however, 
shown that inducing negative affect in participants causes an increase in the number 
of external misattributions on a typical auditory signal detection paradigm (Smailes, 
Meins, & Fernyhough, 2014). This might imply that the content of the inner speech 
does not play a role in its misattribution, but instead a general state of negative affect 
may cause an increase in the likelihood of external misattributions. Future research 
should aim to examine the precise role played by affect in reality discrimination. An 
alternative (although not exclusive) possibility is that dialogic inner speech (that 
takes on the quality of a back-and-forth conversation), or inner speech that includes 
the voices of other people, may be more likely to be misattributed under conditions 
of high cognitive load or stress (Fernyhough, 2004; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a). 
Further research that manipulates qualitative aspects of AVI and investigates their 
interaction with affective state is merited. 
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Chapter 4 
Cognitive predictors of hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical sample 
The study in Chapter 3 showed that engaging participants in auditory verbal mental 
imagery during a signal detection task resulted in a lower response bias (participants 
were more willing to respond that they detected a voice in a burst of noise, 
irrespective of the actual presence of a stimulus). Furthermore, this effect appeared 
to be specific to participants who reported more frequent hallucinatory experiences, 
implying that difficulty distinguishing between internal and external perceptions is 
associated with proneness to hallucinations. This is consistent with the theory that 
hallucinations result from an external misattribution of inner speech, due to biased 1) 
source monitoring, 2) reality discrimination, or 3) self-monitoring processes. 
Problematically, despite being associated with performance on different tasks, these 
three terms have often been assumed to reflect a similar mechanism associated with 
hallucinations (i.e., the tendency to misattribute something internal as external). An 
important question is therefore whether these tasks are all associated with 
hallucination-proneness, and if so, whether they account for the same variance. 
Therefore, the following chapter utilised various task-based and self-report measures 
(including the signal detection data from the AVI condition in Chapter 3, Experiment 
1) to explore whether these tasks index similar or independent cognitive constructs, 
using hierarchical regression analyses to investigate which, if any, of the tasks, 
predicted hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical sample.   
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Abstract 
Cognitive models have proposed that hallucinations occur when an internal mental 
event is misattributed to an external source, due to atypical source monitoring, reality 
discrimination, or self-monitoring. It is unclear, however, whether task-based 
measures that have been used to assess these abilities tap into a common cognitive 
construct, or whether they require participants to engage in fundamentally different 
processes. Tendencies to use different types of inner speech, for example with a 
dialogic structure, have also previously been linked to auditory hallucinations in non-
clinical samples. In the present study, a student sample completed a variety of tasks 
that have previously been linked to hallucination-proneness in clinical and non-
clinical populations, and completed self-report measures relating to inner speech 
phenomenology. A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to investigate 
whether these variables accounted for unique or overlapping variance in self-
reported hallucination-proneness. Results indicated that a tendency to use dialogic 
inner speech, and performance on reality discrimination tasks, independently 
predicted hallucination-proneness, whilst internal source monitoring did not. 
Unexpectedly, performance on an action self-monitoring task was positively 
associated with hallucination-proneness. These findings imply that several tasks 
which have been linked to one construct may relate to different underlying 
mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
Contemporary research into hallucinations has examined the extent to which 
proneness to such experiences is distributed on a continuum in the general 
population (Johns & van Os, 2001), and there is now a large body of research 
indicating that hallucinations are reported by a substantial proportion of the 
population, at some point in their lives (Beavan, Read, & Cartwright, 2011). The 
most prominent cognitive models of hallucinations have proposed that they occur 
when an internal mental event is misattributed to an external source; for example, an 
auditory hallucination (AH) may be experienced when inner speech is misattributed 
(Jones & Fernyhough, 2007), or a visual hallucination when visual imagery is 
misattributed (Brebion, Ohlsen, Pilowsky, & David, 2008). Therefore, one fruitful 
approach has been to examine associations between self-reported ‘hallucination-
proneness’, and performance on cognitive tasks designed to assess participants’ 
ability to distinguish between internally and externally generated perceptions 
(Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005), with the hypothesis that individuals who report more 
hallucinatory experiences will perform differently on these tasks. These cognitive 
tasks have been linked to two separate theoretical strands of research: reality 
monitoring, embedded in the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993), and self-monitoring embedded in motor theories of agency (Frith, 
1992). 
The source monitoring framework attempts to explain how we make judgements 
about the origin (source) of remembered information, using various characteristics 
such as perceptual, semantic or affective detail, or cognitive effort (Johnson et al., 
1993). The term ‘source monitoring’, as a whole, can be divided into three 
categories: internal source monitoring (distinguishing between multiple internal 
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sources; for example, whether a word was spoken aloud or imagined), external 
source monitoring (distinguishing between external sources; for example, whether a 
word was spoken by one person or another person), or reality monitoring 
(distinguishing between internal and external sources; for example, whether a word 
was spoken by oneself, or someone else). Some theories argue that hallucinations 
may be instances in which reality monitoring has either failed, or become biased 
towards labelling information as external (Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991), and this 
is supported by numerous studies showing that hallucinating psychotic patients are 
more likely to incorrectly recall a word as externally generated than non-
hallucinating patients (Bentall et al., 1991; Stephane, Kuskowski, McClannahan, 
Surerus, & Nelson, 2010; Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007), especially under 
conditions of high cognitive effort (Bentall et al., 1991). This finding also appears to 
hold for non-clinical samples who report more frequent hallucinatory experiences 
(Larøi, Van der Linden, & Marczewski, 2004).  
Some studies have, however, also indicated that a similar bias may be present for 
internal source monitoring tasks, towards labelling imagined items as 
performed/spoken aloud (Franck, Rouby, Daprati, Daléry, Marie-Cardine, & 
Georgieff, 2000; Gawęda, Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2013). One possible 
explanation for these findings is that biases in recalling what Johnson et al. (1993) 
call “the actual (public) vs. imaginal (private) status of the information” (p. 3) are 
linked to hallucinations, and that this bias is picked up on by both internal source 
monitoring and reality monitoring tasks (with words spoken aloud in internal source 
monitoring tasks being more ‘public’ than those that are imagined). A recent meta-
analysis showed that while reality monitoring was associated with proneness to 
hallucinations in non-clinical samples, there was insufficient evidence relating 
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internal source monitoring to hallucinations to reach any concrete conclusions 
(Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013). 
Other strands of research relating to reality monitoring have related biases in 
auditory signal detection (most commonly, detecting a voice in noise) to the 
tendency to experience hallucinations. Unlike source memory paradigms, this 
requires the participant to make an ‘online’ decision about whether a perception is 
internally or externally generated, and has previously been termed ‘reality 
discrimination’ to distinguish it from the ‘offline’ decisions made during source 
memory tasks (that is, when there is a delay between stimulus presentation and the 
decision regarding whether it was self-generated or not) (Bentall et al., 1991). 
Reality discrimination has, though, been theoretically linked to source monitoring 
processes (Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 2003), on the grounds that 
such tasks require participants to decide whether any perceived voices were present 
in the noise, or were simply generated internally. Numerous studies have associated 
proneness to hallucinations with a bias in auditory signal detection towards reporting 
hearing voices in noise, in both clinical (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012) and non-
clinical (Barkus et al., 2011) samples. Importantly, most studies show no between-
group difference in sensitivity (the ability to distinguish between speech and noise) to 
the signal detection task (though see Vercammen, de Haan, and Aleman, 2008, for 
an exception).  
Some studies have explicitly engaged participants in mental imagery whilst they 
perform signal detection, to investigate the role of imagery generation on reality 
discrimination and false perception (Aleman, et al., 2003, also see Chapter 3 of this 
thesis), with results indicating that hallucination-proneness was linked to a tendency 
to mistake self-generated imagery for an external stimulus. Various other tasks have 
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also been used to elicit imaginary verbal experiences, and therefore linked to source 
monitoring; for example, the jumbled speech task asks participants to listen to 
speech-like sounds and requires them to report any words they believe were present 
(Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, & Coltheart, 2007). However, it is unclear to what 
extent these tasks tap into the same cognitive mechanisms as the aforementioned 
source memory tasks, or whether atypical jumbled speech or signal detection 
performance may independently predict proneness to hallucinations. An important 
area of research would therefore be to investigate whether source monitoring and 
reality discrimination tasks account for the same variation in hallucination-
proneness, or whether they appear to be measuring separate cognitive constructs. 
A separate, though related, strand of research is grounded in motor theories which 
attempt to explain how agency is experienced for self-generated actions (self-
monitoring). The most prominent theory has suggested that, when a motor command 
for an action is generated, the predicted consequences of that action (sent via an 
‘efference copy’) are compared with the resulting incoming sensory information. If 
the prediction and incoming sensory information match, the cortical response is 
attenuated, and the action is experienced as self-generated. Various theories have 
linked aberrant self-monitoring (efference copy) mechanisms to auditory verbal 
hallucinations specifically
3
 (Ford, Roach, Faustman, & Mathalon, 2007; Heinks-
Maldonado et al., 2007), or schizophrenia more generally (Frith, 1992; Whitford, 
Ford, Mathalon, Kubicki, & Shenton, 2012). It is now a fairly well-replicated finding 
that patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia perform poorly on tasks requiring 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted, however, that many studies, including those cited here, have not shown that 
efference copy mechanisms are dysfunctional in only hallucinating individuals. Instead, the studies 
usually show a difference in the N1 ERP response (thought to reflect an efference copy mechanism) 
to self-produced vocalisations, between patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and healthy 
controls. 
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them to monitor their own actions without visual feedback (Frith & Done, 1989) or 
with distorted visual feedback (Franck et al., 2001), and it is therefore possible that 
an aberrant self-monitoring system may be able to explain various psychotic 
symptoms.  
Such tasks often require participants to take control of a visually presented stimulus 
using a computer mouse or joystick, and, in the absence of visual feedback of the 
movement, discriminate which stimuli are related to movements initiated by the 
participant and which are not (Franck, et al., 2001; Williams & Happé, 2009). 
Theoretically, an aberrant efference copy system should lead to lower performance 
on these tasks: because participants cannot rely on external feedback, they must rely 
on internally generated signals to monitor their performance.  Similarly to source 
monitoring accounts outlined above, self-monitoring theories may specifically be 
able to explain how internal mental events, such as inner speech, could become 
misattributed to an external source, and therefore experienced as a hallucination 
(Jones & Fernyhough, 2007). There have, however, been comparatively few studies 
investigating self-monitoring and hallucination-proneness in non-clinical samples, 
and so a fruitful area of investigation would be to study to what extent clinical 
findings are replicable in non-clinical samples. 
A third variable that has been linked to proneness to hallucinations is 
phenomenology of inner speech (McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011). A 
commonly cited problem with theories that explain auditory verbal hallucinations as 
misattributed inner speech is that heard voices tend to be experienced in the second 
or third person (‘you’, ‘he/she’) and in someone else’s voice (Nayani & David, 
1996), which does not seem consistent with a folk conceptualisation of the 
experience of inner speech. However, from a Vygotskian perspective, it has been 
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argued that typical inner speech may be dialogic in nature (i.e., involving the back-
and-forth of a conversation), and may frequently include the voices of other people, 
representing the developmental endpoint of a gradual internalisation of dialogues 
held externally (Fernyhough, 1996, 2004). This would be consistent with a view of 
inner speech as important in self-evaluation (Morin & Michaud, 2007), which could 
explain why many AHs take the form of a voice commenting or instructing the 
individual.  
A recent investigation of individual’s self-reported experience of inner speech 
showed variations on a number of different dimensions, including a tendency to 
engage in dialogic inner speech, to use inner speech involving the voice of another 
person, to use inner speech for evaluation of one’s own behaviour, and to use inner 
speech with a ‘condensed’ (abbreviated or shortened) format (McCarthy-Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2011). Importantly, the first three of these dimensions correlated 
significantly with self-reported proneness to hallucinatory experiences, and when 
controlling for other factors such as anxiety and depression, tendency to use dialogic 
inner speech was a significant predictor of proneness to AHs specifically. A 
subsequent study replicated the factor structure and reliability of these dimensions of 
inner speech, but did not replicate the unique variance in hallucination-proneness 
accounted for by reported dialogicality of inner speech (Alderson-Day et al., 2014), 
although this may have been due to the inclusion of different covariates relating to 
anxiety and depression. 
 
 
 
114 
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the types of monitoring often associated with AVHs, 
their definitions, and associated tasks. The definitions are not mutually exclusive; 
it is not clear to what extent the various types of monitoring refer to the same or 
different cognitive mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
Type of monitoring Definition Associated tasks 
Self-monitoring The ability to tell whether an 
action is self-produced or not; 
often associated with a sense of 
authorship over actions. Self-
monitoring theories have 
traditionally been based in 
theories suggesting that we 
experience agency over our 
actions as a result of efference 
copies sent by the motor system 
to sensory cortices. 
Error monitoring (participant must 
detect when a self-controlled 
stimulus does not concord with 
their movement). 
Action monitoring (participant must 
distinguish self-controlled stimulus 
movements from non-self-
controlled movements, compared to 
when someone else controls the 
stimulus). 
Source monitoring:   
 Internal source 
monitoring 
Distinguishing between two self-
produced (internal) sources of 
information. 
Source memory (did I say or 
imagine that word?) 
 External source 
monitoring 
Distinguishing between two non-
self-produced (external) sources 
of information. 
Source memory (did that person say 
that word, or another person?) 
 Reality monitoring Distinguishing between self-
produced and non-self-produced 
(internal and external) sources of 
information. 
Source memory (did I say/imagine 
that word, or did someone else?) 
Reality discrimination Distinguishing between self-
produced and non-self-produced 
sources of information. This 
term has generally been used to 
refer to instances in which the 
participant is required to make 
an online (immediate) decision 
about the source of information. 
Auditory signal detection task 
(detecting a voice in noise) 
Jumbled speech task (hearing 
words in jumbled speech) 
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An interesting question is therefore whether the tendency to engage in specific forms 
of inner speech can predict proneness to hallucinatory experiences independently of 
source memory and self-monitoring biases/deficits, or instead whether they might 
account for the same variance. Likewise, it is important to establish whether the 
assorted tasks which have been related to source monitoring or self-monitoring are 
all associated with proneness to hallucinations, and if so, whether they account for 
the same or different variance.  
The present study set out to test this by asking participants to complete four tasks 
that have previously been used to assess source monitoring, reality discrimination or 
self-monitoring (in both verbal and non-verbal modalities): 1) a signal detection 
(reality discrimination) task that required participants to indicate the presence or 
absence of speech stimuli in noise, whilst using auditory imagery (using the same 
data as described in Chapter 3); 2) a source memory task that required participants to 
imagine or say words under conditions of high or low cognitive effort, and later 
recall how they had produced the word (internal source monitoring); 3) an ‘action 
monitoring’ task that required participants to map self-generated and non-self-
generated hand movements onto a visually presented stimulus (self-monitoring); 4) 
an auditory task which asked participants to pick out (non-existent) verbal stimuli in 
‘jumbled speech’. Participants also completed self-report measures relating to inner 
speech phenomenology, as well as depression and anxiety. Measures of depression 
and anxiety were taken to test whether any observed associations were specific to 
hallucinations, as opposed to 1) reflecting a general style of responding on self-
report measures (i.e., common method variance), or 2) reflecting an association with 
a general alteration in cognitive state which may be shared between hallucination-
proneness and depression/anxiety.  
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The aim of the study was to investigate whether these tasks and self-report measures 
predicted hallucination-proneness (also assessed with a self-report questionnaire), 
and if so, whether they accounted for overlapping or unique variation in tendency to 
experience hallucinations. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
120 participants were recruited from the staff and student population of a UK 
university, via email invitation and advertisements in various departments. 10 
participants were not included in the subsequent analysis, as they did not complete 
all tasks due to technical failures or early withdrawal from the study. We recruited 
participants between the ages of 18–30 (M = 20.79, SD = 2.56, no. females = 87), as 
the nature of signal detection analysis required that volume levels of the auditory 
stimuli were kept constant across all participants, and age may have affected the 
sensitivity to the auditory tasks. We also specified that participants should not have 
any diagnosed hearing problems, and that they spoke English as a first language. All 
gave written informed consent, and ethical approval was given by Durham 
University Ethics Committee. 
2.2. Self-report measures 
2.2.1. Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) 
The LSHS-R is a 9-item questionnaire which assesses predisposition to hallucinatory 
experiences. It was adapted by McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) from 
Morrison, Wells, and Nothard’s (2000) Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale, 
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which had relatively low internal reliability. The questionnaire consists of two 
subscales, relating to auditory hallucinations (LSHS-Raud) (e.g., ‘I have had the 
experience of hearing a person’s voice and then found that no-one was there’) and 
visual hallucinations (LSHS-Rvis) (e.g., ‘I see shadows and shapes when nothing is 
there’). Each item is scored on a four-point Likert scale from 1 (‘never’) to 4 
(‘almost always’), summing to total scores from 9-36. 
2.2.2. Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
The HADS is a 14-item questionnaire consisting of two subscales, measuring 
anxiety (HADSanx) (seven items, e.g., ‘In the past month, I have felt tense and wound 
up’) and depression (HADSdep) (seven items, e.g., ‘In the past month, I have felt 
‘slowed down’’). It has previously been shown to have satisfactory psychometric 
properties (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Each item is scored between 0–3, summing to 
a total score between 0–21 for each subscale. 
2.2.3. Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire (VISQ) 
The VISQ is an 18-item questionnaire, designed to assess the self-reported 
phenomenological properties of inner speech. It consists of four subscales, relating to 
tendency to engage in dialogic inner speech (VISQdialogic, 4 items), tendency to use 
inner speech consisting of voices other than one’s own (VISQother, 5 items), tendency 
to use inner speech to evaluate and motivate behaviour (VISQeval, 4 items) and 
tendency to use condensed inner speech (VISQcondensed, 5 items). It has satisfactory 
psychometric properties (Alderson-Day et al., 2014; McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 
2011). Each item is scored between 1 (‘certainly does not apply to me’) and 6 
(‘certainly applies to me’). 
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2.3. Task-based measures 
2.3.1. Signal detection task (SDT) 
In this task, participants listened to bursts of pink noise generated using Audacity 
2.0.2, through over-the-ear headphones (Logik LHHIFI10), and were asked to 
respond with a button press (yes/no) as to whether they believed a voice to be 
present in the noise. At the same time, they were asked to engage in auditory 
imagery of the same sentence, which had previously been presented visually. The 
aim of the task was therefore to require the participant to decide whether any 
perceived sentence was self-generated (i.e., they imagined it) or non-self-generated 
(i.e., it appeared in the noise). 
There were 80 trials, with each burst of noise lasting 3.5 seconds. In 44/80 trials, a 
male voice was present (‘voice-present trials’) at one of four possible volumes, based 
slightly above and below the threshold at which 50% of participants in a small pilot 
study tended to detect the voice. In the remaining 36 trials only noise was played 
(‘voice-absent trials’). Voice-present and voice-absent trials were presented in a 
random order. Before each trial, a short sentence (3–4 syllables) was presented in the 
centre of the computer screen, which the participant was asked to ‘imagine saying’ 
when the fixation cross appeared on the screen. This sentence was always the same 
as that spoken by the voice stimulus, embedded in the noise. In each trial, 
participants were then cued with a countdown lasting 1.5 seconds, which started at 
the same time as the noise. The countdown consisted of a circle positioned in the 
centre of the computer screen shrinking, which was followed by the fixation cross in 
the centre of the screen. At the fixation cross, the voice stimulus was presented in the 
noise (on the voice-present trials), and the participant was asked to simultaneously 
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imagine saying the previously presented sentence. After each burst of noise, 
participants were visually cued to respond with the question ‘Was there a voice 
present in the noise?’, and pressed a button on the computer keyboard to give their 
response. Participants were informed that, if a voice was present, it would appear in 
the pink noise at the same time as the fixation cross. They were also told that voices 
may be present at a variety of volumes, although they were not told on how many 
trials a voice would be present. Before completing the main task, participants 
conducted a practice task consisting of 8 bursts of noise. On half of these trials, 
participants were asked to speak the cued sentence aloud with the fixation cross, to 
show that they understood the timing of the task. On the remaining trials, 
participants used auditory imagery as in the main task; the experimenter then 
checked that the participant understood the instructions regarding the auditory 
imagery, before the main task started. 
Overall, the SDT task lasted approximately 9 minutes, including an enforced 30-
second break midway through the task. The dependent variables in this task were 
signal detection measures: β, a measure of response bias (with a lower value 
indicating a lower criterion for responding that a voice was present) and d', a 
measure of task sensitivity (with a lower value indicating less ability to distinguish 
between signal and noise). 
Since our previous finding demonstrated that auditory signal detection was only 
associated with hallucination-proneness when participants were concurrently 
engaged in auditory verbal imagery (see chapter 3), only this version of the task was 
entered into the regression analysis (whereas the signal detection performance with 
no auditory imagery was not included). 
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2.3.3. Internal source monitoring task (SMT) 
This task assessed source memory for internally generated items (imagined, or 
spoken aloud), and was based loosely on that used by Franck et al. (2000). There 
were two stages to the SMT. In the word completion stage, participants were 
presented with a series of easy ‘word pairs’ (for example, ‘gold and silver’), some of 
which they were required to say out loud, and some of which they were instructed to 
say to themselves using inner speech. 80 word pairs were included in the task, 40 of 
which were presented to the participant fully (e.g., ‘black and white’), and so only 
requiring low cognitive effort from the participant; and 40 of which were only 
partially completed (e.g., ‘black and w____’), requiring higher effort from the 
participant to complete. For each trial, the instruction (‘Out Loud’ or ‘Inner Speech’) 
appeared on the screen for 1250ms, followed by the word pair, for 3250ms, followed 
by an intertrial interval of 750ms. Participants were instructed to say the full word 
pair, in the manner instructed, as soon as possible after the presentation. If they did 
not know the correct answer to the uncompleted word pair, they were asked to 
indicate this with a button press. They were not informed that a memory test would 
follow the word completion stage. After the word completion stage, participants took 
a break from the task, in which they completed the jumbled speech task (see Section 
2.3.4), and began completing the self-report measures (described in Section 2.2).  
After 15 minutes, participants were asked to complete the recall stage of the task, in 
which they were presented with the second part of each word pair (e.g., ‘white’), in a 
random order. Participants were instructed to try to recall whether they said each 
word ‘out loud’ or using ‘inner speech’, responding with a button press. Each word 
was presented in the centre of the computer screen until a response was made. The 
dependent variables for this task were the signal detection measures: β (response 
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bias) (with a lower value corresponding to a lower criterion for responding that a 
word was spoken aloud) and d' (sensitivity) (with a lower value indicating less 
ability to distinguish which words were spoken aloud and which using inner speech). 
2.3.4. Jumbled speech task (JST) 
This task was adapted from the stimuli used by Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, and 
Coltheart (2007). Participants were presented with a recording of a ‘jumbled’ female 
voice, and asked to type any words or phrases heard in the speech. The stimuli had 
been prepared by segmenting the speech at random silent intervals, reversed and then 
assembled into a continuous stream of jumbled speech. Participants listened to 12 
tracks of jumbled speech (as well as one practice track), each lasting nine seconds. 
After each track, they were invited to type in any words or phrases heard in the 
speech. The dependent variable for this task was the number of syllables each 
participant reported hearing in all trials. Following the procedure of Fernyhough et 
al. (2007), words that were reported by > 10% of participants in each trial were 
removed from subsequent analysis as an illusion (i.e., specific words that were 
reported commonly may represent perception of parts of the jumbled speech that, by 
coincidence, sounded like real words). 
2.3.5. Action monitoring task (AMT) 
This task was adapted from the task used by Williams and Happé (2009), in which 
participants were given control of a computer mouse, and asked to determine which 
of a group of squares displayed on the computer screen they were able to control the 
movement of using the mouse (see Fig. 4.1). Whilst all squares on the screen stopped 
or started moving simultaneously, only one square moved in a direction consistent 
with the mouse movement. Participants’ score corresponded to the number of 
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squares that were correctly identified as controlled by the mouse. There were two 
conditions to the task: 1) the participant freely controlled the mouse; 2) the 
participant rested their hand on the mouse, and attempted to determine which square 
was controlled by the experimenter, as the experimenter moved the mouse. In both 
conditions, the participant’s arm was occluded from view underneath a box. In the 
first, ‘self-controlled’ condition, the participant must therefore map the movement of 
their hand onto a square on the screen, using both information derived from internal 
motor processes and proprioceptive feedback from their hand. In the second, ‘other-
controlled’ condition, the participant could only rely on proprioceptive feedback, 
since the experimenter was in control of the mouse. Therefore, following the 
procedure of Williams and Happé (2009), the ability to monitor self-produced 
actions using only information from internal motor processes can be derived by 
subtracting the score from the other-controlled condition from the self-controlled 
condition. 
Table 4.2: Stimulus properties of the action monitoring task. No. squares = 
number of squares presented on the computer screen, from which the participant had 
to identify the target. Distractor movement (°) = the extent to which the movement of 
the distractor squares could vary, relative to the movement of the computer mouse. 
 
Level No. squares Distractor movement (°) 
1 9 360 
2 16 360 
3 25 360 
4 25 180 
5 36 180 
6 36 90 
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The task was designed to increase in difficulty by manipulation of both the number 
of distractor squares and the degree to which the distractor squares matched the 
movement of the target square (see Table 4.2 for details of the increasing difficulty 
of the task). The difficulty of the task was increased after every 8 trials, and, 
similarly to the methodology of Williams and Happé (2009), if participants made ≤ 2 
correct responses in those trials, the condition was discontinued.  This was to prevent 
participants advancing in the task by chance. The dependent variable in this task was 
therefore the number of squares correctly identified in the self-controlled condition, 
minus the number of squares correctly identified in the experimenter-controlled 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Screenshot of action monitoring task. (See Section 2.3.5 for 
description of task.) 
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3. Results 
3.1. Summary 
Bivariate correlations between the self-report scales and LSHS-R scores, as well as 
between the task-based measures and LSHS-R scores, are presented in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4. After applying Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons, total 
LSHS-R score correlated significantly with the VISQdialogic and VISQother, but not 
with the VISQeval subscale, or with either of the HADS subscales. The only task-
based measure to significantly correlate with total LSHS-R score, as well as the 
auditory and visual subscales, was the jumbled speech task, although these 
correlations were not significant after Bonferroni’s correction for multiple 
comparisons was applied.  
 
Table 4.3: Bivariate correlations (Spearman’s) among self-report scales. 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. LSHS-Rtotal 1 - - .406** .393** .266* .242* .166 
2. LSHS-Raud  
1 .503** .396** .376** .243* .218* .106 
3. LSHS-Rvis   
1 .323** .357** .279* .251* .271* 
4. VISQdialogic    
1 .477** .481** .294** .147 
5. VISQother     
1 .341** .245* .119 
6. VISQeval      
1 .279* .227* 
7. HADSanx       
1 .514** 
8. HADSdep        
1 
* p < .05. ** p < .0019 (i.e. = .05/26). 
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The action monitoring task was significantly positively correlated with scores on the 
LSHS-Raud subscale, and the signal detection task was negatively correlated with 
scores on the LSHS-Rvis subscale (i.e., a lower criterion for accepting that a signal 
was present corresponded to a higher score on the LSHS-Rvis) although, again, these 
were not significant after Bonferroni’s correction was applied. Neither the high or 
low cognitive effort conditions of the source memory task correlated with LSHS-R 
scores, and are therefore treated as one SMT score (combined) in the regression 
analysis. 
To investigate which variables may be able to predict proneness to hallucinations, 
we carried out a hierarchical regression analysis to investigate whether self-reported 
phenomenology of inner speech (VISQ) and performance on tasks purported to 
measure internal source monitoring, reality discrimination, and self-monitoring could 
predict the total score on the LSHS-R, when controlling for gender, age, anxiety and 
depression. We then constructed a model using the variables implicated in the 
hierarchical regression, using a stepwise procedure. 
 
Table 4.4: Bivariate correlations (Spearman’s) among task-based measures and 
hallucination-proneness measures. Correlations are given for both the high and 
low effort conditions of the source memory task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
memory, 
high (β) 
Source 
memory, 
low (β)   
Signal 
detection 
(β) 
Jumbled 
speech 
Action 
monitoring 
LSHS-Rtotal .048 .024 -.182 .229* .133 
LSHS-Raud .040 .015 -.113 .193* .194* 
LSHS-Rvis .050 -.026 -.235* .237* -.039 
* p < .05. No correlations were significant at p < .0033 (i.e., = .05/15). 
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3.2. Multiple linear regression 
3.2.1. Total hallucination-proneness 
A hierarchical multiple linear regression (MLR) was performed, with total 
hallucination-proneness score (LSHS-Rtotal) as the dependent variable. There was no 
evidence of multicollinearity in the data (tolerance for all variables >.47), and 
Durbin-Watson scores were satisfactory. There was also no evidence that any single 
case exerted a significant influence on the model (all Cook’s distances < .18), and 
inspection of the residuals indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
of residuals was not broken. Finally, the residuals were normally distributed (D = 
.04, p = .20). 
In the first step, age, gender, and self-report measures of anxiety and depression 
(HADSanx and HADSdep) were included as independent variables. This model was 
significant (F(4, 109) = 4.60, p = .002, R
2
 = .149), with both gender and anxiety 
emerging as significant predictors of hallucination-proneness (see Table 4.5). 
HADSanx score was positively associated with hallucination-proneness, and males 
tended to score higher than females on the LSHS-R. In the second step, three 
subscales of inner speech phenomenology (VISQdialogic, VISQother, and VISQeval) 
which have previously been associated with hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical 
sample were included. Addition of these variables significantly improved the model 
(F(3, 102) = 8.37, p < .001, ΔR
2
 = .168), with both the VISQdialogic and VISQother 
subscales significantly contributing to the model. Finally, in the third step, task-
based measures hypothesized to be associated with hallucination-proneness (SMT, 
SDT, JST, AMT) were included. Again, the model was significantly improved (F(4, 
98) = 6.47, p < .001, ΔR
2
 = .143). Of the task-based measures, performance on the 
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signal detection task, jumbled speech task and action monitoring task all 
significantly predicted LSHS-Rtotal score, although performance on the internal 
source monitoring task did not. In this third model, score on the VISQother subscale 
had dropped to a trend level of significance (p = .077), but gender, anxiety, and 
VISQdialogic still significantly contributed to the model. Unexpectedly, performance 
on the action monitoring task was positively associated with LSHS-Rtotal score, 
indicating that individuals with higher hallucination-proneness scores performed 
better on this task (in contrast to our original hypothesis). 
To test the specificity of the individual task-based measures, each of the four 
variables (SDT, JST, SMT, AMT) were entered separately into a block, in separate 
regression models, again controlling for age, gender, HADSanx, HADSdep, and the 
VISQ scales. This did not alter any of the main results. (That is, JST, SDT and AMT 
still significantly predicted LSHS-R, but SMT did not.)  
The variables that significantly contributed to the above model were retained for a 
subsequent stepwise procedure. In this model, the following variables were entered: 
gender, age, HADSanx, VISQdialogic, the SDT, JST and AMT (see Table 4.6). All 
variables significantly contributed to the model, with the exception of age, which 
was excluded from the model. The final model significantly predicted total 
hallucination-proneness (F(7, 109) = 10.32, p < .001), and accounted for 41.5% of 
variance in LSHS-Rtotal score. 
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Table 4.5: Summary of hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses for 
variables predicting hallucination-proneness (N = 110) 
Variable     B SE B      β 
Step 1 
   
   Constant 22.05 3.38 
 
   Gender -2.63 0.86 -0.28** 
   Age -0.21 0.14 -0.14 
   HADS Anxiety -0.27 0.12 -0.28* 
   HADS Depression -0.01 0.16 -0.01 
Step 2 
   
   Constant 16.21 3.30 
 
   Gender -1.96 0.81 -0.21* 
   Age -0.24 0.13 -0.16 
   HADS Anxiety -0.12 0.11 -0.12 
   HADS Depression -0.02 0.15 -0.02 
   VISQ Dialogic -0.16 0.07 -0.21* 
   VISQ Other -0.15 0.06 -0.23* 
   VISQ Evaluative -0.12 0.09 -0.13 
Step 3 
   
   Constant 14.57 3.07 
 
   Gender -1.85 0.78 -0.20* 
   Age -0.27 0.12 -0.18* 
   HADS Anxiety -0.21 0.1 -0.22* 
   HADS Depression -0.04 0.14 -0.03 
   VISQ Dialogic -0.21 0.07 -0.28** 
   VISQ Other -0.11 0.06 -0.16 
   VISQ Evaluative -0.14 0.08 -0.15 
   SMT (response bias) -0.27 0.25 -0.09 
   IS-SDT (response bias) -0.28 0.12 -0.19* 
   JST (syllables) -0.07 0.02 -0.25** 
   AMT (self – other) -0.10 0.04 -0.23** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of stepwise regression analysis for variables that 
significantly contributed to hierarchical regression predicting total 
hallucination-proneness 
 
Variable     B SE B       β 
Constant 11.46 1.87 
 
VISQ Dialogic -0.29 0.06 -0.39*** 
IS-SDT (response bias) -0.32 0.12 -0.21* 
Gender -2.10 0.74 -0.22** 
JST (syllables) -0.07 0.02 -0.26** 
AMT (self – other) -0.09 0.04 -0.19* 
HADS Anxiety -0.19 0.08 -0.20* 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
3.2.2. Auditory and visual hallucination-proneness 
To investigate whether these variables might specifically be related with auditory or 
visual hallucination-proneness, a hierarchical regression analyses with both 
individual subscales of the LSHS-R (LSHS-Raud and LSHS-Rvis) as independent 
variables was conducted, and the remaining LSHS-R subscale was included as a 
predictor. In this way, we investigated whether any inner speech variables or task-
based measures were related to a certain modality of hallucination, when controlling 
for the other modality. 
With LSHS-Raud as the dependent variable, the same variables were entered in the 
same three steps as when predicting LSHS-Rtotal, as well as LSHS-Rvis in the first 
step. In the first step, gender, age, LSHS-Rvis, HADSanx, and HADSdep were included 
in the model, which significantly predicted LSHS-Raud (F(5, 104) = 10.65, p < .001, R
2
 
= .339), although only LSHS-Rvis significantly predicted LSHS-Raud (β = .515, p < 
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.001). In the second step, the three inner speech subscales (VISQdialogic, VISQother, 
VISQeval) were added, which again resulted in a significant improvement to the 
model (F(3, 101) = 3.03, p = .033, ΔR
2
 = .055), although none of the individual inner 
speech variables significantly predicted LSHS-Raud. (VISQdialogic only approached 
significance; β = .172, p = .072.) In the third step, the four task-based measures were 
included, which again significantly improved the model (F(4, 97) = 3.54, p = .010, ΔR
2
 
= .077), with LSHS-Rvis (β = .346, p < .001), age (β = -.173, p = .030), VISQdialogic (β 
= .219, p = .022),  and the AMT (β = .267, p < .001) significantly predicting LSHS-
Raud. Therefore, in the final model, when controlling for visual hallucination-
proneness, the variables that significantly predicted auditory hallucination-proneness 
were age, VISQdialogic, and score on the AMT.  
This analysis was repeated with LSHS-Rvis as the dependent variable, and LSHS-
Raud as an independent variable. In the first step (gender, age, LSHS-Rvis, HADSanx, 
HADSdep), the model significantly predicted LSHS-Rvis (F(5, 104) = 11.84, p < .001, R
2
 
= .363) although the only significant predictor was LSHS-Raud (β = .497, p < .001). 
In the second step, addition of the inner speech variables (VISQdialogic, VISQother, 
VISQeval) did not significantly improve the model (F(3, 101) = 1.44, p = .236, ΔR
2
 = 
.026). In the third step, addition of the task-based measures significantly improved 
the model (F(4, 97) = 2.48, p = .049, ΔR
2
 = .057), although no individual variables 
other than LSHS-Raud significantly contributed to the model. In the final model, no 
variables significantly predicted visual hallucination-proneness, when controlling for 
auditory hallucination-proneness. 
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3.3. Further task analysis – action monitoring 
Given the unexpected findings relating to the action monitoring task, we conducted 
exploratory analysis to investigate the association between auditory hallucination-
proneness and performance on both the self-controlled and other-controlled 
conditions. We hypothesized that high levels of hallucination-proneness would be 
associated with problems monitoring self-produced actions (i.e., a lower score on the 
self-controlled condition), whereas this difference would not be seen for actions 
controlled by someone else (i.e., no difference in score on the other-controlled 
condition). However, the regression analyses indicated that performance on the task 
(quantified as score on the self-controlled condition, minus the score on the other-
controlled condition, following Williams and Happé, 2009) was positively associated 
with hallucination-proneness. 
To investigate this further, we separated the sample into two groups, using a median 
split so that participants who scored > 9 on the LSHS-Raud formed the ‘high auditory 
hallucination-proneness’ (N = 51) group, and those scoring ≤ 9 formed the ‘low 
auditory hallucination-proneness’ group (N = 59). A 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA 
was then performed, with task condition (self-/other-controlled) and auditory 
hallucination-proneness (high/low) as independent variables, and number of squares 
correctly identified in the task as the dependent variable. There was a significant 
main effect of condition (self-/other-controlled) on task performance (F(1, 108) = 
81.26, p < .001), indicating that participants scored significantly higher on the task in 
the self-controlled (M = 16.31, SD = 8.6) compared to the other-controlled (M = 
9.23, SD = 6.4) condition, as would be expected (see Fig. 4.2). Pairwise comparisons 
showed that there was an effect of auditory hallucination-proneness, with 
participants who scored above the median on the LSHS-Raud scoring significantly 
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higher on the task (M = 14.40, SD = 9.04) than participants who scored below the 
median (M = 11.36, SD = 8.40) (p = .011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of squares correctly identified as controlled by the 
computer mouse in the action monitoring task. Split into self-controlled and 
other-controlled task conditions, and participants who scored above the median 
(high), and those who scored less than or equal to the median (low), on the LSHS-
Raud subscale. * p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
There was also a significant interaction between task condition and hallucination-
proneness (F(1, 108) = 4.08, p = .031). Post-hoc two-tailed independent samples t-tests 
indicated that participants prone to auditory hallucinations scored significantly 
higher (M = 18.88, SD = 8.48) in the self-controlled condition than did participants 
who were not prone to auditory hallucinations (M = 14.08, SD = 8.22) (t(108) = 3.01, 
p = .003, d = .58). However, there was no difference between the two hallucination-
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proneness groups in performance on the other-controlled condition (high: M = 9.92, 
SD = 6.85; low: M = 8.63, SD = 6.03) (t(108) = 1.06, p = .294, d = .20). These 
results are in the opposite direction to that predicted, and are discussed further in the 
Discussion section. 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study investigated proneness to hallucinatory experiences in a non-
clinical sample of young adults, and its associations with self-reported 
phenomenology of inner speech, and performance on source monitoring, reality 
discrimination, and self-monitoring tasks. Results showed that, in a regression 
analysis, proneness to hallucinations was independently predicted by 1) trait anxiety 
(score on the ‘anxiety’ subscale of the HADS); 2) tendency to engage in dialogic 
inner speech (score on the ‘dialogic inner speech’ subscale of the VISQ); 3) 
performance on the auditory signal detection task; 4) number of syllables reported in 
jumbled speech (the JST); and 5) performance on a task which required monitoring 
self- and other-controlled hand movements (the AMT). Proneness to hallucinations 
was not, however, predicted by levels of depression, other people in inner speech, 
evaluative inner speech, or internal source monitoring performance. 
4.1. Varieties of inner speech 
Three dimensions of inner speech phenomenology, assessed by three subscales of the 
VISQ, were entered into a hierarchical regression analysis: the tendency to engage in 
inner speech of a dialogic nature, inner speech including the voices of other people, 
and inner speech for evaluative/motivational purposes. (A fourth scale, the tendency 
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to use condensed inner speech, was not included due to the lack of an association 
with hallucination-proneness in previous studies.) When all other self-report and 
task-based measures were controlled for, only dialogic inner speech emerged as a 
significant predictor of hallucination-proneness (total LSHS-R score). When the 
auditory and visual hallucination subscales were examined separately, dialogic inner 
speech only predicted auditory hallucination-proneness (controlling for visual 
hallucinations), but not visual hallucination-proneness (controlling for auditory 
hallucinations). This is consistent with the findings of McCarthy-Jones and 
Fernyhough (2011), who found that, controlling for anxiety, depression, and 
proneness to visual hallucinations, only dialogic inner speech significantly predicted 
proneness to auditory hallucination. The findings differ, however, from the findings 
of Alderson-Day et al. (2014), who found that a tendency to use dialogic inner 
speech did not predict proneness to auditory hallucinations. This discrepancy may be 
due to the use of different covariates between studies. Whilst both the present study 
and that conducted by McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough controlled for levels of 
anxiety and depression using the HADS, Alderson-Day et al. did not include these 
covariates, focusing instead on dissociation and self-esteem measures (the former of 
which was found to mediate the association between hallucination-proneness and 
dialogic inner speech). Alderson-Day et al. suggest that collinearity between the 
different inner speech measures, and an association between use of evaluative inner 
speech and anxiety, may mean that use of dialogic inner speech only predicts 
proneness to auditory hallucinations once anxiety has been partialled out. 
The present findings also extend those of McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) 
by showing that, when task-based measures relating to source monitoring, reality 
discrimination and self-monitoring were added into the model, this association was 
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still significant. Our findings therefore indicate that a tendency to use inner speech 
with the ‘back-and-forth’ structure of a conversation is a robust predictor of auditory 
hallucination-proneness in non-clinical samples, independently of the ability to 
distinguish between internally and externally generated perceptions, and measures of 
anxiety and depression. This is consistent with the observation that auditory verbal 
hallucinations tend to be experienced as someone else’s voice, speaking to or about 
the individual (Nayani & David, 1996). It therefore seems that both bottom-up 
differences in typical inner experience (high levels of dialogic inner speech) and 
biases in top-down processes relating to the ability to distinguish between internally 
and externally generated information, contribute to the generation of auditory 
hallucinations. McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) speculate that, in non-
clinical samples, dialogic inner speech accompanied by source monitoring errors 
may explain some forms of AH. As McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough noted, 
however, the positive association is not consistent with the finding (at a trend level 
of significance) towards a lower level of dialogic inner speech use in patients with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia that experience auditory hallucinations, compared to 
controls (Langdon, Jones, Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 2009). 
The present study further suggests that visual hallucinations seem to be associated 
with similar top-down biases, but not differences in the experience of inner speech 
(consistent with McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough’s finding in relation to inner 
speech). It remains to be tested whether there would be an association between 
proneness to visual hallucinations and phenomenology of visual mental imagery. For 
example, mirroring the association between dialogic inner speech and auditory 
hallucinations, excessively vivid visual imagery, or imagery involving the 
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perspective of another person, could be related to visual hallucinations. This 
hypothesis should be tested in the future. 
4.2. Source monitoring, reality discrimination, and self-monitoring 
Participants also completed tasks that have previously been used to assess internal 
source monitoring (the source memory task), reality discrimination (the auditory 
signal detection task and the jumbled speech task) and self-monitoring (the action 
monitoring task). The most immediately apparent finding was that, with the 
exception of the source memory task, these tasks appear to account for unique 
variation in total hallucination-proneness, and therefore do not appear to be tapping 
into a common underlying mechanism. Once the other variables were controlled for, 
three tasks were associated with proneness to hallucinations. Two of these were in 
the predicted direction: the auditory signal detection task, in which participants were 
required to generate auditory imagery of a short sentence, and simultaneously decide 
whether a voice was present in a burst of noise, and the jumbled speech task, in 
which participants were asked to respond with any words that they heard in 
meaningless jumbled speech.  
As predicted, in the signal detection task, the results showed that a lower response 
bias was associated with higher LSHS-R scores; that is, hallucination-prone 
participants were more willing to accept that a voice was present in the noise, 
regardless of the actual presence/absence of speech stimuli. This is in agreement 
with previous studies which have associated such a bias with hallucinations, in both 
clinical (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Bristow, Tabraham, Smedley, Ward, & Peters, 
2014) and non-clinical (Barkus, et al., 2011; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011) 
samples. Given our previous finding that engaging the participant in auditory 
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imagery during the task lowered the overall response bias, especially in those scoring 
highly on the LSHS-R (see Chapter 3, this thesis) the results from this version of the 
task were entered into the regression analyses, to maximize the association between 
signal detection and hallucination-proneness. In Chapter 3, it was argued that this 
task requires participants to distinguish between self-generated (auditory imagery) 
and non-self-generated (speech stimuli) perceptions, potentially acting as an ‘online’ 
version of a reality monitoring source memory task. If so, between-participant 
variables such as the vividness of auditory imagery, or the cognitive effort associated 
with generation of auditory imagery, may contribute to the response decision. For 
example, a sentence that was particularly vividly imaged may be more likely to be 
mistaken for an external voice, or an image that took a large amount of cognitive 
effort to imagine may be less likely to externalised.  
Underlying these dimensions, an efference copy system that predicts the sensory 
consequences of self-generated actions may typically be (at least partially) 
responsible for the experience of agency over actions (Frith, 1992; Frith, Blakemore, 
& Wolpert, 2000). Imprecision in an efference copy system may be one way in 
which mental imagery can be experienced as non-self-generated (Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2007), and it is possible that the lack of a top-down signal to inhibit 
sensory cortex may underlie, for example, excessive vividness of imagery. 
Interestingly, performance on the signal detection task whilst using auditory imagery 
did not predict scores on the auditory subscale of the LSHS-R to a greater extent 
than the visual subscale. This might imply that the modality of the imagery is not 
important, but rather that the task requires the participant to decide whether a 
perception was self- or non-self-generated. If this were the case, a similar finding 
should hold if a visual signal detection task (with concurrent visual imagery) were 
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used, though to our knowledge this is a hypothesis yet to be tested in relation to 
hallucination-proneness. 
The jumbled speech task also significantly predicted total hallucination-proneness, 
accounting for unique variance in total LSHS-R score (but not showing specificity to 
the auditory or visual modalities). This task had previously been used as an 
ambiguous auditory stimulus in a similar manner to the signal detection tasks 
(Fernyhough, et al., 2007), but the observation that it accounts for unique variance in 
hallucination-proneness implies that, in fact, there are differing reasons for the 
associations. We would speculatively suggest that the jumbled speech task may serve 
more as a measure of the top-down effects of expectation on perception (similarly to 
what Bristow et al., 2014, term ‘jumping to perceptions’), whereas, as discussed 
above, performance on signal detection tasks require the participant to distinguish 
between internally and externally generated perceptions. It has previously been 
hypothesized that suggestibility plays an important role in proneness to 
hallucinations (Fernyhough, et al., 2007; Young, Bentall, Slade, & Dewey, 1987), 
and this interpretation of our data is consistent with an important role for the effects 
of expectation on hallucinatory experiences. Again, the observation that this was not 
specific to either the auditory or visual subscales implies that this may be a 
mechanism common to hallucination-proneness in general. 
The source memory task, aimed at assessing internal source monitoring, did not 
significantly predict hallucination-proneness. This finding diverges from clinical 
studies indicating that patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who hallucinate 
were more likely to incorrectly recall an imagined action as performed (Gawęda, et 
al., 2013), although it does support the claim made by Brookwell et al. (2013) that 
only tasks that require the participant to distinguish between self-generated and non-
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self-generated items should elicit an externalising bias in hallucination-prone 
individuals. This argument can explain why the present study showed an association 
between the signal detection task (in which participants had to distinguish between 
self-generated auditory imagery and an external stimulus) and hallucination-
proneness, but not an association between the source memory task and hallucination-
proneness. It therefore seems likely that biased reality monitoring, but not internal 
source monitoring, may be linked to hallucination-proneness. An alternative 
possibility is that signal detection theory may not be the most appropriate method by 
which to analyse performance on memory tasks which may rely on recollective 
processes, such as source memory tasks (Yonelinas, 1999). For example, it is not 
possible, with the present data, to test the equality of variance of the signal and noise 
distributions, which is an important assumption of signal detection theory. This 
could be addressed in the future by requiring participants to provide confidence 
ratings during the retrieval phase of the task, which would allow this assumption to 
be tested. 
Finally, an unexpected result of the study was that performance on the action-
monitoring task, which required participants to distinguish self-generated from non-
self-generated movements, was positively associated with auditory, but not visual, 
hallucination-proneness. Further analysis of the data showed that there was an 
interaction between task condition (self- or other-controlled) and auditory 
hallucination-proneness, such that hallucination-prone participants (scoring above 
the median on the LSHS-R auditory subscale) performed better than those below the 
median on the self-controlled condition. There was no difference between the high 
and low group on the other-controlled condition, implying that the observed 
difference between the groups was related to self-generated movement, and that the 
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highly prone participants were better able to distinguish the results of these actions 
from distractor movements. This was contrary to our initial hypothesis, and does not 
seem to support theories which suggest that hallucination-proneness is linked to 
aberrant monitoring of internal motor signals. This paradigm should be used in 
clinical samples to test whether a similar effect is found in, for example, samples of 
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders who do or 
do not hallucinate, although a relatively large literature using other experimental 
paradigms already indicates that hallucinations are linked to a failure to correctly 
monitor self-generated actions (Daprati et al., 1997; Fourneret et al., 2002; Werner, 
Trapp, Wüstenberg, & Voss, 2014). It is possible that, whilst tasks that require 
higher conscious evaluation (e.g., the signal detection task or the jumbled speech 
task) elicit externalising decisional biases in clinical and non-clinical hallucinators 
alike, deficits on tasks that draw on lower-level internal motor processes are specific 
to psychosis. If this were the case, an intact self-monitoring system may act, to some 
extent, as a protective factor against developing more frequent psychotic 
experiences; meanwhile, reality discrimination biases would be linked to a more 
general disposition to report hallucination-like experiences. This line of thought is 
admittedly speculative, and should be directly tested in the future, for example by 
contrasting performance on self-monitoring and reality discrimination tasks in non-
clinical hallucination-prone participants and individuals with psychotic disorders 
who do and do not hallucinate. 
4.3. Limitations and future research 
Firstly, the self-report measure of hallucination-proneness (the LSHS-R) utilised in 
the present study, although showing satisfactory internal reliability in our sample, is 
not specific to any type of hallucination. Although the scale separates into auditory 
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and visual subscales, these have relatively few items, and within each subscale items 
refer to heterogeneous experiences (for example, hearing a voice or hearing music 
being played), which may be related to different underlying cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, the scale is unable to distinguish between possible subtypes of 
hallucinations, despite the growing consensus that phenomenologically distinct 
hallucinatory experiences may relate to different underlying mechanisms (Jones, 
2010; McCarthy-Jones, et al., 2014). Future research should therefore aim to develop 
self-report measures for use with non-clinical samples that relate to different 
subtypes of hallucination. It might be predicted, for example, that a tendency to use 
dialogic inner speech would be related to auditory hallucinations that seem 
explicable within an inner speech framework, but not those that seem to be related to 
intrusions from memory (Waters et al., 2006) or hypervigilance to external stimuli 
(Dodgson & Gordon, 2009; Garwood, Dodgson, Bruce, & McCarthy-Jones, 2013). 
Development of a self-report measure that explores the prevalence of different 
subtypes of auditory and visual hallucinations may be more phenomenologically 
sensitive, and would also enable exploration of this issue, including deepening our 
understanding of the importance of subtypes of hallucinations. 
Secondly, it is likely that other variables play moderating or mediating roles in the 
relationship between inner speech, source monitoring, self-monitoring and 
hallucination-proneness. For example, dissociation has been shown to mediate the 
relationship between experiencing other people as part of inner speech, and auditory 
hallucination-proneness (Alderson-Day et al., 2014). A key area of research relating 
inner speech phenomenology to hallucinations will be to investigate how and why a 
tendency to use certain types of inner speech are linked to higher self-reported 
hallucination-proneness. The dialogicality of inner speech can explain, 
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phenomenologically, why many AHs are experienced as the voice talking to, or 
conversing with, the individual. Presumably, in the case of verbal AHs, biases in 
reality discrimination can lead to misattribution of inner speech; however, as yet, no 
empirical research has investigated why a tendency to engage in dialogic inner 
speech would cause higher self-reported hallucination-proneness. Future research 
should therefore address this issue. 
4.4. Conclusions 
Overall, the present study has shown that a number of different variables can account 
for unique variance in proneness to experiences hallucinations in a non-clinical 
sample. We replicated previous findings that a tendency to engage in dialogic inner 
speech is associated with hallucination-proneness, when controlling for variables 
such as anxiety and depression, and extended this by showing that tasks designed to 
assess reality discrimination (signal detection and jumbled speech tasks) and action 
self-monitoring can also predict hallucinations, independently of inner speech 
variables. In our sample, self-monitoring for actions was positively associated with 
auditory hallucination-proneness (contrary to our initial predictions). Internal source 
monitoring, assessed using a say/imagine source memory task, was not associated 
with hallucination-proneness, suggesting that only self/non-self judgements may 
elicit the type of externalising biases associated with hallucinations. 
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Chapter 5 
The role of the superior temporal lobe in auditory false perceptions: a 
transcranial direct current stimulation study 
The results of Chapters 3 and 4 are consistent with models that specify that 
hallucinations may occur when internal mental events, such as inner speech, are 
misattributed to an external source. Chapter 3 indicated that usage of auditory verbal 
mental imagery decreased response bias on an auditory signal detection paradigm, 
whilst Chapter 4 indicated that this is independent of performance on various other 
source monitoring and self-monitoring tasks, and self-reported phenomenology of 
inner speech. Drawing on previous neuroimaging evidence, Chapter 5 investigates 
the neural mechanisms underlying performance on auditory signal detection; 
specifically, using transcranial direct current stimulation to investigate the role of the 
left posterior superior temporal gyrus in the tendency to make false alarm responses. 
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Abstract 
Neuroimaging has shown that a network of cortical areas, which includes the 
superior temporal gyrus, is active during auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). In 
the present study, healthy, non-hallucinating participants (N = 30) completed an 
auditory signal detection task, in which participants were required to detect a voice 
in short bursts of white noise, with the variable of interest being the rate of false 
auditory verbal perceptions. This paradigm was coupled with transcranial direct 
current stimulation, a noninvasive brain stimulation technique, to test the 
involvement of the left posterior superior temporal gyrus in the creation of auditory 
false perceptions. The results showed that increasing the levels of excitability in this 
region led to a higher rate of ‘false alarm’ responses than when levels of excitability 
were decreased, with false alarm responses in a sham stimulation condition lying at a 
mid-point between anodal and cathodal stimulation conditions. There were also 
corresponding changes in signal detection parameters. These results are discussed in 
terms of prominent cognitive neuroscientific theories of AVHs, and potential future 
directions for research are outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of hearing a voice in the 
absence of any speaker. Although experienced by between 60-80% of people with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia (Sartorius et al., 1986), the experience is also reported by 
approximately 1.5-3% of the general population (Beavan, Read & Cartwright, 2011; 
Tien, 1991). Neuroimaging findings relating to AVHs have been variable, but tend to 
show that AVHs coincide with activation in areas of the temporal lobe such as the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG), and frontal lobe areas such as the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Allen et al., 2012). 
The STG encompasses primary auditory cortex (PAC), as well as secondary auditory 
cortices such as Wernicke’s area/the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the planum 
temporale (PT). Due to its importance in auditory processing, the role of the STG in 
AVHs (and associated cognitive mechanisms), particularly in the left hemisphere, 
has been extensively studied. For example, repeated measurements have shown tonic 
hyperactivity in left STG in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who 
experience AVHs (Homan et al., 2013). Meta-analytic findings show that, in people 
who experience AVHs, PAC shows reduced activation to external auditory stimuli, 
but increased activation to internally generated information such as AVHs (Kompus, 
Westerhausen & Hugdahl, 2011). Additionally, patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia show reduced attenuation in auditory cortex when using inner speech 
(Simons et al., 2010), and reduced attenuation in somatosensory cortex when 
experiencing tactile stimulation (Shergill et al., 2014). These findings may reflect 
failures of internal forward models to successfully attenuate activity in response to 
self-produced actions (Ford & Mathalon, 2005), and/or biased attentional processes 
(Kompus et al., 2011). Finally, using offline repetitive transcranial magnetic 
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stimulation (rTMS) or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to decrease 
activity in Wernicke’s area (left posterior STG) as a treatment protocol has been 
shown to reduce the frequency of AVHs (Brunelin et al., 2012; Hoffman et al., 2013; 
Slotema, Blom, van Lutterveld, Hoek & Sommer, 2013), possibly due to effects on 
activity in other auditory cortical areas in the left STG (Kindler et al., 2013). 
The above evidence suggests that the left pSTG plays a crucial role in the generation 
and/or experience of AVHs. This is in concordance with neuroimaging evidence 
suggesting that, among other areas, the superior temporal gyrus is active in the 
neurotypical brain during verbal self-monitoring (Allen et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 
1995), and when a voice is falsely detected in white noise (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, 
McKie & Lewis, 2007), an error that people who experience AVHs make more often 
(Brookwell, Bentall & Varese, 2013). Nevertheless, the majority of available 
evidence regarding the role of the STG comes from fMRI and, due to the inherently 
correlational nature of neuroimaging, it is hard to draw conclusions about the 
causality of the role of this brain area in AVHs.  
Whilst attempts to treat AVHs using neurostimulation of STG or TPJ are suggestive 
of the critical importance of these regions, and of surrounding auditory cortical areas 
(Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013; Kindler et al., 2013), it remains to be 
determined how neural activations relate to underlying cognitive mechanisms. For 
example, if the STG is causally involved in the genesis of AVHs, it should be 
possible to both increase and decrease AVH frequency by modulating the level of 
activity accordingly. Whilst this is clearly not possible in a clinical sample due to 
ethical issues, one previous approach has been to use a signal detection task, in 
which healthy participants are asked to listen to bursts of white noise, and respond 
whether they believe a voice is present (Bentall & Slade, 1985). This approach 
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enables an analysis of ‘correct’ perceptions, as well as ‘false’ perceptions (or ‘false 
alarm’ responses).  
Previous research suggests that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who 
hallucinate, and non-clinical participants who report more frequent hallucinatory 
experiences, are more likely to falsely perceive a voice in the noise (Barkus et al., 
2011; Brookwell, Bentall & Varese, 2013; Varese, Barkus & Bentall, 2011). These 
studies employ signal detection analysis, and suggest that this finding is due to a 
difference in response bias (i.e., how willing participants are to accept that an 
ambiguous stimuli is present) between hallucinators and non-hallucinators, rather 
than a change in sensitivity to the task (the ability to distinguish between signal and 
noise). This is important, as it implies that individuals who experience AVHs do not 
have a ‘deficit’ on the task, but instead simply exhibit a different style of responding. 
However, in a study by Vercammen, de Haan & Aleman (2008) using a similar 
paradigm, participants who experienced AVHs showed both a lower response bias 
and lowered sensitivity to the task, suggesting that the group differences may be 
more complex than a response bias. Of equal importance, false perceptions on this 
task are associated with high levels of activation in, among other areas, the STG 
(Barkus et al., 2007), even compared to correct perceptions of a voice in the noise. 
This suggests that high levels of activity in the STG might be associated with false 
alarm responses in this task, perhaps reflecting a tendency to misattribute internal, 
self-generated processes to an external source, as in AVHs. 
Nevertheless, as discussed, evidence that activity in the STG is the cause of false 
alarm responses in a signal detection task is lacking. To address this, we utilised a 
form of non-invasive brain stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS), to modulate excitability in the left posterior STG (pSTG) of non-clinical, 
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non-hallucinating participants. tDCS involves running a weak electrical current 
between two electrodes in contact with the participant’s scalp, depolarizing (anodal) 
or hyperpolarizing (cathodal) membrane potentials of underlying neurons, resulting 
in a decrease in potential activity under the cathode and an increase in potential 
activity under the anode (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Furthermore, once stimulation 
has stopped, a reduction in GABA concentration under the anodal electrode and 
glutamate concentration under the cathodal electrode can be observed (Stagg & 
Nitsche, 2011), as well as short-lasting behavioural effects (Hummel & Cohen, 
2006).  
There are two main advantages of using non-clinical samples to study hallucination-
like experiences: 1) results are not confounded by anti-psychotic medication or 
additional symptoms of psychosis; 2) it would not be ethical to attempt to increase 
cortical excitability in a population which may already experience potentially 
pathological over-activity in superior temporal regions. Our objective was to test 
whether modulating excitability in left pSTG would lead to a change in the number 
of false perceptions that participants would make on an auditory signal detection 
task. Specifically, given findings that levels of activity in this region are related to 
both AVHs and false perceptions on auditory signal detection, we hypothesized that 
increasing the excitability of the posterior STG using anodal stimulation would lead 
to an increase in false alarms, whereas decreasing excitability using cathodal 
stimulation would lead to a decrease in the number of false alarms. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 30 right-handed participants (7 males, 23 females), aged 18-
26 (M = 20.6, SD = 2.67). Participants were considered ineligible to take part if they 
reported any hearing problems, or any history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. 
All gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, 
and ethical approval was provided by Durham University Ethics Committee. 
Participants were paid £15 for participation, and were naive to the aim of the study, 
simply being told that the study was investigating ‘auditory perception’.  
2.2. Signal detection task 
The stimuli used in the signal detection task were similar to those used by Barkus et 
al. (2007; 2011), in which participants were asked to detect a voice stimulus 
embedded in white noise. The voice stimuli were identical to those used by Barkus et 
al.; a neutral, androgynous voice reading text from an instruction manual, which was 
segmented into 1-second clips. To set the volume levels in the task, we ran a small 
pilot study (N = 8, none of whom took part in the main study), in which participants 
listened to a continuous burst of white noise, within which the voice clips were 
played, at a gradually ascending volume level. Participants were simply asked to 
respond with a button press when they heard a voice, and each pilot participant’s 
threshold was defined as the point at which they heard three consecutive voices. For 
the main task, we then set the volume levels at the point at which 100%, 75%, 50% 
and 25% of participants in the pilot study consistently detected the voices 
(henceforth referred to as volume levels 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively).  
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The stimuli for the main task consisted of 144 5-second bursts of white noise. During 
80 bursts, a voice was present for the middle 1 second (‘voice-present’ trials). In the 
voice-present trials, voices were played at one of the four volume levels, which were 
kept constant across all participants (a requirement of the analysis, based on signal 
detection theory). The remaining 64 ‘voice-absent’ trials consisted of the white 
noise, with no embedded voice. Each burst was followed by 3 seconds of silence, in 
which the participant was instructed to respond with a button press whether they 
believed a voice was present in the noise (yes/no). The stimuli were pseudo-
randomly ordered, so that none of the five possible trial types (voice-absent, plus 
four voice-present volume levels) was presented more than three times in a row. 
Participants were not informed how often a voice was likely to be present, but were 
told that voices may be present at a variety of volumes. The task was separated into 
two blocks, each lasting 576 seconds, with a 5 minute break between the blocks. 
2.3. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
Participants received 15 minutes of tDCS, using a Magstim Eldith DC stimulator. A 
1.5mA current was delivered to the first 14 participants, but for the final 16 
participants this was decreased to 1mA, after two participants experienced a mild 
headache following stimulation. The current was delivered through rubber electrodes 
placed in saline-soaked sponges, held in place by two rubber straps. One electrode (5 
x 5cm = 25cm
2
) was positioned over the left posterior superior temporal gyrus 
(pSTG), over electrode site CP5 according to the EEG 10-20 system. This system 
ensures that the electrode montage is adjusted for differing head sizes between 
participants, and has been used previously to target the superior temporal gyrus, and 
more specifically, Wernicke’s area (e.g. You, Kim, Chun, Jung & Park, 2011). The 
second electrode (5 x 7cm = 35cm
2
) was positioned above the right eye, as in other 
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tDCS studies (e.g. Ball, Lane, Smith & Ellison, 2013; Ellison et al., 2014). A 
contralateral location was chosen as this is the most commonly used in the tDCS 
literature (Nitsche et al., 2008). The difference in electrode size ensured that the 
stimulation under the superior temporal electrode reached a higher current density 
than under the larger electrode. There were three stimulation conditions over the 
pSTG: anodal, cathodal and sham stimulation. Each participant received each type of 
stimulation in separate sessions, with each session separated, where possible, by 7 
days (mean no. days between Sessions 1–2 = 7.47, SD = 1.55, range = 6–14; mean 
no. days between Sessions 2–3 = 7.80, SD = 2.51, range = 3–14). The order in which 
participants received the three types of stimulation was counterbalanced, so that all 
six possible orders were represented equally in the sample. Anodal and cathodal 
stimulation of the pSTG consisted of 900 seconds (15 minutes) of stimulation, plus 8 
seconds during which the strength of the stimulation gradually faded in, and 8 
seconds during which it faded out. Sham stimulation consisted of the application of 
30 seconds of stimulation, plus 8 seconds fade-in and 8 seconds fade-out; this 
method of sham stimulation ensured that the participant experienced the initial 
tingling sensation on the scalp associated with active stimulation, but did not receive 
sufficient stimulation to modulate neuronal excitability.  This has been demonstrated 
to be an effective method of blinding participants to the stimulation condition 
(Gandiga, Hummel & Cohen, 2006). 
2.4. Procedure 
In each session, participants were seated in front of a laptop computer, and were 
provided with noise-cancelling earbuds (Creative EP-630), through which the stimuli 
were played. Pilot testing indicated that some participants preferred to close their 
eyes whilst completing the task; therefore, all participants were blindfolded to 
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prevent between-participant differences in visual input. Participants completed a 
short practice trial before receiving tDCS, consisting of 8 bursts of white noise. The 
first block of signal detection trials commenced 340 seconds after initiation of the 
stimulation, thus ensuring that the task ended simultaneously with the stimulation. 
Participants then sat quietly for a 300 second (5 minute) break, in which the 
electrodes were removed from their scalp, to maximise the participant’s comfort. 
They then completed a second block of the signal detection trials. The first block of 
trials is henceforth referred to as ‘online’ (as it was completed whilst active or sham 
stimulation was applied), and the second block as ‘offline’ (completed after the 
electrodes had been removed from the scalp). 
2.5. Data analysis 
Responses were categorised into four types: hits (voice-present trial, ‘yes’ response), 
misses (voice-present trial, ‘no’ response), correct rejections (voice-absent trial, ‘no’ 
response) and false alarms (voice-absent trial, ‘yes’ response). These responses are 
expressed as a ‘hit rate’ (the percentage of voice-present trials on which the 
participant correctly responded ‘yes’) and a ‘false alarm rate’ (the percentage of 
voice-absent trials on which the participant incorrectly responded ‘yes’). From these, 
standard signal detection measures for sensitivity and response bias were calculated 
for each block of trials completed by the participant. d', a measure of sensitivity to 
the stimulus, is defined as the difference between the standardised hit rate and false 
alarm rate, with a higher score indicating an increased ability to distinguish signal 
from noise. β, a measure of response bias, is calculated as outlined in Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999):     
             
 
 , where Z(FA) corresponds to a standardised 
false alarm rate, and Z(H) corresponds to a standardised hit rate. Lower β values 
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indicate a more ‘liberal’ response bias (i.e., participants are more likely to accept that 
a voice is present under ambiguous circumstances). 
We used a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed model design, with the three stimulation conditions 
(anodal/cathodal/sham) and two task blocks (online/offline) as within-subjects 
variables. We also included the two stimulation strengths (1.5mA/1mA) as a 
between-subjects variable, to test whether the alteration in current strength affected 
any potential main effect. We therefore conducted a mixed model ANOVA, using 
stimulation condition, task block and stimulation strength as independent variables, 
and false alarm rate as the dependent variable. This analysis was also conducted with 
signal detection measures as dependent variables (d', β), as well as the hit rate (in 
which volume level was included as a within-subjects variable). We then performed 
planned contrasts to investigate specifically how false alarm rate differed between 
the three conditions, using planned paired t-tests. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Effects of tDCS on false alarm rate 
Descriptive statistics for performance on the signal detection task are presented in 
Table 5.1. If assumptions of sphericity or homogeneity of variance were not met, 
then the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. A 3 × 2 × 2 (stimulation 
condition × task block × stimulation strength) mixed model ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of stimulation condition on false alarm rate: F(2, 56) = 3.70, p = 
.031, η
2
 = .117. Planned comparisons (two-tailed paired samples t-tests) showed that, 
as predicted, the false alarm rate in the anodal stimulation condition was 
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significantly higher than in the cathodal stimulation condition (t(29) = 2.52, p = 
.018) (see Fig. 5.1). However, the difference between the anodal stimulation 
condition and sham condition did not reach significance (t(29) = 1.54, p = .134), and 
the sham condition did not differ significantly from the cathodal condition (t(29) = 
1.07, p = .30). From these results, it is difficult to conclude whether the observed 
difference in false alarm rate between anodal and cathodal stimulation is due to an 
effect of one stimulation condition or the other (or both). However, given the similar 
difference in false alarm rate between anodal/sham and cathodal/sham, it seems 
probable that the observed effect was due to both an increase in false alarms in the 
anodal stimulation condition, and a decrease in the cathodal stimulation condition. 
To back this up, we conducted an exploratory within-subject polynomial contrast 
analysis, which indicated that there was a significant linear trend across the three 
conditions (F(1, 28) = 6.42, p = .017) suggesting that the false alarm rate varied 
linearly with the type of stimulation applied. 
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Figure 5.1: False alarm rate (%) in auditory signal detection task by stimulation 
condition. Error bars = 1 SEM. * p < .05 
 
There was an effect of task block (online/offline) on false alarm rate: F(1, 28) = 23.68, 
p  < .001, η
2
 = .458, implying that false alarm rate tended to drop between the first 
SDT block (M = 13.19, SD = 10.33) and the second SDT block (M = 8.96, SD = 
8.27). There was no interaction between stimulation condition and task block: F(1.6, 
43.9) = .396, p = .675, η
2
 = .014. There was also no interaction between any variables 
and the strength of the stimulation applied (all ps > .15), indicating that the change of 
current strength between participants did not change the main effect of the 
stimulation.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for hits, false alarms, response bias and sensitivity in each stimulation condition (both task blocks) (M, 
SD). ‘On’ refers to performance during stimulation; ‘Off’ refers to performance five minutes following stimulation. FA = false alarms; β = bias; 
d' = sensitivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    Hits (%) FA (%) β d' 
Type of stimulation On Off On Off On Off On Off 
Anodal 59.17 (11.9) 58.08 (10.9) 15.62 (14.7) 10.64 (10.3) 3.09 (2.5) 4.22 (3.34) 1.45 (.63) 1.64 (.63) 
Sham 57.92 (11.9) 56.25 (12.4) 12.05 (11.6) 9.28 (10.6) 4.32 (3.8) 4.99 (3.7) 1.6 (.61) 1.69 (.53) 
Cathodal 58.08 (12.4) 58.83 (15.3) 11.69 (11.1) 6.68 (9.1) 3.61 (2.7) 5.88 (4) 1.58 (.5) 1.92 (.5) 
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Table 5.2: Hit rate (%) for the four different volume levels of voice embedded in 
the white noise. 0 = overall false alarm rate (voice-absent trials). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Effects of tDCS on other signal detection measures 
To explore the effect of stimulation condition on hit rate at differing voice volumes, 
we conducted a 3 × 2 × 2 × 4 (stimulation condition × block × stimulation strength × 
voice volume) mixed model ANOVA. As would be expected, there was a significant 
effect of volume (F(2.3, 64.5) = 361.20, p < .001) on hit rate, showing that participants 
were more likely to correctly identify voices at higher volumes (see Table 5.2 for 
descriptive statistics). There was no effect of tDCS (F(2, 56) = .549, p = .581) or task 
block (F(1, 28) = .715, p = .405) on hit rate, nor any interaction between stimulation 
condition and task block (F(2, 56) = .581, p = .563) (see Fig. 5.2). There was no 
interaction between voice volume and any variables (all ps > .097) or between 
stimulation strength and any variables (all ps > .49) From a signal detection 
perspective, a decrease in response bias (β) would predict an increase in false alarm 
rate (as observed), but also a corresponding increase in hit rate, especially in the 
voice stimuli presented at low volumes. Unexpectedly, our results do not support this 
hypothesis, since there was no effect of stimulation on overall hit rate; that is, 
stimulation condition affected the number of false perceptions that participants 
Volume Level M SD 
4 98.6 3.67 
3 66.6 17.53 
2 44.5 15.88 
1 22.5 12.60 
0 10.6 9.86 
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made, but not the number of correct perceptions. There was also no interaction 
between voice volume and stimulation condition (F(6, 174) = .450, p = .844), 
indicating that stimulation did not selectively affect perception of, for example, the 
‘below threshold’ voice stimuli.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Hit rate (%) in auditory signal detection task by stimulation 
condition. Error bars = 1 SEM.  
 
A 3 × 2 × 2 (stimulation condition × task block × stimulation strength) mixed model 
ANOVA with response bias (β) as the dependent variable showed a main effect of 
stimulation condition, approaching significance (F(2, 56) = 2.8, p = .069, η
2
 = .091). 
Planned contrasts (two-tailed paired samples t-tests) showed that β in the anodal 
stimulation condition was significantly higher than in the cathodal stimulation 
condition (t(29) = 2.19, p = .038). (See Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics.) The 
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difference between β in the anodal  and sham conditions only approached 
significance, (t(29 = 1.74, p = .092), but the sham condition did not differ from the 
cathodal condition (t(29) = .17, p = .86). There was also an effect of task block (F(1, 
28) = 21.74, p < .001, η
2
 = .437), suggesting that participants became less willing to 
respond that a voice was present with more experience of the task. There was no 
interaction between stimulation condition and task block (F(2, 56) = 2.39, p = .101), or 
any interactions between any variables and stimulation strength (all ps > .18). 
A 3 × 2 × 2 (stimulation condition × task block × stimulation strength) mixed model 
ANOVA with sensitivity (d') as the dependent variable showed that there was a main 
effect of tDCS on task sensitivity approaching significance: F(2, 56) = 3.17, p = .05. 
Planned contrasts (two-tailed paired samples t-tests) showed that there was a 
significant difference between the anodal and cathodal stimulation conditions (t(29) 
= 2.79, p = .010), but no significant difference between the anodal and sham 
conditions (t(29) = 1.05, p = .60) or the sham and cathodal conditions (t(29) = 1.25, p 
= .44). This difference between the anodal and cathodal conditions can be accounted 
for by the aforementioned larger change in false alarm rate than hit rate, as an 
increased false alarm rate, but stable hit rate, will lead to a decrease in sensitivity to 
the task. (In other words, as false alarm rate increases, the difference between the hit 
rate and false alarm rate decreases, leading to a lower d' score.) 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study used tDCS to study the effect of modulating cortical excitability of 
the left posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG) on rate of auditory false 
perceptions reported in white noise. The results showed that, as predicted, there were 
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significantly more false alarm responses when excitability was increased in this 
region using anodal stimulation, than when excitability was decreased with cathodal 
stimulation. The false alarm rate in the sham stimulation condition lay at a mid-point 
between that observed for anodal and cathodal stimulation, with the comparison with 
sham non-significant in each case. Signal detection analysis revealed that changes in 
performance due to stimulation were related to both changes in response criterion 
(bias) and in task sensitivity. Our findings can thus be taken to demonstrate that the 
left pSTG plays a role in the generation of auditory false perceptions in a non-
clinical population. This is consistent with neuroimaging results showing that false 
alarm responses on auditory signal detection tasks are associated with over-
activation of the STG, above and beyond that seen when participants correctly report 
hearing a voice (Barkus et al., 2007), and crucially provides evidence that this 
cortical area is causally involved in false alarm responses.  
In signal detection terminology, as a result of the stimulation condition we observed 
a change approaching significance in response bias, where participants were more 
willing to respond that a voice was present when stimulation to increase the 
excitability of pSTG was applied. Furthermore, there was a decrease in sensitivity in 
the anodal stimulation condition, and an increase in sensitivity after cathodal 
stimulation (indicating that increasing excitability made it more difficult for 
participants to distinguish between the voice signal and the noise, whereas 
decreasing excitability made it easier). Previous studies have found that individuals 
who experience auditory hallucinations show a lower response bias (β), but a similar 
level of sensitivity (d') on auditory signal detection tasks, compared to non-
hallucinating individuals (Brookwell, Bentall & Varese, 2013), which has been taken 
as evidence that AVHs are associated with a bias towards labelling ambiguous 
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percepts as external. These findings are also consistent with findings that 
hallucinating individuals show higher levels of activity in primary auditory cortex in 
response to internally generated processes such as AVHs (Kompus et al., 2011).  
However, the present findings are only partially consistent with the hypothesis that 
differing levels of activation in the pSTG result in a differential response bias, since 
a change in task sensitivity was also observed as a result of stimulation condition. 
Nevertheless, some studies have shown a difference in sensitivity to signal detection 
between hallucinating and non-hallucinating groups (Vercammen et al., 2008), 
which may implicate broader differences in the way auditory verbal stimuli are 
processed in individuals prone to hallucinations. Our results suggest that higher 
levels of activity in the pSTG causes a bias to responding that a signal is present, but 
also make it more difficult to distinguish between signal and noise. Clearly, the 
stimulating electrodes are not simply creating an ‘analogue’ of individuals who 
experience AVHs; it is possible that, at a neural level, stimulation to increase 
excitability in pSTG could have reduced the signal-to-noise ratio, making it difficult 
to distinguish between internally and externally generated perceptions (as evidenced 
by the change in sensitivity).  
The pSTG includes secondary auditory cortical areas such as Wernicke’s area and 
the planum temporale (PT), as well as the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). The PT 
lies within secondary auditory cortex, and is preferentially active to auditory stimuli 
located in the external environment (Hunter et al., 2002). Thus, as well as lowering 
sensitivity, aberrant activation of this area may lead to a higher likelihood of a 
stimuli being attributed to an external source (as seen in the change in response bias). 
This is consistent with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence 
showing that AVHs experienced as located in the external environment are 
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associated with higher levels of activation in the PT (Looijestijin et al., 2013). The 
TPJ, meanwhile, has been implicated in feelings of ‘sensed presence’, and 
intracranial stimulation of this area can lead to disrupted self-processing (Blanke, 
Ortigue, Landis & Seeck, 2002). Resting state fMRI suggests that aberrant functional 
connectivity between TPJ and language production areas may be associated with 
AVHs (Vercammen, Knegtering, den Boer, Liemburg & Aleman, 2010) which may 
underlie problems monitoring self-produced (inner) speech. Taken together, these 
findings indicate that the TPJ and other posterior temporal regions may play a key 
role in distinguishing between self-generated and externally-generated perceptions. 
However, the area stimulated in the current study (25cm
2
) does not allow us to 
disentangle the potential roles of specific areas of the pSTG in this task. Indeed, a 
limitation of the technique employed in this study is the relatively low spatial 
resolution, and so it is not possible to test whether differences in levels of activation 
of, for example, the PT or TPJ, drive the observed effect, and it is also possible that 
the stimulating electrode could have affected inferior parietal regions of cortex. 
Whilst it is not possible to resolve this issue using the current data, it should be noted 
that, in a neuroimaging study using a very similar task, other cortical regions such as 
the inferior parietal lobe were not implicated in false alarm responses (Barkus et al., 
2007). In principle, stimulating electrodes with a smaller surface area could be used 
to investigate the role of more specific cortical regions (e.g., Borckardt et al., 2012), 
although these techniques are still in their infancy, and the higher current density 
(due to smaller electrode surface) can lead to discomfort for the participant. A 
combination of noninvasive neurostimulation, such as the technique used in the 
present study, and functional neuroimaging techniques, would allow investigation of 
precise cortical areas involved in false alarm responses. This would also allow 
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exploration of effects that may be distal to the stimulating electrode, and potentially 
part of a network of cortical areas involved in the genesis of auditory false 
perceptions. 
It is, furthermore, possible that tDCS could affect functional interactions between 
pSTG and other regions of a cortical network thought to be involved in auditory false 
perceptions (for example, anterior cingulate regions involved in error detection or 
inferior frontal regions involved in speech production; Allen et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, Hoffman, Fernandez, Pittman & Hampson (2011) have argued that a 
corticostriatal loop involving Wernicke’s area, Broca’s area, and the putamen may 
be hyperconnected in those who experience AVHs, and that this may be affected by 
left TPJ stimulation. Again, integration of neurostimulation and neuroimaging 
paradigms will enable exploration of these issues (for a recent example, see Ellison 
et al., 2014). 
We also observed a reduction in false alarm rate between the first and second task 
block, regardless of stimulation condition; that is, participants were less prone to 
auditory false perceptions in the offline block (after stimulation) regardless of 
whether they had received sham stimulation or either of the active stimulations. This 
is in accordance with the practice effect in auditory signal detection noted by Varese 
et al. (2011). There was no interaction between stimulation condition and task block, 
implying that the increased or decreased excitability of the pSTG was still evident in 
the offline block of the signal detection task. This is consistent with previous 
findings which have indicated that, after 15 minutes of stimulation, behavioural 
effects can be seen for up to an hour (Hummel & Cohen, 2006). Our results also 
indicated that decreasing the strength of the stimulation applied, from 1.5mA to 
1mA, did not significantly affect the results (that is, there was an effect of 
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stimulation on false alarm rate regardless of stimulation strength). It might be 
expected that, if the stimulation strength was decreased, a smaller effect size would 
be observed, but it is probable that the present study was not adequately powered to 
pick up an interaction between stimulation condition (anodal, cathodal or sham) and 
stimulation strength (1.5mA/1mA). Investigating this interaction was not, however, a 
primary aim of the study. 
One possible alternative interpretation of these findings relates to the positioning of 
the ‘reference’ electrode above the right eye. This electrode likely covered anterior 
areas of the right prefrontal cortex, an area which has previously been implicated in 
source memory retrieval (Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith & Burgess, 2006). It is, 
therefore, possible that the reported effects are due to modulation of activity in this 
brain region; however, neuroimaging using auditory signal detection tasks did not 
specifically associate this brain area with any aspects of performance, whereas 
superior temporal regions were specifically associated with false alarm responses 
(Barkus et al., 2007). We also attempted to minimise the potential effect of the 
frontal electrode by increasing the size of the electrode, therefore decreasing the 
current density and lessening the potential for neuronal modulation. Whilst it seems 
more parsimonious to conclude that the observed effect was due to changes in 
activity of the pSTG, it cannot be ruled out that modulation of areas in prefrontal 
cortex may be responsible for the observed effect on auditory signal detection. 
Indeed, many other studies utilise a contralateral frontal electrode (e.g., Ball et al., 
2013; You et al., 2011), and so this is an issue which pervades much tDCS research. 
Regardless of limitations relating to spatial resolution, this study has provided 
evidence that stimulating using this electrode montage can affect the number of 
auditory false perceptions on a signal detection task. This has implications for the 
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potential of using neurostimulation as a treatment option, with studies attempting to 
reduce activity in the posterior STG suggesting that this may be an efficacious 
treatment option to reduce their frequency (Slotema et al., 2013). It has recently been 
suggested that modulation of a cortical network important in self/reality monitoring 
and inner speech may underlie the therapeutic effect of neurostimulation (Moseley, 
Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013), although evidence concerning the effect of 
neurostimulation on reality monitoring is limited. This would, however, be 
consistent with the present results, and with neuroimaging findings relating to 
activity in the STG during source memory and signal detection tasks (Barkus et al., 
2007; Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene & Johnson, 2014), which imply that higher 
levels of activation may lead to perceptions being labelled as external. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be to investigate whether stimulation of the pSTG 
would affect response biases in detecting stimuli other than voices. It has been 
relatively well established that individuals that hallucinate are more likely to 
misattribute auditory verbal material (Brookwell et al., 2013), but less research has 
investigated other modalities. Gawęda, Woodward, Moritz, and Kokoszka (2013) 
found that patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who hallucinated showed a bias 
towards responding that imagined actions were actually performed, indicating that 
response biases may not be specific to voices, or, indeed, auditory stimuli. 
Future research should therefore attempt to establish the precise relationship between 
reality monitoring (distinguishing between internally and externally generated 
perceptions) and the auditory signal detection task used here, as well as the 
specificity of the effect to auditory verbal material. Previous literature has tended to 
assume that the differential response bias shown by hallucinating participants in 
auditory signal detection is linked to reality monitoring mechanisms (Bentall & 
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Slade, 1985; Brookwell, Bentall & Varese, 2013). One could argue that a false alarm 
response must, by definition, be an internal mental event misattributed to an external 
source (i.e., the white noise), and this idea is supported by meta-analytic findings, 
which show a similar effect size between hallucinating and non-hallucinating 
samples for response biases on source memory tasks and auditory signal detection 
tasks (Brookwell et al., 2013). Here, we have shown that modulating excitability of 
left pSTG can alter the false alarm rate, and it is possible that this may be due to 
modulation of activity in areas important for reality monitoring, but it is not clear 
whether this finding would be specific to language. Future research should aim to 
establish whether neurostimulation of pSTG can have a similar effect on other tasks 
purported to test reality monitoring. 
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that modulating activity in the pSTG can 
affect the number of false alarm responses that participants make when asked to 
detect speech in white noise. These results are consistent with theories that specify 
an important role for the pSTG in mechanisms that distinguish between internally 
and externally generated perceptions. It also provides a mechanism through which 
modulation of excitability of this cortical region may reduce frequency of AVHs, in 
those that seek help with anomalous experiences. 
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Chapter 6 
Investigating the role of superior temporal and medial prefrontal cortices in 
reality monitoring 
The findings from Chapter 5 indicated that modulating levels of activity in the left 
posterior superior temporal gyrus affected the number of false perceptions on an 
auditory signal detection task, associated with changes in both response bias and task 
sensitivity. Combined with the findings from Chapters 3 and 4, this provides 
evidence that this cortical region is involved in external misattributions typically 
associated with auditory verbal hallucinations. A further question, however, is 
whether the purported cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying external 
misattributions are linked to contemporary memory models relating to reality 
monitoring (e.g., distinguishing imagined from perceived past events).  
In Chapter 4, internal source monitoring was not found to be associated with either 
signal detection performance, or self-reported hallucination-proneness. However, a 
relatively large amount of previous research indicates that performance on source 
monitoring tasks that require the participant to distinguish whether an event was 
internally generated or externally generated (reality monitoring) is associated with 
hallucination-proneness in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Brookwell, 
Bentall, & Varese, 2013), as well as implicating similar cortical regions in external 
misattributions. This is in contrast to the internal source monitoring task utilised in 
Chapter 4, which simply required participants to distinguish between words they had 
imagined, and words they had spoken aloud (i.e., all the words were internally 
generated; see Table 4.1, Chapter 4). Using transcranial direct current stimulation, 
the following study therefore investigated the role of both superior temporal and 
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medial prefrontal cortical regions in memory for the source (internal/external) of 
auditory verbal stimuli.
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Abstract 
‘Reality monitoring’ refers to the ability to distinguish between internally and 
externally generated information. The source monitoring framework suggests that 
subjective attributes relating to recalled information are used to make judgements 
about its origin, such as perceptual vividness and cognitive effort associated with 
production of the information. Recent evidence has suggested that cortical regions 
involved in these judgements include the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (amPFC) 
and the left superior temporal gyrus (STG). Biased reality monitoring performance 
has also been linked to the tendency to experience auditory hallucinations, with the 
left STG in particular being implicated in the propensity to make external 
misattributions (i.e., to recall internally generated information as external). The 
present study used transcranial direct current stimulation, a noninvasive brain 
stimulation technique, to transiently modulate excitability in the right amPFC and 
left STG, in order to investigate whether these regions play crucial roles in reality 
monitoring for verbal information. Participants completed a source memory task in 
which they were asked to recall whether previously presented words had been heard 
or imagined. Results indicated no difference in task performance when these regions 
were stimulated during the encoding stage of the task compared to a sham 
stimulation control condition. It is concluded, therefore, that these regions play less 
important roles than previously theorised in encoding (and may be of greater 
importance in the retrieval of source information), or that more complex functional 
connections between different regions underlie reality monitoring abilities.  
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1. Introduction 
The ability to recall the origin, or ‘source’, of information is a crucial aspect of 
remembering past experiences, and has been termed ‘source monitoring’ (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitoring can be separated into various 
categories, depending on the sources of information that must be distinguished 
between. For example, internal source monitoring requires the participant to 
distinguish between two or more internal sources (e.g., imagining a word, or 
speaking a word aloud), whilst external source monitoring requires the participant to 
distinguish between two or more sources external to the self (e.g., whether a word 
was spoken by one person or another person; see Chapter 4, Table 4.1). The ability 
to recall whether information was externally generated (i.e., emanated from the 
surrounding environment) or internally generated (an action performed or imagined 
by oneself) has been termed ‘reality monitoring’ (Johnson, et al., 1993; Johnson & 
Raye, 1981; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Research falling under the source 
monitoring framework has investigated the specific qualitative attributes of 
memories that may contribute to judgements of source; for example, an event 
represented in memory as especially vivid (i.e., high in perceptual detail) may be 
more likely to be recalled as originating from the external environment (Johnson, 
Foley, & Leach, 1988). Conversely, a remembered event associated with high 
cognitive effort may be recalled as self-generated, or ‘internal’ (Finke, Johnson, & 
Shyi, 1988). Typically, reality monitoring is assessed using a source memory 
paradigm, in which the participant must recall whether a stimulus (e.g., a word or 
image) was previously presented to them, or whether they imagined/spoke the 
stimulus themselves (Brookwell, et al., 2013; Johnson, et al., 1993). 
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Cognitive neuroscientific research into reality monitoring has implicated anterior 
medial prefrontal cortical (amPFC) regions in distinguishing between internally and 
externally generated perceptions (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; Vinogradov et al., 
2006). For example, Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, and Burgess (2006) showed that, 
during the retrieval phase of a source memory paradigm, reduced activation in the 
amPFC was associated with the likelihood that imagined events would be recollected 
as perceived. Furthermore, Buda, Fornito, Bergström, and Simons (2011) 
demonstrated that absence of the paracingulate sulcus (located adjacent to, and 
associated with differential grey matter volumes in, the medial PFC) was associated 
with impaired reality monitoring performance. It has been theorised that activity in 
PFC regions may reflect engagement of higher level cognitive operations and so 
should be important in the feeling of cognitive effort associated with self-generated 
events (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson, 
2014). For example, drawing on evidence relating anterior medial PFC activity to, 
among other things, metacognition, theory of mind, and the default mode network, 
the ‘gateway hypothesis’ specifies that anterior PFC plays a role in switching 
between stimulus-oriented (i.e., external) and stimulus-independent (i.e., internal) 
thought (Burgess, Simons, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2005). It is therefore no surprise 
that amPFC is important in the ability to retrospectively distinguish between events 
that were external and events that were internal. 
Similarly, Sugimori et al. (2014), in a paradigm that required participants to recall 
whether words had previously been heard or only imagined, showed that frontal 
regions, such as the middle frontal gyrus, were more active during encoding of 
words that were correctly recalled as ‘imagined’. This could be interpreted as 
evidence that engagement of cognitive operations (reflected in MFG activity) later 
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acted as a cue that stimuli were self-generated. Furthermore, Sugimori et al. showed 
that words later recalled as ‘heard’ were associated with activity in speech 
production areas such as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), regardless of the original 
source of the word. The authors argue that the involvement of IFG in reality 
monitoring provides evidence that semantic and perceptual detail from speech 
production areas can inform the judgement of source at retrieval. Interestingly, 
Sugimori et al. also investigated the link between reality monitoring, cortical 
activation, and the tendency of the participants to experience auditory hallucinations 
(assessed using a self-report measure). It was found that activity in the superior 
temporal gyrus (STG; encompassing primary and secondary auditory cortex) when 
participants incorrectly recalled a word they had imagined as ‘heard’, was 
significantly correlated with the tendency to experience auditory hallucinations.  
The most prominent cognitive models which attempt to explain auditory verbal 
hallucinations (AVHs) have linked deficits or biases in self-monitoring or reality 
monitoring to the tendency to report hallucinatory experiences (Bentall, Baker, & 
Havers, 1991; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). These models are evidenced by 
studies indicating that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who hallucinate 
are more likely to make external misattributions on source memory tasks (that is, 
incorrectly recall that a self-generated word was spoken by someone else), than those 
that do not hallucinate (Stephane, Kuskowski, McClannahan, Surerus, & Nelson, 
2010; Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007). One possibility highlighted by the 
source monitoring framework is that individuals who hallucinate generate 
excessively vivid mental imagery (Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 
2003), which is therefore more likely to become misattributed. An alternative, 
though not exclusive, possibility, is that atypical efference copy mechanisms relating 
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to sensory predictions of self-generated motor acts cause internally generated events 
to be misattributed to an external source (Ford & Mathalon, 2005; Frith, 1992). In 
this way, it is hypothesized that inner speech may become misattributed to an 
external source, and experienced as an AVH (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007).  
Symptom-capture neuroimaging studies have shown that, during the experience of 
an AVH, areas including the left IFG, left STG and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, 
which is immediately adjacent to, and often referred to as part of, the medial 
prefrontal cortex) are often active (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 2008; Jardri, 
Pouchet, Pins, & Thomas, 2011). Neuroimaging has also indicated that atypical 
connectivity between frontal and temporal regions is associated with AVHs (Lawrie 
et al., 2002; Mechelli et al., 2007). The fact that AVHs are associated with similar 
areas to those involved in reality monitoring tasks has been taken to support theories 
specifying that they result from biased monitoring processes, potentially specific to 
inner speech, supported by evidence of activation in the left IFG during AVHs 
(Jardri et al., 2011). High levels of activity in the STG could reflect either high levels 
of vividness of inner speech (Zvyagintsev et al., 2013), and/or a failure of efference 
copy processes to attenuate sensory cortices in response to a self-generated action, 
such as inner speech (Simons et al., 2010). 
Recent research has studied the effects of reducing cortical excitability in superior 
temporal regions as a treatment option for AVHs, with results suggesting that 
decreasing excitability using techniques such as offline repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) or cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) can lead to a reduction in the frequency of AVHs (Hoffman et al., 2013; 
Slotema, Blom, van Lutterveld, Hoek, & Sommer, 2013). It has been suggested that, 
at a cognitive level, this reduction in AVH frequency may be linked to improved 
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self-/reality monitoring ability (Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013; Chapter 1). 
Our previous findings suggest that modulating excitability in the superior temporal 
lobe using tDCS affects performance on a signal detection task (Moseley, 
Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2014; Chapter 5), a task which is thought to index a similar 
mechanism to that which distinguishes between internal and external perceptions 
(Brookwell et al., 2013). Furthermore, one study showed that there was a concurrent 
improvement in performance on a source memory task alongside a reduction in AVH 
frequency following treatment using offline 1 Hz rTMS (Brunelin et al., 2006). 
These studies therefore inform two streams of research, relating to: 1) the importance 
of prefrontal areas, and primary and secondary auditory cortical regions in the STG, 
for reality monitoring of auditory stimuli; 2) the importance of reality monitoring 
(internal/external) processes in AVH. However, as yet, no study has tested the 
involvement of these brain regions in reality monitoring using neurostimulation, in a 
non-clinical population. 
Therefore, the present study tested the involvement of two cortical regions in reality 
monitoring for auditory verbal stimuli: the right anterior medial prefrontal cortex and 
the left superior temporal gyrus. We used a noninvasive brain stimulation technique, 
tDCS, to increase or decrease cortical excitability whilst participants completed the 
encoding stage of a source memory task. The rationale for applying stimulation 
during the encoding stage was based on models of reality monitoring suggesting that 
vividness of self-generated imagery, and cognitive effort associated with the 
imagery, may underlie later source judgements. tDCS involves running a weak 
electrical current between two electrodes placed on the participant’s scalp, 
depolarising or hyperpolarising the membrane potentials of underlying neurons, 
under the anodal and cathodal electrode respectively. Cortical excitability is 
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therefore increased underneath the anode, and decreased underneath the cathode 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). The source memory task required participants to recall 
whether they had heard a word, imagined hearing it, or whether the word was 
completely new. Participants were therefore assessed for old/new recognition, as 
well as source discrimination. They were also required to provide ratings for the 
vividness with which they had heard or imagined each word, since, as has been 
outlined, this is thought to be a key variable that may affect reality monitoring 
performance. 
In this study, tDCS was applied during the encoding phase of the task, whilst 
participants were presented with a series of words on the screen. For each word, the 
participant was either asked to listen to a male voice speak the word, or to imagine 
hearing the same male voice speak the word. At a later stage, the participant was 
then required to recall, for each word, whether they believed it had been heard or 
imagined earlier in the task, or if they believed the word was new (had not been 
presented earlier). The hypothesis was that, by increasing cortical excitability in the 
left STG, the rate at which participants would respond that they had heard the 
previously presented words would increase (as in individuals who experience 
AVHs). We also predicted that decreasing excitability in the right amPFC would 
lead to a decrease in correct source judgements overall, but that old/new 
discrimination would not be affected.  
Following Sugimori et al. (2014), participants also completed self-report measures, 
to test whether proneness to hallucinations was associated with source memory in 
each stimulation condition. Based on the results of Sugimori et al., who showed that 
activation in the left STG for imagined items subsequently recalled as heard 
correlated with hallucination-proneness, we hypothesized that external misattribution 
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errors would correlate with hallucination-proneness, and that this may be most 
evident in the temporal stimulation condition. Finally, as outlined, previous 
neuroimaging findings indicate a role for the amPFC in meta-cognition (Burgess et 
al., 2005), especially with respect to memory (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski & 
Margulies, 2013). Participants were therefore asked to provide a meta-cognitive 
estimate of reality monitoring task performance, with the hypothesis that meta-
cognitive estimates would be worse following right amPFC stimulation, compared to 
sham stimulation. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 36 participants (9 males, 27 females), aged 18–28 (M = 
20.14, SD = 2.5). All participants were right-handed, and were also considered 
ineligible to take part if they reported any hearing problems, or any history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorder (see Appendix 1 for specific eligibility criteria). 
Ethical approval was provided by Durham University Ethics Committee, and written 
informed consent was given by participants, in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. All participants were rewarded with a £25 gift voucher for participating, 
and course credits if required. The study was advertised as testing ‘auditory 
memory’. 
2.2. Source memory task 
The source memory task was based upon that used by Sugimori et al. (2014). The 
task consisted of two stages: the encoding stage and the recall stage. The stimuli 
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consisted of 450 words taken from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 
1988), each consisting of 1-3 syllables and 4-6 letters. The words were separated into 
nine lists, each consisting of 50 words, matched on mean number of letters and 
syllables, as well as Kucera-Francis frequency, familiarity, concreteness, 
imageability and meaningfulness.  
In the encoding stage, participants were presented with a series of 100 words, taken 
from two lists. One list was assigned to be ‘heard’, and the other list ‘imagined’. 
Participants were presented with each word consecutively. The heard and imagined 
words were presented alternately, although the order in which the items from each 
list were presented was randomised for each participant. Immediately before each 
word, participants were cued with the word ‘HEAR’ or ‘IMAGINE’ in the centre of 
the screen. Each word was then presented for 2500ms in the centre of the screen 
(font: Arial, font size: 24 pt; see Fig. 6.1 for example). If the word followed the cue 
to hear the stimuli, it was accompanied by an auditory stimulus, of a male voice 
speaking the word once. If they had been asked to imagine the presented word, no 
auditory stimulus was presented, and the participant was required to imagine hearing 
the word being read out in the same male voice they had heard. Following the 
presentation of each word, the participant was cued to provide a rating for how 
vividly they had heard/imagined the word (1 = low; 2 = average; 3 = high). 
Specifically, participants were informed that they should rate each word for how 
‘clear, detailed and realistic’ it had sounded. The rating screen was presented for 2.5 
secs, regardless of whether a response was entered. The encoding stage therefore 
lasted a total of 900 seconds. 
Following the encoding stage, participants were given a short break from the task 
(during which time the tDCS electrodes were removed from their scalp). Participants 
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were either given a break of 5 or 15 minutes. We included this between-subject 
variable because neurostimulation techniques such as tDCS can have after-effects 
beyond the period of stimulation, both at a neural (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011) and 
behavioural (Hummel & Cohen, 2006) level, which may have directly affected task 
performance in the recall phase (as opposed to indirectly through the effect on 
encoding that we wished to study). If any observed effect was due to after-effects of 
the tDCS, it would be expected to be weaker after a longer time period, as the effects 
of stimulation began to wear off. During the task break, participants were asked to sit 
quietly in the darkened room; it was not appropriate to give participants a distractor 
task, since this may have interacted with the effects of the tDCS. 
After the task break, participants completed the recall stage of the task. In this stage, 
they were presented with the two lists of words included in the encoding stage, as 
well as a third list which had not been previously presented. In this stage, they were 
therefore presented with 50 words which had previously been heard, 50 words which 
had previously been imagined, and 50 words which had not previously been 
presented. The words were presented in a random order, and appeared on the screen 
until a response was entered. For each word, participants were asked to respond, with 
a button press, whether they believed the word had been heard or imagined in the 
first stage, or if the word was completely new. 
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Figure 6.1: Schematic of a single trial during the encoding stage of the reality 
monitoring task. Participants were presented with either the word ‘HEAR’ or 
‘IMAGINE’ (Screen 1), followed by a target word (Screen 3), followed by a screen 
which asks them to rate the vividness with which they heard or imagined the word 
(Screen 4). 
 
2.3. Other measures 
As well as completing the source memory task, participants were asked to complete 
a number of self-report measures relating to both their experience of the task, and 
proneness to hallucinatory experiences. 
After each session, participants completed a short questionnaire which asked them 
the following three questions relating to the task they had just completed, requiring a 
response between 0–100:  
1) ‘Please enter an overall vividness rating, corresponding to how vividly, when 
asked, you think you were able to imagine each of the words’;  
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2) ‘Please enter an overall rating, corresponding to how often you think the voice 
you imagined was in the other person’s voice (as opposed to your own)’;  
3) ‘What percentage of the words do you think you correctly classified as 
heard/imagined/new? (chance performance = 33%)’. 
The aim of the first question was to provide a retrospective estimate of the vividness 
with which the words were imagined, providing participants with a wider range of 
possible answers (0–100, as opposed to 1–3 during the task). The second question 
was included to provide a measure of the extent to which participants engaged in 
imagery of the male voice (as opposed to their own voice), as they were instructed. 
The aim of the third question was to assess the participant’s ability to meta-
cognitively estimate how well they had performed on the task. 
Finally, participants completed the Revised Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale 
(LSHS-R; McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011), a self-report measure of 
hallucination-proneness that asks participants to rate the frequency of hallucinatory 
experiences (e.g., ‘I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice and then 
found that no-one was there.’). The scale consists of 9 items, with each item scored 
between 1-4, summing to a possible total of 36. 
2.4. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
Participants received 900s (plus 8s of fade-in and 8s of fade-out) of tDCS whilst 
completing the encoding stage of the source memory task (see Section 2.2), using a 
Magstim Eldith DC Stimulator. A 1 mA current was delivered through two 5 x 5cm 
(25cm
2
) electrodes, placed in sponges soaked in saline solution, and held in place on 
participants’ scalp by two rubber straps. There were three separate stimulation 
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conditions, which all participants completed. In these, three regions were stimulated: 
right anterior medial PFC (amPFC), left STG, and visual area V5/MT (the latter was 
chosen as a control site, because it was not expected to play a role in the source 
memory task used in the present study). These sites were localised using the EEG 
10-20 system, which adjusts for individual head size, and has previously been used 
to target the left STG under electrode site CP5 (Moseley et al., 2014; You, Kim, 
Chun, Jung, & Park, 2011) and right amPFC under electrode FP2 (Karim et al., 
2010). The V5 electrode was positioned 3cm above the inion, and 6cm left of the 
midline, as in previous studies which have stimulated this cortical region (Antal et 
al., 2004). 
Participants therefore received stimulation on three occasions. In one session, the 
cathodal electrode was positioned over the right amPFC, and the anodal electrode 
over the left STG (subsequently referred to as the ‘temporal’ condition, see Fig. 
6.2a). This condition was included to investigate the effect on performance of 
stimulating the left STG, over and above (or in interaction with) the effect of 
stimulating the right amPFC. In another session, the cathodal electrode was 
positioned over the right amPFC, and the anodal electrode over left V5 
(subsequently referred to as the ‘occipital’ condition, see Fig 6.2b). This was 
included to investigate the effect of right amPFC on task performance, without 
stimulation of the left STG. Finally, as a baseline condition, in another session, the 
electrodes were positioned as in the temporal condition, but stimulation was only 
applied for 30 seconds (plus 8s fade-in and 8s fade-out; subsequently referred to as 
the ‘sham’ condition). Sham stimulation is not sufficient to modulate neuronal 
excitability, and has previously been demonstrated to be an effective method of 
blinding participants to the condition (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006). Where 
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possible, sessions were separated by 7 days (mean no. days between Sessions 1-2 = 
7.17, SD = 0.51, range: 7-9; mean no. days between Sessions 2-3 = 6.92, SD = 0.55, 
range: 5-8). The order in which participants completed each condition was 
counterbalanced. 
 
Figure 6.2: Top-down representation of electrode positioning in (a) the 
temporal condition and (b) the occipital condition. Dashed line = cathodal 
electrode; solid line = anodal electrode. (Note that the anodal electrode in the 
occipital condition was not positioned according to the EEG 10-10 system – see text 
for details.) Effects specific to the temporal condition would indicate specificity to 
the electrode placed over the left STG, whereas effects of both active conditions, 
compared to sham stimulation, would indicate an effect of the electrode placed over 
right amPFC. Image retrieved from 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/openbci/openbci-an-open-source-brain-
computer-interface-fo/posts/712302. 
 
2.5. Procedure 
In each session, participants were seated in front of a computer and provided with 
earbuds (Creative EP-630), through which the stimuli were played. Before starting 
the reality monitoring task, participants listened to a short sound clip, consisting of a 
male voice reading a brief passage of text (60s). This was so that the participants had 
(a) (b) 
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prior experience of the voice they would be asked to imagine hearing as part of the 
reality monitoring task. Participants then completed a short practice of both stages of 
the task (consisting of 6 words in the encoding stage, then 9 words in the recall 
stage). Participants were allowed to repeat the practice stage if they wished. The 
tDCS was then started, and after the 8s fade-in period, the encoding stage of the task 
began. After 900s, the encoding stage of the task ended, at the same time as the fade-
out period (8s) of the tDCS began. The participant was asked to sit quietly for either 
5 or 15 minutes, in which time the electrodes were removed from their scalp. They 
then completed the recall stage of the task, followed by the short questionnaire 
outlined in Section 2.3 (all sessions), and the hallucination-proneness measure 
(LSHS-R, final session only). 
This procedure was kept identical across all three sessions (i.e., participants listened 
to the sound clip and completed the practice task each time they participated). The 
only difference between each session was that 1) different word lists were used in 
each session; 2) the stimulation condition was varied. 
2.6. Data analysis 
For old items (those presented in the encoding stage), within-subject variables that 
were entered into the analysis were stimulation condition (temporal/occipital/sham 
condition), presentation type (hear/imagine; representing the two types of trial that 
were part of the encoding stage), and response (heard/imagined; representing the 
source decision made by the participant in the recall stage). Interval length 
(5min/15min, representing the length in time between the encoding and recall stages 
of the task) was also included as a between-subject variable. To analyse task 
performance, a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA was therefore carried out with 
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number of responses as the dependent variable. The crucial effect of interest was 
stimulation condition × response type (with the prediction that heard responses 
would be higher in the temporal stimulation condition, but imagined responses 
would not). Power analysis indicated that, for a medium effect size (f = .25) and 80% 
power, a 3 × 2 (in this case, stimulation condition × response) interaction with two 
within-subject variables required a minimum of 30 participants.  
Mean vividness ratings were calculated for each presentation type and response type, 
by dividing the sum of the responses after each word (1-3) by the number of each 
type of response. To analyse the vividness ratings, stimulation condition 
(temporal/occipital/sham condition), presentation type (hear/imagine) and response 
(heard/imagined) were included in the design as within-subject variables, as well as 
interval length (5/15) as a between-subjects variable. A 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 (stimulation 
condition × presentation type × response type × interval length) mixed model 
ANOVA was therefore carried out, with mean vividness rating as the dependent 
variable. This was to investigate whether stimulation affected the vividness with 
which participants reported hearing/imagining the presented words, as well as 
whether vividness ratings differed between the presentation types and response 
types. For all analyses carried out on vividness ratings, participants who made 0 of 
any response type (N = 4) were not included, because mean vividness ratings could 
not be calculated for all types of response. 
Old/new recognition was also investigated, by entering the number of old/new errors 
into a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA (stimulation condition × error direction × 
interval length). ‘Error direction’ refers to incorrect responses, either classifying an 
old item (a hear/imagine item in the encoding stage) as new, or a new item (not 
previously presented) as old. The mean vividness ratings of old words was also 
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analysed, to investigate whether old words correctly recalled as such 
(heard/imagined) were originally rated as more vivid than old words that were 
subsequently labelled new. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Reality monitoring performance 
Descriptive statistics for reality monitoring performance are presented in Table 6.1 
and Fig. 6.3. There was no main effect of stimulation condition on number of heard 
and imagined responses (F(2, 68) = 0.78, p = .46), showing that stimulation did not 
affect the tendency to label a word as heard/imagined. Stimulation condition did not 
interact with presentation type (F(2, 68) = 1.45, p = .24), indicating that stimulation did 
not specifically affect reality monitoring performance on items presented as ‘hear’ or 
‘imagine’. Importantly, stimulation condition did not interact with response type (F(2, 
68) = .004, p = .99), indicating that altering the type of stimulation had no effect upon 
the tendency to recall words as heard or imagined (irrespective of the original 
presentation mode). Finally, stimulation condition did not interact with any other 
variables, or combination of variables (all ps > .16). 
There was a significant main effect of presentation type (F(1, 34) = 5.46, p = .025) on 
number of responses, indicating that items originally presented as ‘hear’ (M = 17.13, 
SD = 3.3) were more likely to be recalled as heard/imagined than ‘imagine’ items (M 
= 16.36, SD = 2.9). There was also a main effect of response type (F(1, 34) = 5.49, p = 
.025), indicating that, other things being equal, participants were more likely to 
respond that they had imagined a word (M = 17.84, SD = 4.2) than that they had 
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heard a word (M = 15.66, SD = 4.1). Importantly, there was also a significant 
interaction between presentation type and response type (F(1, 34) = 49.51, p < .001), 
explained by the result that participants were more likely to respond ‘heard’ (M = 
21.13, SD = 7.26) than ‘imagined’ (M = 13.14, SD = 4.76) for items originally 
presented to ‘hear’ (t(35) = 4.60, p < .001), and were more likely to respond 
imagined (M = 22.54, SD = 7.15) than heard (M = 10.19, SD = 4.68) for items 
originally presented to ‘imagine’ (t(35) = 7.02, p < .001). (This interaction indicates 
that participants were able to recall the source of items at a level that was well above 
chance.) Apart from response type, presentation type did not interact with any 
variables or combination of variables (all ps > .24). There was a significant 
interaction between response type and interval length (F(1, 34) = 4.14, p = .049). 
Further exploration using paired t-tests showed that, after a 5 minute interval, 
participants were more likely to respond that they had imagined a word (M = 18.85, 
SD = 4.54) than heard a word (M = 14.78, SD = 4.70), irrespective of the original 
presentation type (t(17) = 2.53, p = .022). However, after a 15 minute interval, there 
was no difference between the number of heard (M = 16.54, SD = 3.33) and 
imagined (M = 16.82, SD = 3.59) responses (irrespective of the actual source).  
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Table 6.1: Task performance on hear/imagine judgements on reality monitoring task (%), by interval length, response type and 
stimulation condition (M, SD) 
  
Interval length Presentation type Response  type 
Stimulation condition 
Temporal Occipital Sham 
5 mins Hear Heard 43.00 (16.7) 40.33 (18.3) 44.11 (20.5) 
  Imagined 28.22 (12.7) 26.56 (8.6) 25.89 (9.9) 
 Imagine Heard 15.89 (9.5) 16.78 (10.9) 17.22 (9.6) 
  Imagined 47.33 (16.5) 46.78 (16.4) 51.44 (20.7) 
15 mins Hear Heard 40.67 (10.4) 43.22 (14.7) 42.22 (13.3) 
  Imagined 25.22 (12.0) 26.33 (13.2) 25.44 (8.9) 
 Imagine Heard 23.89 (9.1) 24.67 (9.7) 23.78 (11.2) 
  Imagined 40.00 (12.2) 42.56 (11.1) 42.33 (11.8) 
194 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Task performance (collapsed across stimulation conditions) on the 
reality monitoring task. ‘Presentation type’ refers to whether the word was 
originally heard or imagined by the participant; within this, each bar represents the 
rate at which participants labelled words heard, imagined or new. 
 
3.2. Effects of imagery vividness on reality monitoring performance 
Descriptive statistics for vividness ratings for heard and imagined words are 
presented in Table 6.2. There was no main effect of stimulation condition on 
vividness ratings of the heard or imagined words (F(2, 60) = 1.62, p = .207), nor any 
interaction between stimulation condition and presentation type (F(2, 60) = 0.31, p = 
.737) or between stimulation condition and response type (F(2, 60) = 0.38, p = .685). 
There was a main effect of presentation type on vividness ratings (F(1, 30) = 159.02, p 
< .001), indicating that words that were presented as ‘hear’ (M = 2.76, SD = 0.21) 
were rated as more vividly perceived than words that were presented as ‘imagine’ (M 
= 2.00, SD = 0.28), as would be expected. There was also a main effect of response 
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type (F(1, 30) = 17.77, p < .001), indicating that words recalled as ‘heard’ (M = 2.42, 
SD = 0.18), irrespective of their original source, were rated as more vivid than those 
recalled as ‘imagined’ (M = 2.34, SD = 0.20). There was no presentation type × 
response type interaction (F(1, 30) = 2.24, p = .145), indicating that the effect of 
response type on vividness rating was not different for correct or incorrect source 
judgements (that is, items correctly classified as heard were previously rated as 
higher in vividness than those incorrectly classified as imagined; and items 
incorrectly classified as heard were previously rated as higher in vividness than items 
correctly classified as imagined). Finally, there was no interaction between any other 
variables included in the model (all ps > .095).
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Table 6.2: Mean vividness ratings for heard and imagined words, by interval length, response type and stimulation condition (M, SD) 
 
  
Interval length Presentation type Response  type 
Stimulation condition 
Temporal Occipital Sham 
5 mins Hear Heard 2.70 (0.3) 2.77 (0.2) 2.72 (0.3) 
  Imagined 2.59 (0.5) 2.76 (0.2) 2.59 (0.4) 
 Imagine Heard 1.96 (0.4) 2.07 (0.3) 2.11 (0.5) 
  Imagined 1.92 (0.4) 1.96 (0.3) 1.88 (0.4) 
15 mins Hear Heard 2.81 (0.2) 2.84 (0.1) 2.86 (0.1) 
  Imagined 2.79 (0.2) 2.84 (0.2) 2.85 (0.2) 
 Imagine Heard 2.05 (0.3) 2.06 (0.5) 2.06 (0.4) 
  Imagined 1.93 (0.3) 1.97 (0.4) 2.03 (0.4) 
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3.3. Old/new performance 
Descriptive statistics for old/new performance are presented in Table 6.3. There was 
no main effect of stimulation condition on number of old/new errors made (F(2, 68) = 
0.85, p = .433). There was a main effect of error direction (F(1, 34) = 7.91, p = .008), 
showing that participants were more likely to incorrectly classify an old item as new 
(M = 33.01, SD = 11.8) than to classify a new item as old (M = 24.09, SD = 13.9). 
Old/new performance did not interact with any variables (all ps > .08). 
3.4. Effects of imagery vividness on old/new performance 
Descriptive statistics for old/new vividness ratings are presented in Table 6.4. There 
was no main effect of stimulation condition (F(2, 68) = 0.69, p = .503), indicating that 
stimulation did not affect vividness ratings over all items. There was a main effect of 
old/new response type (F(1, 34) = 18.60, p < .001), showing that items correctly 
classified as ‘old’ (M = 2.37, SD = 0.20) were previously rated as higher in vividness 
than old items incorrectly classified as ‘new’ (M = 2.28, SD = 0.25). There were no 
interactions between any other variables (all ps > .210). 
3.5. Self-report measures and task performance 
Spearman’s correlations between self-reported hallucination proneness (LSHS-R) 
and task errors indicated that neither total number of imagined words incorrectly 
recalled as heard (rs = .233, p = .171), or number of heard words incorrectly recalled 
as imagined (rs = -.266, p = .116) (summed across all conditions), were significantly 
associated with hallucination-proneness. 
When broken down by condition, hallucination-proneness was positively correlated 
with number of imagined items recalled as heard in the temporal stimulation 
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condition (rs = .298, p = .039), although this was not the case in the occipital (rs = 
.186, p = .279) or sham (rs = .126, p = .465) stimulation conditions (one-tailed). 
However, Hotelling’s t-test indicated that correlation coefficients did not 
significantly differ between the temporal and occipital (t(33) = 0.80, p = .214), 
temporal and sham (t(33) = 1.38, p = .089), or occipital and sham conditions (t(33) = 
0.39, p = .653). Hallucination-proneness was negatively associated with heard items 
being incorrectly recalled as imagined in the sham stimulation condition (rs = -.374, 
p = .013), but not in the temporal (rs = -.105, p = .542) or occipital (rs = -.148, p = 
.389) conditions (one-tailed). Hotelling’s t-test indicated that there was a significant 
difference between the correlation coefficients in the sham and temporal stimulation 
conditions (t(33) = 1.94, p = .031), and in the sham and occipital conditions (t(33) = 
1.71, p = .049), but not between the temporal and occipital conditions (t(33) = 0.28, 
p = .61). 
 
Table 6.3: Old/new errors (%), by interval length, error direction and 
stimulation condition (M, SD) 
 
 
Interval length Error direction 
Stimulation condition 
Temporal Occipital Sham 
5 mins Old-new 32.78 (11.4) 34.78 (12.7) 30.67 (17.1) 
 New-old 22.78 (15.8) 20.56 (14.3) 20.00 (13.7) 
15 mins Old-new 35.11 (11.5) 31.6 (12.2) 33.11 (13.7) 
 New-old 24.89 (15.6) 29.56 (19.8) 26.78 (12.7) 
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Neither retrospective estimations of vividness taken at the end of each session (see 
Section 2.3) (F(2, 66) = 1.46, p = .240), nor estimations of the extent to which the 
words were imagined in the other person’s voice (F(2, 66) = 0.74, p = .482) differed 
between the three stimulation conditions.  
 
Table 6.4: Vividness ratings for ‘hear’ and ‘imagine’ items, by interval length, 
response type (i.e., whether they were classified as old or new), and stimulation 
condition (M, SD). 
 
 
Analysis of the meta-cognitive estimates of task performance showed that participant 
estimates of the percentages of words they had classified correctly (M = 49.67, SD = 
11.2) were significantly lower than the actual number of words classified correctly 
(M = 54.41, SD = 11.2) (F(1, 33) = 4.87, p = .034). There was also a 3 × 2 interaction 
between stimulation condition (temporal/occipital/sham) and percentage of correctly 
classified words (actual score/meta-cognitive estimate) (F(2, 66) = 4.02, p = .023). 
Further analysis revealed no effect of stimulation condition on total number of words 
Interval length Response type 
Stimulation condition 
Temporal Occipital Sham 
5 mins Old 2.32 (0.3) 2.38 (0.2) 2.29 (0.3) 
 New 2.22 (0.3) 2.20 (0.3) 2.22 (0.3) 
15 mins Old 2.39 (0.2) 2.42 (0.2) 2.45 (0.2) 
 New 2.33 (0.2) 2.35 (0.2) 2.40 (0.3) 
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correctly classified (F(2, 66) = 0.98, p = .381), but an effect of stimulation condition on 
the meta-cognitive estimate of correctly classified words (F(2, 66) = 4.49, p = .015). 
Paired t-tests indicated that meta-cognitive estimates were significantly lower in the 
temporal stimulation condition (M = 46.47, SD = 11.48) than in the occipital 
condition (M = 50.82, SD = 13.03), (t(33) = 2.51, p = .017) and the sham condition 
(M = 51.71, SD = 13.94), (t(33) = 2.90, p = .007), but that there was no difference 
between estimates in the occipital and sham stimulation conditions (t(33) = 0.43, p = 
.671). 
 
4. Discussion 
This study used tDCS to investigate the role of left superior temporal and right 
anterior medial prefrontal cortices in source memory for heard and imagined verbal 
stimuli. Participants took part in three conditions, receiving stimulation in separate 
sessions to 1) right amPFC and left STG, 2) right amPFC and a left hemispheric 
occipital region, and 3) sham stimulation.  
4.1. Reality monitoring task performance 
Firstly, the key finding of this study was that there was no discernible effect of tDCS 
on source memory judgements. It was hypothesized that stimulation of the left STG 
and right amPFC, compared to the two other conditions, would lead to participants 
being more likely to recall words as ‘heard’ (corresponding to an externalising bias 
often shown by individuals prone to hallucinate). That stimulation in this condition 
did not affect task performance compared to the occipital or sham conditions 
suggests that the left STG may not play a crucial role in encoding source in reality 
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monitoring tasks. It was also hypothesized that stimulating right amPFC and an 
occipital control site, compared to sham stimulation, would decrease the overall 
number of correct source judgements. Again, results showed no difference between 
the conditions on task performance, implying that encoding source may not crucially 
rely on the right amPFC. As predicted, there was no difference between the three 
conditions on old/new recognition. 
Previous studies into the cognitive and neuroscientific mechanisms underlying 
reality monitoring have mainly used neuroimaging techniques to investigate 
associations between levels of activation in specific regions and task performance 
(Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; Simons, et al., 2006; Sugimori, et al., 2014). The amPFC 
has been implicated in switching between stimulus-independent and stimulus-
oriented cognition (Burgess, et al., 2005), variously being linked to theory of mind, 
meta-cognition, and episodic memory. The left STG, meanwhile, encompasses 
primary and secondary auditory cortex, and, in relation to reality monitoring, 
primary and secondary sensory cortices have been linked to imbuing imagery with 
perceptual detail/vividness in both the visual (Gonsalves et al., 2004; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2006) and auditory (Shergill et al., 2001) domain, and/or as important in 
self-monitoring through a role in comparing sensorimotor predictions with incoming 
perceptual information (Simons, et al., 2010). The present study expanded upon 
previous work by utilising a technique which enables inferences into the causal role 
of certain brain regions in specific tasks. To our knowledge, this is the first time 
tDCS has been used to investigate the causal role of specific brain regions in reality 
monitoring.  
Since stimulation of the left STG or right amPFC did not affect reality monitoring 
performance, it is possible that activation seen in previous neuroimaging studies is 
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epiphenomenal, and not crucial for successful task performance. For example, 
Sugimori et al. (2014) also implicated the left inferior frontal gyrus and left middle 
frontal gyrus in reality monitoring task performance, linking activation in these areas 
to perceptual vividness and cognitive operations respectively. Furthermore, Mitchell 
and Johnson (2009) outline a wide range of cortical and subcortical regions that have 
been implicated in source memory task performance, such as dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, as well as hippocampal and parahippocampal regions (which 
neurostimulation techniques such as used here would not be capable of directly 
stimulating). It is therefore possible that these regions may play a more crucial role 
in reality monitoring, whereas activity in the right amPFC and left STG are instead 
only epiphenomenally involved.  
A more likely scenario is perhaps that the functional significance of amPFC and left 
STG is reflected in their functional connectivity with other regions, which may not 
have been affected by the stimulation montage used in this study. For example, 
whilst increasing excitability in the left STG may have secondarily affected other 
cortical regions, functional connectivity (correlations in levels of activity) between 
these regions may have remained relatively stable. Techniques that are used to 
introduce noise into cortical systems (e.g., transcranial random noise stimulation) 
may be ideal for investigating this issue. The hypothesis that functional connectivity 
between frontal and temporal regions may underline reality monitoring biases 
receives some support from a study by Wang, Metzak, and Woodward (2011), who 
showed that functional connectivity between amPFC and left STG was abnormal in 
patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, whilst they performed a source memory 
task. This idea is also consistent with studies using other task paradigms which 
require participants to distinguish between stimuli associated with the self or other 
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people. For example, Mechelli et al. (2007), using dynamic causal modelling, 
showed that misattribution of speech in hallucinating participants was associated 
with atypical connectivity between the STG and anterior cingulate cortex. Further 
study is needed to investigate the effects of superior temporal tDCS on functional 
connectivity with other regions. Future research could accomplish this by using 
tDCS and fMRI concurrently, which would also enable an investigation of the 
effects of tDCS on brain regions distal to the electrode. 
One unexpected finding related to the participants’ meta-cognitive estimates of their 
task performance. The measure of meta-cognition was included with the hypothesis 
that amPFC stimulation would lead to worse meta-cognitive estimates of 
performance (in other words, that participants would be less accurate at estimating 
the number of words they had correctly classified). Overall, participants 
underestimated the percentage of words that they had correctly classified as heard, 
imagined or new, but further analysis indicated that this effect was only evident in 
the temporal stimulation condition (compared to the occipital and sham conditions). 
This suggests that the effect was not due to stimulation of the right amPFC (since 
this was also stimulated in the occipital stimulation condition), but instead must have 
been due to the positioning of the anodal electrode over the left STG (or an 
interaction between the two electrodes). This finding seems at odds with previous 
research, much of which suggests that medial and lateral prefrontal areas are of 
crucial importance in meta-cognitive evaluation of task performance (Fleming & 
Dolan, 2012; Baird et al., 2013). Although impaired meta-cognition in schizophrenia 
has been linked to atypical activation in the superior temporal sulcus, these findings 
pointed towards hypoactivation (Murphy et al., 2010), rather than increased 
excitability which would be expected after anodal stimulation to STG, as in the 
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present study. These findings are, therefore, hard to interpret, and further research 
should attempt to replicate the present results before firm conclusions are drawn. 
4.2. Perceptual vividness of imagined words 
Previous research has suggested that the vividness with which internal mental events 
are experienced is one variable used to discriminate between internally and 
externally generated information; for example, in source memory paradigms, such as 
the one used in the present study, imagined stimuli rated as having higher perceptual 
detail have previously been shown to be more likely to become externally 
misattributed, and later recalled as ‘heard’ (Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979; 
Sugimori, et al., 2014). Therefore, in the present study, we expected that words 
classified as heard, correctly or incorrectly, would have previously been rated as 
higher in vividness. Our data showed that participants rated items that were 
presented to ‘hear’ as more vivid than items that were presented to ‘imagine’, as 
might be expected. However, words that participants later recalled as heard 
(irrespective of original presentation type) were also rated as more vivid than those 
recalled as imagined or new. In this respect, the data provides support for previous 
findings, indicating that participants used information relating to perceptual 
vividness to make source judgements. 
This finding did not interact with the type of stimulation applied, indicating that 
modulating excitability in the left STG or right amPFC did not affect the perceived 
vividness of heard or imagined words. This was not a primary hypothesis of the 
study; indeed, asking participants to rate perceptual vividness on a scale from 1-3 
may be too coarse a measure to have been affected by a technique such as tDCS, 
which elicits relatively small changes in cortical excitability. However, retrospective 
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estimates of vividness, as well as estimates of the extent to which the words were 
imagined in the ‘other’ voice, on a larger scale (0-100), also did not differ by 
stimulation condition, implying that stimulation did not affect this facet of task 
performance. 
4.3. Associations between task performance and hallucination-proneness 
To our knowledge, the only study that has used neuroimaging to study the neural 
correlates of external misattributions on a source memory task, specifically in 
relation to hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical sample, was conducted by 
Sugimori et al. (2014), who showed that the level of activity in the left STG during 
external misattributions (imagine to hear errors) was positively correlated with self-
reported hallucination-proneness. Therefore, we investigated whether the number of 
external misattributions on the source memory task was most strongly associated 
with hallucination-proneness when we increased excitability in the STG using anodal 
stimulation. Correlational analysis indeed indicated that self-reported hallucination-
proneness was only significantly correlated with number of external misattributions 
in the temporal stimulation condition, but not the other conditions; however, the 
difference between the correlation coefficients did not reach significance. 
Interestingly, the propensity to make errors in the opposite direction (hear to imagine 
errors) was only negatively associated with hallucination-proneness in the sham 
stimulation condition. Further, this correlation coefficient was significantly different 
to that observed in the two active stimulation conditions. This might indicate that 
amPFC stimulation (the electrode position common to both active stimulation 
conditions) affected the tendency of hallucination-prone participants not to make 
internal misattributions. This finding might suggest that activity in the right 
prefrontal cortex may play a role, specifically in hallucination-prone individuals, in 
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the classification of externally generated stimulus as external. However, future 
research, with larger sample sizes (therefore with greater statistical power) should 
aim to test whether stimulation can affect performance differently in groups who 
report higher and lower levels of hallucination-proneness. 
4.4. Limitations and future research 
Although the use of tDCS allows inferences into the causal role of brain areas in 
specific cognitive processes, it also suffers from a number of weaknesses. The 
present study used 25cm
2
 electrodes, which, although typical for tDCS studies, limits 
the spatial resolution of the technique to relatively large cortical regions. Although 
there was no effect of stimulation on reality monitoring task performance, it cannot 
be ruled out that stimulation of multiple cortical regions under each electrode 
cancelled out any hypothesized effect of stimulation. For example, different regions 
within the medial prefrontal cortex are known to be associated with different aspects 
of memory, emotion and attention, at a fine spatial scale (Gilbert, Henson, & 
Simons, 2010). Research coupling neurostimulation and neuroimaging methods such 
as fMRI are needed to study the precise effects of tDCS during source memory, and 
could also be used to investigate potential inter-individual differences in the effects 
of stimulation (such as between individuals scoring high and low in proneness to 
hallucinations, or in clinical and non-clinical groups who experience regular 
hallucinations). 
It should also be noted that this study only suggests that prefrontal and superior 
temporal regions may not be crucial in encoding information relating to the source of 
perceptual stimuli. Future research should also examine the role of these areas in the 
retrieval of source information, especially the amPFC, which has previously been 
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shown to be active during the retrieval of source information (Simons, Gilbert, 
Owen, Fletcher, & Burgess, 2005). A future study could therefore replicate the 
present study, but applying tDCS during the recall stage of the task. It is possible, for 
example, that stimulation of the left STG during retrieval could modulate the 
perceptual detail associated with recalled words, rather than encoded words. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Overall, the present study showed few discernible effects of prefrontal and/or 
superior temporal stimulation on source memory performance. The study replicated 
previous findings which have emphasized the importance of information relating to 
perceptual vividness in source judgements. Stimulation of the left STG was 
associated with reduced accuracy in estimating task performance, suggesting that 
participants’ ability to metacognitively assess performance was impaired by 
increased excitability of the STG, despite no differences in reality monitoring task 
performance. There were some differences in the associations between self-reported 
hallucination-proneness and task performance between the different stimulation 
conditions used, although these should be treated with caution until further research 
specifically investigates these issues. 
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
The previous six chapters have investigated some of the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms associated with hallucinations in a non-clinical sample. This chapter 
will provide an overview of the thesis, consider the implications of its findings and 
problematic issues arising from the empirical studies conducted, and discuss future 
avenues for research in the area. 
 
1. Summary of findings 
Chapter 1 provided a review of the most prominent cognitive neuroscientific model 
of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), discussing the evidence that some AVHs 
may occur when inner speech is misattributed to an external source, due to atypical 
self- or source monitoring processes, and concluding that there is relatively strong 
evidence for this model. The review provided an outline of a number of cognitive 
tasks often used to assess self- or source monitoring, atypical performance on which 
has been associated with AVHs (see Chapter 1, Table 1.1). Recent research into the 
use of neurostimulation techniques as a treatment option for AVHs was also 
discussed, and it was argued that, if effective, neurostimulation to the left posterior 
superior temporal gyrus/temporoparietal junction (STG/TPJ) may affect processes 
involved in the monitoring of inner speech. 
Chapter 3, using an auditory signal detection task, showed that auditory verbal 
imagery affected task performance only in hallucination-prone individuals, 
suggesting that they may struggle to monitor internally generated signals. Chapter 4, 
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using hierarchical regression, showed that a number of different variables such as 
inner speech phenomenology and performance on reality discrimination tasks, 
accounted for unique variance when predicting hallucination-proneness. Chapters 5 
and 6 investigated the neural basis of performance on tasks that required participants 
to distinguish between self- and non-self-generated information, showing that 
modulating the excitability in left STG affected performance on an auditory signal 
detection task, but not on a reality monitoring task. 
Taken as a whole, this thesis has addressed three issues. Firstly, previous research 
has tended to assume that a number of cognitive tasks aimed at assessing self-/source 
monitoring measure a single underlying cognitive mechanism, which may not be the 
case. Secondly, the extent to which these tasks relate to inner speech models of 
AVHs is questionable, and, as such, studies in this thesis have aimed to directly test 
inner speech or auditory imagery, and its relation to AVHs. Thirdly, very few studies 
have tested the cognitive neuroscientific mechanisms thought to underlie AVHs 
using neurostimulation techniques, limiting the types of inferences that can be made 
about the role of specific cortical regions, and limiting knowledge of the effects of 
neurostimulation on self-monitoring. This chapter will take these themes in turn, 
focusing on how the empirical studies in the thesis have progressed the field by 
addressing these issues. 
 
2. Source monitoring, reality discrimination and self-monitoring 
A number of terms are used to describe how a self-generated event, such as inner 
speech, may be misattributed to an external source. For example, previous studies 
have used tasks aimed at assessing reality monitoring (a sub-category of source 
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monitoring), reality discrimination, and self-monitoring. These are typically 
associated with performance on different tasks – reality monitoring is often tested 
using a source memory paradigm (Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991), reality 
discrimination using an auditory signal detection task (Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de 
Haan, & Kahn, 2003), and self-monitoring using tasks requiring the participant to 
distinguish between the results of movements performed by themselves and by an 
external stimulus (Williams & Happé, 2009) (see Table 4.1, Chapter 4 for an 
overview of these terms). Although these tasks differ in a number of ways (whether 
they require online/offline decisions, whether they involve the participant in inner 
speech, overt speech, or a bodily movement, whether they are analysed using signal 
detection theory), they are often assumed to reflect one mechanism which, when 
dysfunctional/biased, can lead to the external misattribution of internal mental 
events. 
The results presented in this thesis, however, do not support such a simplistic view. 
For example, Chapter 4 showed that, in a non-clinical sample, lower response biases 
on a signal detection task were associated with hallucination-proneness, whilst 
performance on an internal source monitoring task was not. Performance on a self-
monitoring task, however, was positively associated with hallucination-proneness. 
This suggests that the different tasks do not index one underlying mechanism. 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 indicated that false alarm responses on a signal detection 
task were affected by modulation of excitability of the left STG, whereas Chapter 6 
indicated that performance on a reality monitoring task was not affected by the level 
of excitability in left STG during encoding. Based on these results, it seems unlikely 
that the two tasks both draw on the same neural mechanisms in the superior temporal 
lobe (although this says nothing of potential overlap in other areas of the brain). 
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These studies suggest, therefore, that a more complex and multi-faceted approach is 
needed to explain how internal processes may become misattributed to external 
sources, as in AVHs. A similar point has also been made in the study of agency by 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008), who argue that most accounts of the sense 
of agency do not distinguish between the ‘feeling’ and the ‘judgement’ of agency. 
They argue that the feeling of agency probably relates to lower level cognitive 
processes (including efference copy mechanisms outlined in this thesis), and is a 
relatively automatic process consisting of little conscious evaluation. The judgement 
of agency, meanwhile, relates to higher level evaluative processes, including 
decision-making biases and conscious evaluation. The results presented in this thesis 
may indicate that a similar approach would be useful when discussing the source 
monitoring, reality discrimination and self-monitoring literature.  
One possibility is that self-monitoring tasks represent lower level mechanisms based 
on motor processes, such as efference copy mechanisms, whereas measures such as 
the jumbled speech task used in Chapter 4 represent higher level decision-making 
biases which are not necessarily linked to the motor system. This would be 
consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, which showed that self-monitoring 
performance was positively associated with hallucination-proneness. As discussed, it 
is possible that a bias in higher level decision-making processes may be associated 
with non-clinical hallucination-proneness, but this only develops into the more 
frequent experiences associated with psychosis when the self-monitoring/efference 
copy system is also dysfunctional. It is unclear, however, whether reality 
discrimination tasks such as the auditory signal detection task used in this thesis 
draw on these higher or lower level processes (or both). This could be investigated 
by testing the involvement of lower level motor processes in reality discrimination 
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tasks. Such a study could, for example, test whether reality discrimination biases are 
affected by arresting motor activity, by requiring the participant to complete a signal 
detection task that requires simultaneous use of the mouth (such as chewing gum, or 
holding a pencil in the mouth; Reisberg et al., 1989). If such a manipulation affected 
response biases on this task, this would indicate that low level motor processes are 
involved in false perceptions in signal detection. If not, this might indicate that 
higher level decision making biases underlie differential task performance in 
hallucination-prone individuals. 
 
3. Inner speech models of AVH 
Another problematic aspect of previous research into AVHs is that it often purports 
to be testing inner speech models, despite the fact that the tasks used do not engage 
the participant in inner speech or auditory verbal imagery. As such, the assumption is 
made that, for example, speaking aloud uses the same or similar cognitive and neural 
mechanisms as inner speech. The studies in this thesis have all engaged the 
participant in auditory verbal imagery (Chapters 3 and 6), assessed participants’ 
experience of inner speech (Chapter 4), or stimulated cortical regions that have 
previously been shown to be involved in inner speech (Chapters 5 and 6). The results 
from these studies provide evidence that 1) a tendency to use dialogic inner speech is 
associated with hallucination-proneness (consistent with the findings of McCarthy-
Jones et al., 2011), 2) use of auditory verbal imagery leads to a lower response bias 
on signal detection tasks in hallucination-prone individuals, and 3) stimulating left 
STG, an area previously shown to be overactive in individuals with a diagnosis of 
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schizophrenia during inner speech (Simons et al., 2010) leads to a higher rate of false 
perceptions in a signal detection task. 
However, a relatively small amount of research has investigated the precise cognitive 
or neural mechanisms involved in false perceptions on auditory signal detection 
paradigms. One study, carried out by Vercammen and Aleman (2010), showed that 
semantic priming increased the number of false perceptions in a signal detection 
task. The authors suggested that this reflected aberrant top-down processing in 
hallucination-prone individuals, in which prior expectations were too highly 
weighted. This is consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 3 (Experiment 2), 
which showed that cuing hallucination-prone participants with a sentence on a signal 
detection task led to a lower response bias. However, our findings indicated that 
rather than simply being an effect of semantic expectation, this was dependent on the 
concurrent use of auditory verbal imagery. Therefore, this finding is equally 
consistent with the explanation that false alarms on auditory signal detection tasks 
reflect external misattributions of internal mental imagery. Alternatively, it is 
possible that these seemingly different types of explanation can be subsumed under a 
broader framework of predictive coding (see Wilkinson, 2014, and below). 
The findings in this thesis not only provide support for inner speech models of 
AVHs, using tasks with more relevance to inner speech, but also highlight that it is 
possible to study inner experience in an experimental setting. This opens the door to 
numerous options for future studies. One outstanding question for inner speech 
models is why some instances of inner speech may become misattributed, but not 
others. Building on the findings of Chapter 3, this could be addressed by 
manipulating the type of inner speech that participants are asked to use (e.g., dialogic 
vs. monologic, first/second/third person, in another’s voice vs. one’s own voice) 
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whilst completing signal detection tasks, and observing the extent to which each type 
had an effect on response biases. Based on the studies investigating the 
phenomenology of AVHs (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012; Nayani & David, 1996), it 
might be predicted that inner speech in another’s voice, of a dialogic quality, and in 
the second or third person, would be most likely to become misattributed. 
 
4. Neurostimulation and AVHs 
A key issue raised in Chapter 1 related to the use of neurostimulation as a treatment 
option for AVHs. Chapter 5 indicated that modulating the level of excitability of the 
left posterior STG using cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
affected the number of false alarm responses on an auditory signal detection task 
Since the publication of Chapters 1 and 5, new evidence has been published 
suggesting that cathodal tDCS to the left STG may reduce AVH frequency, with a 
concurrent improvement in source monitoring ability (Mondino, Haesebaert, Poulet, 
Suaud-Chagny & Brunelin, in press), and also affect the N1 ERP response to self-
produced vocalisations (thought to be related to efference copy mechanisms) 
(Nawani et al., 2014). These findings provide support for one argument made in 
Chapter 1: that the therapeutic effect of neurostimulation may result from the role of 
the left STG in monitoring inner speech. However, the findings of Mondino et al. are 
not consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 4 or 6. This is because the task 
they used was an internal source monitoring task, in which participants receiving 
daily tDCS were asked to complete a task in which they had to recall whether they 
had spoken or imagined a word. The data presented in Chapter 4 suggested that this 
type of source monitoring task was not associated with proneness to hallucinations. 
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Furthermore, Chapter 6 suggested that performance on reality monitoring tasks 
(requiring the participant to recall whether they imagined or heard a word) were not 
affected by modulating excitability of the left STG. One possibility is that, rather 
than reflecting an underlying mechanism of AVHs, biased performance on internal 
source monitoring tasks actually results from the frequent voice-hearing experiences 
associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and that the therapeutic effect of tDCS 
of reducing the frequency of AVHs in fact causes the improvement in internal source 
monitoring (rather than vice versa). Another possibility is that discontinuities 
between hallucinatory experiences assessed by the self-report scales used in this 
thesis and those experienced by patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (or other 
psychotic disorders) are reflected in differences in performance on internal source 
monitoring. Future studies should aim to compare performance on this type of task 
between patient groups that do or do not hallucinate, and non-clinical samples that 
report differing levels of hallucination-proneness. 
 
5. Theoretical and conceptual implications 
One framework that may be useful in explaining such cognitive mechanisms is the 
predictive coding framework (PCF, sometimes also referred to as the ‘predictive 
processing framework’, or PPF), a Bayesian approach that assumes that much (if not 
all) of what the brain does is aimed at predicting subsequent incoming information 
and then minimising the error associated with these predictions (see Clark, 2013, and 
Hohwy, 2014, for reviews). Two papers have specifically attempted to use a PCF 
approach to explain AVHs (and other positive symptoms of schizophrenia). Fletcher 
and Frith (2009) link excessive dopaminergic activity to atypical precision weighting 
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(that is, how much weight prediction errors are given in shaping further predictions), 
speculating that this may lead to the formation and persistence of delusional beliefs, 
as well as AVHs. More recently, Wilkinson (2014) has applied the PCF to specific 
models of AVHs, including inner speech models. The PCF might predict that the 
main difference between self- and non-self-generated actions would be higher 
precision weighting attached to error associated with self-generated actions (since 
the predictions should be more precise). Activation in sensory cortical areas would 
typically reflect prediction error – hence, activation in these areas is typically 
attenuated in response to self-generated actions. Atypical weighting of prediction 
error could therefore lead to high levels of sensory cortical activity (i.e., a small 
amount of error may be highly weighted), and potentially the misattribution (or 
misperception) of inner speech.  
There are two main implications of this approach to the work discussed in this thesis. 
Firstly, since two studies modulated levels of activity in secondary auditory cortical 
regions using tDCS, it is possible that, viewed through the PCF, this would have the 
effect of increasing the error on sensory predictions. For example, increasing 
excitability in the left STG could lead to a higher level of prediction error on 
incoming sensory information, passed up the hierarchy, with the result being that 
subsequent predictions are altered (for example, regarding the presence or absence of 
a stimuli, as found in Chapter 5). A second implication of this approach is that it 
does not necessarily privilege prediction of the sensory consequences of motor 
actions, since the brain must predict all incoming sensory information. It is therefore 
possible that efference copy models of AVHs (and of self-monitoring in general) can 
be subsumed under the more general PCF, and findings which suggest externalising 
biases are associated with AVHs, even in the absence of self-produced speech (Allen 
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et al., 2004) can be explained in terms of atypical error weighting. The previously 
mentioned study by Vercammen and Aleman (2010), in which semantic expectations 
were found to modulate auditory false perceptions in noise in hallucination-prone 
individuals, can also be explained with reference to high precision weighting. 
Undoubtedly, linking AVHs, inner speech and self-monitoring to the PCF is an area 
ripe for investigation. In particular, exploring the extent to which involvement of the 
motor system is necessary for inner speech and AVHs will help to distinguish 
between traditional self-monitoring and source monitoring theories and a broader 
predictive coding model. On a neural basis, using functional neuroimaging to 
investigate activity in sensory cortices to errors in prediction of both self-generated 
and non-self-generated stimuli, in both hallucinating and non-hallucinating 
individuals, would be one way to test the ideas stemming from the PCF, outlined 
above. 
 
6. Limitations and future research 
The research presented in this thesis has a number of limitations. Some of these have 
already been covered (e.g., limitations of tDCS as a technique, such as lack of spatial 
resolution) and so will not be repeated in this section. One limitation which is worthy 
of discussion, though, relates to the use of a non-clinical sample throughout. The 
research presented has relied heavily on self-report measures of the experiences of 
hallucinations in mainly student samples. Although this has some advantages (lack 
of anti-psychotic medication and other symptoms of psychosis which may confound 
results, as well as the relative ease with which larger samples can be recruited), it 
inevitably brings some limitations to the conclusions that can be made. Johns et al. 
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(2014) have recently explored issues relating to AVHs in persons with and without a 
need for care. They argue that future research should be careful to distinguish 
between individuals that are hallucination-prone (i.e., score highly on self-report 
measures such as used in this thesis), healthy voice-hearers (who experience frequent 
voice-hearing experiences, often assessed by semi-structured interviews, but are not 
distressed or impaired by their experiences; Sommer et al., 2010) and clinical voice-
hearers (often with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder). They 
also suggest that it is useful to distinguish between a continuum of experience 
(between, for example, intrusive mental imagery and more frequent AVHs) and a 
continuum of risk of developing problematic AVH with a need for care. The results 
presented in this thesis provide evidence that, at least with regard to hallucination-
proneness assessed via self-report, the continuum of experience may be linked to 
specific cognitive mechanisms, although they say less about the risk of such 
experiences developing into problematic psychotic experiences.  
Future research should also attempt to link cognitive mechanisms to potential 
discontinuities in experience. For example, an increasingly held view is that there 
may be qualitatively different subtypes of AVHs, which may be associated with 
different underlying cognitive mechanisms (Jones, 2010; McCarthy-Jones et al., 
2014). Inner speech based AVHs, for example, may be based on biased monitoring 
processes, whereas hallucinations best described as ‘hypervigilance’ to the external 
environment (Dodgson & Gordon, 2009; Garwood, Dodgson, Bruce, & McCarthy-
Jones, 2013) could be better explained as a result of biased attentional processes. 
Future research should attempt to explore the extent to which different cognitive 
mechanisms can explain continuities and discontinuities in hallucinatory 
experiences. 
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As such, future research should aim to apply similar methods to hallucinating and 
non-hallucinating individuals, for example with diagnoses of schizophrenia. In 
particular, investigating performance on the tasks used in Chapter 4 in a large 
clinical sample, to determine the extent to which they are independently associated 
with specific symptoms or experiences, should be a priority. It would also be 
predicted that the use of AVI during signal detection (Chapter 3) would have a larger 
effect on hallucinating patients than on non-hallucinating patients, and that the 
therapeutic effect of neurostimulation to the left posterior STG may be associated 
with less biased performance on auditory signal detection tasks. 
Another limitation relates to the use of signal detection theory (SDT) to analyse task 
performance. Although SDT is crucial in distinguishing between patterns of 
performance due to response bias and differing sensitivity, it relies on a number of 
assumptions, which cannot be directly tested within the current data. For example, 
SDT calculations assume normality of the signal and noise distributions, as well as 
equality of signal and noise standard deviations; to test these assumptions, a task is 
required which allows participants to give confidence ratings on each trial. Most 
previous studies which apply SDT to the study of hallucinations have not used this 
measure, with a notable exception being Vercammen, de Haan, and Aleman (2008). 
However, these authors do not present any analyses of whether the SDT assumptions 
were met. Future research should address this issue by using a task that asks the 
participants for confidence ratings after each trial. 
One clear avenue for future research would also be to combine the relative strengths 
of neurostimulation and neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI. For example, a 
study which concurrently used tDCS and fMRI whilst the participant performed an 
auditory signal detection task would allow inferences to be made regarding cortical 
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regions (and the interaction between them) other than those directly underneath the 
stimulating electrodes. It might be predicted that, as well as changes in activity levels 
in the left posterior STG, primary auditory cortical regions in the anterior STG, and 
perhaps anterior cingulate regions implicated in self-/reality monitoring, would be 
affected. An important analysis would also be to investigate the possible effects of 
tDCS on functional connectivity, particularly between frontal and temporal regions, 
during both auditory signal detection and source memory. Similarly, combining 
tDCS and EEG would allow investigation into the effect of left STG stimulation on 
event-related potentials (such as the N1 response thought to be associated with the 
efference copy mechanism), as well as cortical oscillations which may reflect 
synchronous activity between brain regions (Ford, Roach, Faustman, & Mathalon, 
2008). 
Finally, a relatively new technique, transcranial alternating current stimulation 
(tACS), may be a promising tool to investigate the role of cortical oscillations in 
cognitive functions (Ali, Sellers, & Fröhlich, 2013). tACS is capable of enhancing or 
interfering with the frequency of cortical oscillations (Antal & Paulus, 2013), 
thereby allowing inferences into the importance of certain oscillatory patterns in 
specific cognitive functions. This is of particular interest to the study of AVHs, since 
it has been hypothesized that typical efference copy/corollary discharge function 
may be reflected in synchronized oscillatory activity between cortical regions. For 
example, Ford et al. (2008) showed that synchronous oscillatory activity in the beta 
and gamma bands over sensory-motor cortex was lower in patients with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia (not specific to those who hallucinated) before a self-generated 
action, compared to healthy controls. Gamma band synchrony was interpreted as 
reflecting efference copy signals, which were dysfunctional in the patient group. 
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Future research could therefore test this hypothesis further by selectively entraining 
or interfering with oscillatory activity to test for an effect on self-monitoring. It 
would be predicted that enhancing gamma band synchrony in motor cortical regions 
using tACS would improve self-monitoring performance (whereas interfering may 
have the opposite effect). 
 
7. Conclusions 
The four experimental chapters in this thesis have provided evidence that a number 
of variables, relating to inner speech usage and phenomenology, reality 
discrimination and self-monitoring, are associated with proneness to hallucinations 
in a non-clinical sample. Although previous research has tended to assume that 
different tasks are related to one underlying process, results have generally indicated 
that this would be an over-simplification and may not be the case. Two experimental 
studies also modulated activity in frontal and temporal cortical regions using 
neurostimulation. These studies showed that increasing excitability in the left 
posterior superior temporal gyrus affected the number of auditory false perceptions 
on a signal detection (reality discrimination) task, but did not affect performance on 
a source memory (reality monitoring) task. Areas for future research are outlined, 
including using a wider variety of cognitive neuroscientific techniques to study inner 
speech and self-/reality monitoring, as well as extending the use of the paradigms to 
clinical populations. 
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Appendix 1 – eligibility criteria for neurostimulation 
 
Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit 
 Wolfson Research institute 
 University of Durham, Queen’s Campus tel:  0191 334 0430 
 University Boulevard fax: 0191 334 0452 
 Thornaby amanda.ellison@durham.ac.uk 
 Stockton-on-Tees 
 TS17 6BH  
Subject Questionnaire 
If you agree to take part in this study, please answer the following questions. The information you 
provide is for screening purposes only and will be kept completely confidential. 
 
Have you ever suffered from any neurological or psychiatric conditions?   YES/NO 
If YES please give details (nature of condition, duration, current medication, etc). 
 
 
Have you ever suffered from epilepsy, febrile convulsions in infancy or had recurrent fainting  
spells?           YES/NO 
 
Does anyone in your immediate or distant family suffer from epilepsy?   YES/NO 
If YES please state your relationship to the affected family member.  
 
 
Do you suffer from any skin allergies e.g. rash, eczema?     YES/NO 
 
Have you ever undergone a neurosurgical procedure (including eye surgery)?  YES/NO 
If YES please give details. 
 
 
Do you currently have any of the following fitted to your body?    YES/NO 
i) Heart pacemaker 
ii) Cochlear implant 
iii) Medication pump 
iv) Surgical clips 
 
Are you currently taking any unprescribed or prescribed medication, including anti-malarials.  
If YES please give details.        YES/NO 
 
 
Are you left or right handed?       LEFT/RIGHT 
 
Subject Consent 
I (please give full name in CAPITALS)__________________________confirm that I have read the 
letter of invitation and have completed the above questionnaire. I confirm that I am not taking 
recreational drugs and have not participated in a TMS/tDCS/tACS experiment already today and feel 
well rested. The nature, purpose and possible consequence of the procedures involved have been 
explained. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Signature__________________________ Date_________________________________ 
 
Please note: All data arising from this study will be held and used in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1984). The 
results of the study will not be made available in a way which could reveal the identity of individuals. 
